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Making Sense of Complex Systems:  The Case of 9/11 
 
Sandra M. Cooper  
ABSTRACT 
  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks attributed the 
September 11 attacks on the U.S. homeland to the terrorists’ exploitation of “deep 
institutional failings.”  These findings are similar to the conclusions of the Presidential 
Commission investigating the 1986 Challenger accident and the Columbia Accident 
Investigative Board (2003).   Generally Commissions aim to provide the fullest 
possible account of events contributing to the catastrophe under investigation and to 
identify lessons learned, but avoid specifying responsibility and accountability.  For 
this reason, various commission reports have been criticized for being abstract and 
shallow.  These criticisms make a valid point.  How commissions make sense of 
failures has real consequences in terms of preventing reoccurrences.  If these 
accounts do not satisfactorily address the question, How did this happen?, clear 
prophylactic measures for the future also remain unspecified.  This dissertation calls 
into question the usefulness of current constructions of system failure that focus 
solely on the abstract role of the institution or system in creating the conditions for 
failure.  For the purpose of acquiring insight into our current narratives of system 
failure and accountability, the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts are analyzed.  This 
research is a qualitative textual analysis of excerpts from the Transcripts related to 
both pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability.  Using Weick’s view of 
sensemaking to gain a better understanding of our current constructions of system 
failure/resilience and accountability, this research identifies the dominant 
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constructions of  pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability that are 
documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts and the sensemaking resources 
that reinforce and solidify these constructions.  Verbatim excerpts from the 9/11 
documents are included to support claims.  The theory of autopoiesis, a form of 
systems theory, is introduced as an alternative resource for constructing narratives 
on system-environment relationships and accountability.  Leadership practices that 
foster system resilience and individual accountability for system-wide performance 
are presented.       
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CHAPTER ONE 
MAKING SENSE OF COMPLEX SYSTEM FAILURE 
 On September 11, 2001, four U.S. planes hijacked by terrorists crashed into 
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field near Shanksville, a small town in 
Pennsylvania.  The loss from these attacks was staggering.  Within a few hours 
nearly 3,000 people died, an estimated 1,609 people lost a spouse or a partner, and 
approximately 3,051 children lost one or both of their parents. Twenty per cent of 
Americans, it is estimated, knew someone hurt or killed in the attacks (“9/11 by the 
Numbers,” 2005, para. 2, 19-21).  On 9/11/2001, in a matter of minutes, millions of 
lives were irreversibly altered. 
 The magnitude of the devastation unleashed by the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States remains incomprehensible.  What is more, the lack of 
mobilization to the frequent, although fragmentary, threats to the U.S. homeland 
before 9/11 continues to be difficult to understand:     
In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat.  
They did not have the direction, and did not have a plan to institute.  The 
borders were not hardened.  Transportation systems were not fortified.  
Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat.  State and 
local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts.  The 
public was not warned. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004, p. 265) 
In the end, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(2004), i.e., the 9/11 Commission, observed, “The terrorists exploited deep 
institutional failings within our government” (p. 265).   
 A similar explanation had previously been constructed by the Presidential 
Commission investigating the 1986 Challenger accident—that is, the “human failures 
behind the [shuttle’s] technical failure” (Tompkins, 1993, p. 127) were “rooted in 
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[the] history” of the problems in communication at the Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986, p. 
120).  Similarly, the Columbia accident, according to the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (2003), was “likely rooted to some degree in NASA’s history and 
the human flight program’s culture” (p. 9).  The findings of these three investigations 
are also similar in that: 
1. Each of the government-appointed Commissions aimed to provide a complete 
and frank account of the events leading up to a catastrophe.   
2. None of the Commissions assigned individual accountability for those events.  
3. All have been criticized for crafting official reports that are abstract, bloodless 
(Tompkins, 1993, p. 128), and shallow, as if organizations weren’t populated by 
human beings “with names, power, and obligations who are charged with making 
[them] work” (Meier, Jones, & Moyers, 2004, para.6).   
Generally, government-appointed Commissions aim to provide the fullest 
possible account of events contributing to the catastrophe under investigation and to 
identify lessons learned, but in the interest of not engaging in a blame game, they 
typically avoid specifying responsibility and accountability.  For this reason, various 
commission reports have been criticized for being abstract and shallow.  These 
criticisms make a valid point.  How commissions make sense of failures has real 
consequences in terms of preventing reoccurrences.  If these accounts, in the end, 
do not satisfactorily address the question How did this happen?, clear prophylactic 
measures for the future also remain unspecified.   
 In light of the national need to have measures for preventing large scale 
system failures similar to those on September 11, 2001, this dissertation calls into 
question the usefulness of retrospective constructions of system failure that do not 
take into account that small changes in a system can also lead, over a period of 
time, to large-scale consequences.  This is often referred to as the butterfly effect—
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that is, “a butterfly stirring the air today in Beijing can cause a storm in New York 
next month” (Capra, 1996, p. 134).  Similarly, we have painfully learned how 
seemingly non-consequential decisions such as flying a shuttle with minutely eroded 
O-rings can lead to a catastrophic accident.  When only systems are held responsible 
for performance, as is the case in the official reports on the Challenger and Columbia 
accidents and 9/11, the relationship between individual actions and system 
performance is evasive, creating the potential for inaction, ineffectiveness, and 
inadequate performance (Connors, Smith, & Hickman, 1994, p. 23).   
This dissertation analyzes the retrospective sensemaking of the events 
leading to September 11 that is documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, 
for the purpose of acquiring insight into our current narratives of system failure and 
identifying alternative narratives for expressing system accountability and system 
resilience.  Historically, system performance and accountability have been dispersed 
throughout organizations, as a result of division of labor and specialization of 
knowledge and skills.  Under these circumstances, each individual is accountable for 
achieving the precise goals of his or her position.  This approach to organizations, 
work, and accountability is most effective when the environment is stable enough to 
ensure that the routine, standardized performance of individuals is summative and 
cumulatively attains organizational goals.  Traditionally, our understanding of system 
performance and accountability has assumed a stable, predictable environment.     
Now that we are immersed in an age of technology that enables complex 
global interdependencies, including events such as international terrorism, one of the 
major challenges facing organizations is to generate fresh ideas and approaches to 
understanding and fostering accountability in complex, dynamic environments.  One 
possibility is a definition of accountability that aims for a pervasive sense of 
responsibility and ownership for the survival and success of the whole system, as 
well as for one’s own job.  From this holistic perspective, each individual is 
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accountable for achieving the goals of the system.  This requires all individuals to 
look beyond their jobs and be keenly aware of how their work interacts with the work 
of others to achieve the mission of the whole organization, what Weick and Roberts 
(1993) called heedful interrelating.  In the absence of this sort of accountability, 
there is a breakdown of “the nervous system that [connects] the brain to the 
muscles” (Tompkins, 1993, p. 61), that is, communication that fosters system 
resilience.       
The 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts are artifacts of sensemaking processes 
that reverberate with themes of accountability, and its breakdowns. After 9/11, the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States was established to 
“investigate ‘facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001’” (National Commission, 2004, p. xv), twelve public hearings were 
conducted, testimonies were transcribed and released to the public, and a report was 
issued.  Using Weick’s view of sensemaking (1979, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005), I aim to reveal the communication beliefs and practices that inform 
the constructions of institutional failure and accountability in the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts.  By examining our current narratives, I aim to discover opportunities for 
constructing new distinctions and descriptions that contribute to our understanding 
of the kinds of accountability that foster organizational resilience.  A new, systemic 
model, autopoietic systems, is presented and tested as an alternative descriptor for 
system resilience and accountability.   
Systems Thinking 
 The remainder of this chapter offers systems thinking as a useful theoretical 
framework for researching large scale organizational failure/resilience and 
accountability.  First, systems thinking is presented as an alternative approach to 
understanding contemporary organizational issues.  Second, the theory and 
language of systems theory that are relevant to this project are explored.  Third, 
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systems thinking is presented as a framework for assessing and influencing system 
resilience.  Fourth, an approach to accountability that is grounded in systems 
thinking is presented.  Autopoiesis, a form of systems theory, offers a new image of 
accountability, one that redefines traditional management practices.  This section 
concludes with a look at this new image of organizational relationships.  Excerpts 
from Tompkins’s (1993, 2005) studies of organizational communication at the 
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama during the Apollo era (1960s) 
and after the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia accidents, as well as related 
reports (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Presidential Commission, 
1986), are used to illustrate systems concepts that offer new ways of considering 
organizational performance and accountability.     
Understanding 21st Century Organizational Issues 
 Since the end of the 18th century, the major tenets of the Renaissance, 
Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment have shaped the lives of the 
Western world; these include atomism, reductionism, mechanism, 
anthropomorphism, instrumentality, standardization, bureaucratization, 
centralization, universal principles, and a privileging of the masculine.  Table 1 is my 
summary of this mode of thought and its influence on the research and practices of 
modern organizations (Carey, 1989; Cobb, 1926; Eisler, 1987; Morgan, 1997; 
Spretnak, 1997).  
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Table 1 
The influence of traditional science on organizational research and practice
Research  Mechanistic mode of  
 
thought 
 
Application of mechanistic 
 
thinking to organizations  
 
What phenomena do we  
 
observe and study?    
 
A set of mechanistic  
 
relations:  Relations  
 
between clearly defined  
 
parts that have some  
 
determinate order.   
 
Use of labor, machines,  
 
materials,  instruments,  
 
and tools (e.g., tasks,  
 
roles, goals) that have  
 
been invented to aid in  
 
attaining a goal. 
 
 
How is effectiveness  
 
defined? 
 
Machine-like operations. 
 
Rationalized, efficient,  
 
reliable, operations.  
 
 
Where do we target 
 
interventions?   
 
Routinize and mechanize   
 
human thought and  
 
action.  
 
The division,  
 
specialization, and  
 
standardization of  
 
machinery, materials,  
 
instruments, tools, and  
 
labor.   
 
What are indicators of  
 
success?   
 
Prediction and control; the  
 
ordering of our lives; the  
 
advancement of  
 
civilization.     
 
 
Political, economic, and  
 
religious power, control,  
 
and influence.   
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Traditional mechanistic approaches to organizations are effective:   
(a) when there is a straightforward task to perform; (b) when the 
environment is stable enough to ensure that the products produced will be 
appropriate ones; (c) when one wishes to produce exactly the same product 
time and again; (d) when precision is at a premium; and (e) when the human 
“machine” parts are compliant and behave as they have been designed to do. 
(Morgan, 1997, p. 27)   
Conversely, mechanistically structured organizations have difficulty responding 
effectively to the continuous social, economic, and technological changes of the 21st 
century.  Mechanistic structures that are ill-suited for dynamic environments include 
pre-determined goals, highly-specialized functional divisions, hierarchical levels, and 
task-based position descriptions (Morgan, 1997, pp. 28-29):   
1. Performance that is guided by predetermined goals is not easily shifted to 
response patterns that would effectively address changes in the environment. 
2. Functional silos and hierarchical levels often contribute to distortions in 
information and delays in coordinated responses to unfamiliar situations.   
3. Highly specialized functional divisions and hierarchical levels foster myopic 
views and unilateral actions that often undercut the responsiveness of other 
functional areas, or the whole organization (e.g., when budget decisions 
heedlessly debilitate an organization’s training, health and safety, and 
security functions).  
4. The precise position descriptions found in most hierarchical organizations 
encourage many organizational members to ignore the unfamiliar and “adopt 
mindless, unquestioning attitudes such as ‘it’s not my job to worry about 
that,’ ‘that’s his responsibility, not mine,’ or ‘I’m here to do what I’m told’” 
(Morgan, 1997, pp. 28-30). 
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Although many contemporary organizational theorists and others have argued 
that the concepts of mechanism are inadequate to deal with our globally 
interconnected world (Eisler, 1987; Morgan, 1997; Spretnak, 1997; Wheatley, 
1994), most of Western culture continues to subscribe to them.  People rely on these 
old vocabularies because they are not yet fluent in new ones.  This is most evident in 
our modern organizations. Challenging us to reshape our current worldview, 
advocates of systems thinking offer new ways of considering organizational issues, 
such as chaos/order, control/autonomy, structures, information management, 
planning, prediction (Wheatley, 1994, p. ix).  The traditional way of thinking has 
been called mechanistic, reductionistic, and atomistic.  Conversely, systems thinking 
focuses on the whole, connections, relationships, and context, and has been called 
holistic, organismic, and ecological.   
The Theory and Language of Systems Thinking 
System failures have predominantly been attributed to institutional, historical, 
and cultural failings.  If, however, we acquire a deeper understanding of how both 
individuals and the system are accountable for system failure, strategies for building 
system resilience can be enhanced.  A theoretical framework that supports this 
definition of accountability and system resilience is autopoiesis, a form of systems 
theory.  This theory:   
1. Focuses on “organization and its dynamics, based on the ’triggering’ effects of 
information transmission” (Buckley, 1967, pp. 1-2).   
2. Privileges the relationship of the system with its environment.  
3. Relates communication processes and system resilience.  
4. Provides a theoretical framework for system assessment, prediction, and 
interventions. 
This section reviews four systems theory concepts that are relevant to this project.  
Conceptualized as autopoietic systems of communication, social systems can, and 
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must, reinvent themselves.  Meaning and resonance explain the role of 
communication in system/environment interconnections, learning, and system 
resilience.  Requisite variety provides a theoretical framework for strengthening a 
system’s ability to respond to dynamic environments.  Collectively, these concepts 
from systems theory provide a communication framework for assessing, predicting, 
and preventing system failure.   
Autopoietic Systems 
 Concepts of organismic biological systems have been applied to social 
systems (Buckley, 1967; Capra, 1996; Luhmann, 1990; McWhinney, 1993; Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Wheatley, 1994).  Whereas living systems operate in the 
medium of life, social systems operate in the medium of conversation (Luhmann, 
1990).  In addition to being characterized as systems, living and social systems are 
specifically characterized as open systems; they each engage in interchanges with 
the environment in order to maintain system viability (Buckley, 1967, p. 50).  
Whereas living systems characteristically work to maintain their genetically given 
structures within fairly defined limits (homeostasis), higher level social systems are 
characterized primarily by their morphogenic properties (Buckley, 1967, pp. 4-5).  
Rather than preserve a given, fixed structure, social systems adapt through growth, 
development, change, and continuous learning; that is, they create, elaborate, or 
change structures in order to remain viable as ongoing systems (Buckley, 1967, p. 
5).  However, while continuously reinventing themselves, they also continue to 
maintain the integrity of their structures and continue to be recognizable as 
themselves.  This developmental process is called autopoiesis, from the Greek word 
for self reproduction.  
 Reproduction, as Luhmann (1990) points out, is a production of products.  
The medium of social systems is communication; consequently, a social system is an 
autopoietic system of communication that, in a recursive network of communication, 
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not only constructs its own unity, structure, and communication, but also can learn 
and change itself through its communication.   
           The self organizing principle of autopoietic social systems can be illustrated 
by the various configurations of family in our society:  We have married and 
unmarried couples; biological, adopted, step, and foster children; heterosexual and 
same sex parents and partners; and single-parent, two-parent, and extended 
families.  However it is configured, a family does not exist until people come 
together, assume roles, and begin to interact.  Over time those interactions lead the 
participants to seek definition about their relationship, that is, what they are trying 
to do, and are capable of doing, together.  This is the self organizing process of 
autopoietic systems; in a recursive network of communication, the system constructs 
its unity, structure, and communication.   
           Autopoietic systems can also learn and change themselves.  Continue to 
consider, as an example, certain family systems.  The children grow older, go to 
school, and engage in academic and extracurricular activities.  Some graduate, some 
marry, some have their own children.  Each conscious or unconscious choice made 
along the way by the members of the family is some kind of real-time re-
organization for that family system—for example, who is in the family and what they 
do together; the formal and informal roles that the members assume; the quantity, 
forms, and content of family interactions; and the quality of relationships among 
family members. On a daily basis, these unique interactions constitute, maintain, 
perpetuate, and characterize the family.  This year, for example, my family is in the 
process of reorganizing (i.e., reinventing) itself as my daughter transitions from 
middle school to high school and I temporarily shift from full-time employee to full-
time graduate student.  These are significant reconstructions of major pieces of our 
lives; as a result, how much time we spend together, how we use that time, the 
distribution of household responsibilities, and so forth are being renegotiated in day-
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to-day, formal and informal conversations.  Consciously and unconsciously, through 
our interrelated words, meanings, and actions, my daughter and I not only construct 
a unity and structure for our family system, we also change it.  At the same time, we 
also fundamentally remain recognizable as the Cooper family.  In larger systems 
such as universities, government agencies, and Fortune 500 companies, autopoiesis 
is harder to see, as large organizations often appear as powerful super realities 
imposed on their members.  To the contrary, it is the daily interactions within a 
system, whatever its size, that creates and maintains the system’s reality.     
 Carey’s (1989) discussion of the ritual view of communication aligns with the 
conceptualization of social systems as autopoietic systems of communication that 
create, maintain, and perpetuate themselves.  Viewed as rituals, communication is a 
pattern of actions or words with some regularity and preciseness that reinforces 
social cohesion and the maintenance of society.  A newspaper, for example, portrays 
and confirms particular views of the world.  As such, it offers form, order, and tone 
to life.  It does not describe the world, but rather portrays multiple views of it and 
“invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often vicariously, social roles 
within it” (p. 21).  Through portrayal, invitation, and reader participation, the 
newspaper contributes to the creation, maintenance, and perpetuation of particular 
views of the world (p. 33).  A newspaper is one of countless human-made objects 
that serve to perpetuate (or contest) our understanding of the world.  Other 
examples include novels, plays, art, events, customs, and traditions.  Organizational 
examples include vision, values, and mission statements; policies and procedures; 
bulletin boards; and parking spaces.  Examples also include the communication that 
Tompkins (1993) identifies as the essence of organizations—upward communication, 
downward communication, face-to-face communication, mediated communication, 
and decentralized and centralized communication (pp. 17-28).  In this way, a social 
system is an autopoietic, recursive network of communications where communication 
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both produces, and is produced by, the system (Berger, 1967; Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1967). 
System/Environment Interconnections:  Meaning and Resonance 
An autopoietic system, by way of recursive networks of communication, 
creates its structure, unity, and communication (Luhmann, 1990) as its members go 
about defining their relationship to one another and identifying what they are 
capable of doing together.  By means of communication, the system and its 
components can be defined; and by process of exclusion, what is not of the system—
the so-called environment—can be identified.   
In practice, however, drawing boundaries between the system and the 
environment is never easy, and system/boundary designations are always fuzzy and 
shifting.  First, the system/environment boundaries are always politically inspired 
and incessantly negotiated.  Similar to a rubber band, the system/environment 
boundary expands and contracts, taking on various shapes, as the boundaries 
(inclusion/exclusion) are continuously negotiated.  Second, none of the members is 
engaged solely with one system as all members participate to some degree in 
multiple systems, processes, and relationships.  With autopoietic systems, there is 
always the question: Who is in (and to what extent), and who is out?   
Although the nature of a system may change with time, the process of 
drawing boundaries remains important.  Considering a university as an example, the 
question is Who is part of the university system?  The university/environment 
boundaries can be drawn so that professors, staff, and students constitute the 
system:  Classes of professors and students, supported by staff, enact a world—that 
is, a recursive system of communication with structure and unity.  Arguments can 
also be made that faculty and staff are in, and students are part of the environment; 
or faculty and students are the system and staff, like vendors, are part of the 
environment.  The status of parents is also muddy:  Are they insiders, or outsiders?  
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The answer is that we can draw the system/environment boundaries however we 
choose.  While there is no right answer to the question What is environment to the 
system?, it is important to recognize that each answer has particular practical 
implications.  A striking example, to return to the family context previously 
discussed, is the instance when a blood relative is rejected by a family as one of its 
members, or vice versa.   
Once we construct or re-construct a boundary, the question How do we relate 
to what is not in the system? must be addressed.  Other questions to consider 
include:  Who is included in the recursive network that is engaged in 
communicatively constituting the system?  Should parts of the designated 
environment be part of the recursive network of communication that is the 
designated system?  Are there times, for example, when the community leadership 
should be designated as part of a state-wide university system, possibly to engage in 
defining the missions of the various universities and their outcomes and services?   
 Once lines have been drawn to distinguish the system from its environment, 
the system produces very selective system/environment interconnections.  Luhmann 
(1990) uses the concepts of meaning and resonance to designate the 
system/environment interplay.  Meaning is the representation of world complexity—
that is, the system’s representations of the environment at any given moment.  
Resonance implies that the resilience of a system is connected to the system’s 
relation to the environment, which in turn is dependent on the system’s 
representations of its environment.  Contrary to the adage seeing is believing, an 
autopoietic system sees, and typically responds to, what it already believes/knows.  
An organization can not be resilient if it does not have the tools to describe the 
environment, a necessary condition to act in a responsive way.       
 Excerpts from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident (Presidential Commission, 1986) can be used to illustrate the 
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concepts of meaning, resonance, the relationship between the two, and system 
stability.  In Chapter V of the Report, “The Contributing Cause of the Accident,” the 
Commission reported how they “sought to identify the human failures behind the 
technical failure” (Tompkins, 1993, p. 127): 
The decision to launch the Challenger [sic] was flawed.  Those who made that 
decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-
rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation  
of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 
degrees Fahrenheit. . . .They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell’s 
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad.  If the 
decision makers had known all the  facts, it is highly unlikely that they would 
have decided to launch on January 28, 1986.  (Presidential Commission, 
1986, p. 82)  
More specifically, the Commission concluded that the decision to launch the 
Challenger was based on “incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a 
conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA 
management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key 
shuttle managers” (Tompkins, 1993, p. 128).  Summarized from a systems 
perspective, the complexity of the situation was inadequately represented 
throughout the system and triggered a faulty response.  When the system’s 
representations or descriptions of its environment are inadequate, system resonance 
is low and system vulnerability is high.  Thus, on January 28, 1986, seven crew 
members on board the Challenger lost their lives.   
 For a system to survive, it must be able “every moment [to] select a new 
state which is different from the previous one” (Luhmann, 1990).  A stable system, 
contrary to popular belief, is not a system that does not change. In short, its 
structures must be capable of continual adaptation, learning, and innovation, which 
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in turn is accomplished by way of “meaning” (Luhmann, 1990), that is, the capacity 
to grasp world complexity at any given moment.   
 Meaning is accomplished through difference technique:  The system acquires 
a grasp on the states and the events that appear to it as information by producing its 
own distinctions and descriptions (Luhmann, 1990, pp. 17-18), that is, its own 
knowledge and communication.  In this way, the system remains dependent on 
autopoiesis; the continuous generation of knowledge/communication determines the 
system’s capacity to react to whatever is environment for it.   
Requisite Variety 
 Difference technique is synonymous with differentiation within the system.  
By system differentiation, the system attempts to reduce the environmental 
complexity by placing a variety of possibilities within the environment and 
determining what works.  This introduces the concept of requisite variety (Conant & 
Ashby, 1970).  The law of requisite variety states:  “The variety within a system 
must be at least as great as the environmental variety against which it is attempting 
to regulate.  Put more succinctly, only variety can regulate variety” (Buckley, 1967, 
p. 495).  Weick (1979) applies the concept of requisite variety to organizations: 
Organizational processes that are applied to equivocal inputs must 
themselves be equivocal.  If a simple process is applied to complicated data, 
then only a small portion of that data will be registered, attended to, and 
made unequivocal.  Most of the input will remain untouched and will remain a 
puzzle to people concerning  what is up and why they are unable to manage  
it. . . . 
The inability of people in organizations to tolerate equivocal processing 
may well be one of the most important reasons why they have trouble.  It is 
their unwillingness to meet equivocality in an equivocal manner that produces 
failure, nonadaptation.  (p. 189) 
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Traditionally, our organizations have been structured to respond to stable 
environments and, as a result, may not have the variety of knowledge and 
experience to survive in dynamic, equivocal environments.  Systems with greater 
complexity (i.e., greater capacity to represent environmental complexity, knowledge) 
have more and different kinds of relationships with their environments.  Recent 
practices suggest that our governing bodies are beginning to recognize the need to 
diversify the input that informs decision making in today’s dynamic, equivocal 
environments.  These practices include the recent re-emergence of town hall 
meetings at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as recruitment 
efforts to attract employees from diverse cultural backgrounds to public service.  
These system/environment interconnections have the potential to produce the 
variety of knowledge, experience, and information in the system that can better 
serve the public.     
 An extreme example of an organization’s effort to enhance its information-
driven decision-making processes is the practice of penetration exercised at the 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama in the 1960s.  
Penetration was the practice of assigning MSFC engineers to contractor plants in 
order to monitor the work of the contractors.  Through penetration, the government 
hoped to become a “smart buyer” (Thompson, 2005, p. 127) when the hardware was 
ready for delivery to NASA.  Tompkins (1993) reports, for example, an incident in 
which the Marshall Center engineers knew more about the problems with the second 
stage of Saturn V than the contractor who built it: 
One such contractor delivered a rocket stage to Huntsville. . . . The Marshall 
personnel quizzed the contractor on the possibility of cracks in the stage.  The 
contractor’s people finally admitted there might be some cracks in it.  How 
many cracks? 
  “Twenty-one,” was the answer. 
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  “No, there are 26 cracks,” asserted an MSFC official. 
 The rocket stage was submitted to an examination and X-rayed.  The 
stage contained twenty-six cracks—along with a few workers’ tools and lunch 
boxes and other debris that shouldn’t have been there. (p. 69) 
 NASA in this case had penetrated the manufacturing organization, observed the 
production processes, monitored workbenches, and quizzed contractor employees.  
Through selective system/environment interconnections and requisite variety, NASA 
(an autopoietic social system) had increased its ability to realize (meaning or 
organizational consciousness) and respond to unanticipated events in the 
environment (environmental resonance or system resilience).   
Assessing and Influencing System Resilience 
The purpose of this research project is understanding, and deterring, large-
scale system failure.  To this end, autopoietic systems are presented as an 
alternative for conceptualizing system accountability and system resilience.  To guide 
research and practice, the theory on autopoietic systems must provide direction on 
the following:  What phenomena do we observe, study, and assess?  How is 
effectiveness defined?  What are relevant interventions, for the purpose of enhancing 
effectiveness?  What are measures of success?  Table 2 is my summary of the 
framework provided by the theory and language of autopoiesis and its application to 
research on social systems.                         
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Table 2 
Application of systems theory to social systems  
 
Research  
 
The language of systems  
 
theory 
 
Application of autopoiesis, 
 
a form of systems theory, 
 
to social systems 
 
 
What phenomena do we  
 
observe and study?   
 
Autopoiesis:   A network  
 
that creates and recreates  
 
its own unity, structures,  
 
and elements.  
 
A recursive network of  
 
communication, where the  
 
communication produces,  
 
and is produced by, the  
 
system.  
 
 
How is effectiveness  
 
defined?   
 
Requisite Variety:  The  
 
system’s ability to respond  
 
to anomalies in the  
 
environment.   
 
 
Viability:  The ability to  
 
represent and respond to  
 
complexity; maintenance  
 
of society in time.  
 
 
 
Where do we target  
 
interventions, for the  
 
purpose of enhancing  
 
effectiveness?   
 
Meaning: The  
 
representation of world  
 
complexity that is  
 
realizable by the system  
 
at any point in time.   
 
 
 
Organizational  
 
Consciousness:  The  
 
production of  
 
communication/knowledge 
 
throughout the system.  
 
 
 
What are measures of  
 
success?   
 
Resonance:  System  
 
complexity reduces  
 
environmental complexity.  
 
Resilience:  Ability  
 
to respond to greater  
 
environmental complexity.  
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Summarized, a social system is an autopoietic system of communication whose 
effectiveness and viability are related to its ability to represent the complexity of the 
environment.  Efforts to enhance the system’s effectiveness target its 
communication/knowledge base—that is, its ability to represent the environment’s 
complexity, with the goal of enhancing the system’s complexity.  With increased 
ability to respond to dynamic environments, system vulnerability is decreased.  In 
this way, the theory and language of autopoietic systems provide a new language for 
understanding and influencing system performance.   
 Structures of Accountability 
 At first glance, it would seem that accountability for the performance of social 
systems resides solely with the system’s ability to respond to the complexity of the 
environment.  To stop here, however, is to align systems thinking with previous 
abstract accounts of institutional failure. To the contrary, viewed from a systems 
perspective, accountability does not reside wholly with the system as an abstract 
entity.  Systems thinking requires one to see a system as a functional whole and to 
understand the interdependence of its parts.  To assign accountability for system 
performance is to be attentive not only to the whole system, but also to the 
participation, contributions, and interrelating in the system.   
 This kind of accountability is captured in the “method of operation” 
(Tompkins, 2005, p. 87) at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) during the 
1960s, the Apollo Era.  Known as automatic responsibility, it was first and foremost a 
system of professional and individual accountability:   
[Automatic responsibility] fixed responsibility in any individual who had the 
technical competence to recognize and fix a problem; if the individual was 
unable to fix it, he or she was to communicate it up the line so that technical 
strength could be brought to bear on the problem.  Every individual was 
supposed to make NASA a smart buyer and to keep the technical lines of 
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communication open. (Tompkins, 2005, p. 127) 
In the absence of this sort of accountability, there is an inevitable breakdown of the 
communication that fosters system resilience.  Nearly thirty years after the 
successful Apollo launch, Tompkins (2005) concluded that it was not coincidental 
that the descriptions of many of the MSFC communication practices immediately 
preceding the 1986 Challenger accident did not fit the philosophy of automatic 
responsibility practiced during the successful Apollo era (pp. 116-117).   
 Autopoiesis provides a theoretical framework for understanding the ways in 
which system participants, individually and collectively, are accountable for their 
participation, contributions, and communication.  The remainder of this section 
presents this non-traditional image of accountability.   
 Individual and collective performance.  The language we consciously or 
unconsciously use to create social reality is the result of a series of selections.  
Selection involves the conscious or unconscious imposition of meaning on equivocal 
displays in an attempt to reduce their equivocality (Weick, 1979, p. 131).   
 The meaning that is ultimately selected is influenced by numerous factors.  
Retention, a repository for interpretations, affects subsequent interpretations of 
equivocality.  People try to fit equivocal displays into what they have known all 
along.  When the current situation doesn’t fit with past experience, the situation is 
often ignored or misread (Weick, 1979, p. 177).  Decision makers also influence 
selection: 
Decision makers in organizations intervene between the environment and its 
effects inside the organization, which means that selection criteria become 
lodged more in the decision makers than in the environment.  What the 
decision makers attend to and enact, the cues they use, why they use  those 
cues, their pattern of inattention and their processes for scanning and 
monitoring all become more influential as sources of selection criteria.  Reality 
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as perceived by the members becomes more the source of selection within 
the organization than does reality as perceived by some omniscient, less 
involved observer. (Weick, 1979, p. 125)   
 This, however, is only half the story.  Meaning, action, and accountability do 
not reside wholly with tradition, the institution, or the system.  Members of 
organizations can avoid being “victimized by . . . their parochial volition” by 
systematically interjecting “chronic doubt” (Weick, 1979, p. 177).  Experience 
retained as memory can serve as a constraint on interpretation and action; whether 
memory persists and dominates can be a choice, an interpretive choice or an 
enactment choice (p. 217).   
 Interpretive choice.   Interpretive choice appears to organizational actors as a 
question:  “’Knowing what I know now, should I change the way I label and connect 
the flow of experience’” (Weick, 1979, p. 217).  The choice is about the extent to 
which previous interpretations should inform current explanations of events.  The 
concept interpretation choice (p. 217) creates opportunities to locate instances 
where the organization’s interpretive structures curb its ability to recognize 
anomalies.  For example, because the Challenger had flown with O-ring erosion and 
nothing happened, flying with minute amounts of erosion was not interpreted as a 
high risk venture (Presidential Commission, 1986, p. 148).   
Enactment choice.  Enactment choice prompts a related question:  “’Knowing 
what I know now, should I act differently’” (Weick, 1979, p. 217).  This choice 
concerns whether a previous action that responded to, or created, change should 
guide current actions.  The concept enactment choice, like interpretive choice, 
provides an opportunity to understand and prevent social system failures.  First, 
enactment choice assists us with locating actions and outcomes that were plausible, 
but not initiated; were initiated but not coordinated; or were coordinated but not 
coordinated inadequately.  For example, for one reason or another, the seriousness 
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of the problems concerning the Challenger’s O-rings was not adequately reported “up 
the line” (Tompkins, 1993, p. 130).   
 Individual and collective accountability.  The concepts interpretive choice and 
enactment choice focus our attention on the constraints and opportunities available 
at a given moment in time.  We can continue to reenact what we already know and 
do, or challenge our knowledge and practices and construct new interpretations and 
responses.  However, repeated enactments or persistent discrediting of the past 
undermines a system’s adaptability.  Weick (1979) suggests a compromise.  For an 
organization to survive, it must develop an ambivalent attitude towards experience, 
one that simultaneously respects and challenges its history.  The chief outcome of 
organizations, as Weick (1979) points out, is the production of “stable interpretations 
of equivocal displays” (p. 229). These explanations of what an organization is trying 
to accomplish, and how to go about it, serve as guides for future action and 
interpretation.  Collectively, these explanations become an enacted organization, the 
familiar world of mission, vision, values, policies, procedures, and practices.  
Together, they provide some stability as people go about their business.  As 
organizations are reenacted moment by moment, individuals in the organization also 
face the critical question of what to do with what they know, as changes in the 
environment may challenge the usefulness of the experience or memory of the 
organization.  Weick (1979) describes members of adaptive organizations as, “people 
who oppose, argue, contradict, disbelieve, doubt, act hypocritically, improvise, 
counter, distrust, differ, challenge, vacillate, question, puncture, disprove, and 
expose” (p. 229).  All of these actions embody ambivalence, some uncertainty 
toward what is generally accepted as the way to do business.  The tension between 
the organization’s need for both stability (an ongoing reenactment of the system) 
and flexibility (adaptation to changes in the environment) reveals the ways in which 
the organization (the familiar world everyone knows) and individuals (choices of 
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interpretation and enactment) are accountable for system performance.     
A New Image of System Resilience and Accountability 
 Accountability and systems thinking are not often joined in public thinking.  
For example, in his research at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Tompkins 
(1993, 2005) made the following observation about automatic responsibility, the 
system of professional and individual accountability at MSFC that held individuals 
responsible for resolving problems or communicating them “up the line” (2005, 
p. 127):   
[Automatic responsibility] was a radical departure from typical bureaucratic 
practice.  It was such a radical innovation that since 1967 I have found few 
executives who felt they could administer such a principle.  They feared it 
would foster anarchy.  How could you run an assembly line with such a 
principle? they asked. (1993, p. 67)   
Fearful of radical departures from typical bureaucratic practices, leaders often 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the organization to respond to disruptive 
events.  The typical organization’s emphasis on policy, procedures, protocols, and 
chains of command constrains individuals’ abilities to respond to the unexpected.  
The tendency is to try to fit a square peg into a round hole by normalizing the 
unexpected event and implementing preconceived protocols.  When routines are 
activated, people assume that the world they face is similar to the world that existed 
at the time the routine was first drafted (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 43).  This 
practice ignores unfamiliar information that suggests that trouble is incubating and 
escalating (so-called red flags), and generates responses that are consistent with 
previously crafted plans and operating procedures for correct performance.  Work 
rules, though usually well intentioned, constrain what workers see and do 
(Tompkins, 1993, p. 67).   
Wheatley (1994) captures the essence of a new image of system resilience 
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and accountability, one that is informed by autopoiesis and accounts for individual-
organization accountability: 
If we allow autonomy at the local level, letting individuals or units be directed 
in their decisions by guideposts for organizational self-reference, we can 
achieve coherence and continuity.  [Self organizing autopoietic systems 
succeed] when the system supports the independent activity of its members 
by giving them, quite literally, a strong frame of reference.  When it does this, 
the global system achieves even greater levels of autonomy and integrity 
[i.e., complexity]. (p. 95)   
Luhmann (1990) concurs.  Systems are domains of instability and chaos.  What is 
stable are functions and structures (e.g., values, strategic direction, practices).  They 
constitute a worldview that is shared, yet continually contested.  As such, they serve 
as provisory but relatively stable points of departure for further operations.   
 During his stint as organizational communication consultant at the Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC), Tompkins (1993, 2005) identified institutionalized 
values that contributed to the success of man’s landing on the moon.   One was the 
practice of “Monday Notes” (Tompkins, 1993, pp. 62-66; 2005, pp. 82-85).  During 
the growth stage of MSFC, the director asked managers, lab directors, and project 
managers who were removed from him by at least one layer of management to send 
him, and the other contributors, a weekly, one-page note summarizing the week’s 
progress and problems.  The advantages reported by the contributors included:  
keeping the director informed of problems and progress; fostering formal, regular, 
horizontal communications throughout MSFC; keeping channels of communication 
open during times of decreased or limited face-to-face communications; assuring 
problems did not fall through the cracks by creating more channels than are logically 
or ideally necessary; and surfacing conflicts.  “In short,” Tompkins (1993) 
summarized, “von Braun’s simple request for [Monday Notes] had generated a 
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rigorous and regularly recurring discipline of communication within the organization” 
(p. 65).   
With values-based structures and processes such as Monday Notes in place, 
systems can achieve coherence while simultaneously leaving space for the 
individuality, diversity, and learning that is fundamental to continuity.  Wheatley 
(1994) states:  “What is critical is the relationship created between the person and 
the setting.  That relationship will always be different, will always evoke different 
potentialities.  It all depends on the players and the moment” (p. 34).  System  
resilience, according to advocates of self organizing autopoietic structures, depends 
on organizational functions and structures that not only provide direction,  but also 
allow for local autonomy, the readiness of players, the moment, and a pervasive 
system of accountability.    
A critical leadership role is designing the underlying structures—that is, the 
interrelationships that shape the conditions where types of behaviors and events 
become likely (Senge, 1990, p. 341).  These underlying interrelationships (e.g., the 
purpose, vision, and core values of the system) are important because these 
structures foster certain behaviors; by changing the underlying structures, we can 
promote different patterns of behavior. In this capacity, no one has a more sweeping 
influence on the system than its leaders (p. 341).  The work of the leader/designer 
includes seeing the system as a whole in which the parts are not only internally 
connected but also linked to the environment, clarifying how the whole system can 
work better, and designing the underlying heedful interrelating of people, processes, 
and structures that support system resilience (pp. 341-345).   
Recognizing the role of leaders in designing the underlying structures of 
organizations, recent high profile lawsuits (e.g., Enron) have aimed to hold individual 
CEOs culpable for their roles in system failure.  Similarly the project manager for 
Discovery preemptively claimed responsibility if any system failures prevented the 
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shuttle from returning to Earth.  Although these recent instances bring attention to 
issues of leadership responsibility and culpability, they do not meaningfully assist us 
with understanding and preventing system failure.  In the worst case scenario, they 
obfuscate a more productive understanding of the nexus of individual and system  
accountability that fosters system resilience.       
Autopoiesis provides a fresh alternative for understanding system 
performance.  To varying degrees, the familiar world constructed by organizations 
provides both opportunities and constraints for individual contributions.  For the 
opportunities and constraints it creates, the organization is accountable.  As 
contributors to the system, members of the system have opportunities to express 
themselves, by either reinforcing or contesting the world enacted by the system.  
Concomitantly, the system and its individual members are accountable for what they 
contribute to the on-going production and reproduction of the system, and the reality 
that is created.   
This new way of talking about system performance and accountability is 
supported by theory and research on system failure/resilience in risky (Perrow, 
1999) and high reliability (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) organizations.     
Organizational Theory 
 Weick and Roberts (1993) developed the concept of collective mind to 
describe system performance in situations requiring error-free operational reliability.  
Collective mind is conceptualized as a pattern of heedful interrelating in a social 
system:   
Actors in the system construct their actions (contributions), understanding 
that the system consists of connected actions by themselves and others 
(representation), and interrelate their actions within the system 
(subordination). (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 357)  
In practice, the concept of collective mind resembles automatic responsibility – the 
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system of professional and individual accountability practiced at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC) in the 1960s.  Automatic responsibility, the “method of 
operation” (Tompkins, 2005, p. 87), provided direction on how to participate, 
contribute, and interrelate in the system.  It assumed not only technical expertise, 
but also system knowledge.  Employees were expected to address problems by 
resolving them or communicating them to others.  The goal at MSFC was successful 
flight missions; the practice of automatic responsibility ensured all parts of the 
organization were interfacing and communicating with the other parts of the system 
working toward this end.     
 The concept of collective mind provides a theoretical framework for 
researching system performance.  First, it specifies empirical materials for 
researching and understanding system resilience.  Weick and Roberts (1993) argue 
that patterns of interrelating (contributing, representing, and subordinating) within a 
system are as close to a physical substrate for holistic consciousness or knowledge 
as we are likely to find (p. 365).  Groups connect their actions with more or less 
care, and focusing on the way this is done reveals collective mental processes that 
differ in degree of development (p. 360).  To understand consciousness within the 
system is to be attentive to the participation, contributions, and nature and degree 
of interrelating in the system; to study interrelating is to grasp the intelligence or 
consciousness of the system, a necessary condition to act in a responsive way.  
Automatic responsibility, Monday Notes, and penetration were identified as 
organizational practices at MFSC in the 1960s that cumulatively contributed to the 
successful Apollo mission.   All are examples of patterns of interrelating that are 
accessible for researching and analyzing system consciousness, responsiveness, and 
resilience.    
Second, the concept of collective mind establishes a performance model; it 
specifies a goal or vision to be realized.  Weick and Roberts (1993) conceptualize 
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organizational performance as interrelations of actions of a system that are mediated 
by the consciousness within the system:   
There are group actions that are possible only when each participant has a 
representation that includes the actions of others and their relations.  The 
respective actions converge relevantly, assist and supplement each other only 
when the joint situation is represented in each and when the representations 
are structurally similar.  Only when these conditions are given can individuals 
subordinate themselves to the requirements of joint action.  These 
representatives and the actions that they initiate . . . bring group facts into 
existence and produce the phenomenal solidity of group process.  (Asch, 
1952, pp. 251-252)  
A performance model establishes the goal to be realized.  Ideally, the actions of each 
member of the system are informed by knowledge of the environment, actions of 
others, and the interdependencies in the system.  In this way, the joint situation is 
represented in each response by individuals and the system.     
 Third, the concept of collective mind can account for variations in system 
performance.  Where the concept of consciousness suggests a kind of capacity in an 
ongoing stream of interactions, performance is the set of actions that physically 
exists within a particular system.  Examples include the previously mentioned 
practices of automatic responsibility, Monday Notes, and penetration at MSFC.  
Conversely, breakdowns in performance likely indicate a corresponding deficiency in 
consciousness.  When consciousness is deficient:   
Individuals represent others in the system in less detail, contributions are 
shaped less by anticipated responses, and the boundaries of the envisaged 
system are drawn more narrowly, with the result that subordination becomes 
meaningless.  Attention is focused on the local situation rather than the joint 
situation. . . . Key people and activities are overlooked. . . . There is less 
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comprehension of the implications of unfolding events, slower correction of 
errors, and more opportunities for small errors to combine and amplify. . . . 
There is a greater chance that small lapses can enlarge into disasters. (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993, p. 371) 
 Fourth, the concept of collective mind identifies targets for improving 
performance—that is, forms of social processes, connection, and interrelating (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993, p. 360): 
People act heedfully when they act more or less carefully, critically, 
consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, conscientiously, 
pertinaciously. . . . 
When heed declines, performance is said to be heedless, careless, 
unmindful, thoughtless, unconcerned, indifferent.  Heedless performance 
suggests a failure of intelligence. . . . It is a failure to see, to take note of, to 
be attentive to. (Weick & Roberts, 1993, pp. 361-362) 
Activities can be interrelated more or less adequately depending on the care with 
which contributing, representing, and subordinating are done (p. 363).  It is these 
varying forms of interrelating that embody the degree of care or consciousness 
within the system; it is these varying forms of consciousness that are actualized in 
patterns of behavior that range from “stupid to intelligent” (p. 361).  The more that 
heedfulness is reflected in a pattern of interrelations, the more developed the 
collective mind and the greater the capability to meet emergent situational demands.   
 The concept of collective mind provides a theoretical foundation for analyzing 
and improving system performance.  It specifies empirical materials for analyzing 
organizational performance, performance goals to be realized, indicators of actual 
performance, and targets for performance enhancements.  Table 3 is my summary of 
the framework provided by the application of autopoiesis, a form of social systems 
theory, to research on social systems.  This table points out how abstract systems 
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theory concepts (e.g., recursive networks of communication) are related to empirical 
materials of our social world (e.g., interrelating) that can be observed, assessed, and 
changed.   
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Table 3 
Social system research   
 
Research  
 
Application of autopoiesis,  
 
a form of systems theory,   
 
to social systems  
 
 
Applied social system  
 
research   
 
What phenomena do we  
 
observe and study?   
 
A recursive network of  
 
communication, where  
 
the communication  
 
produces, and is produced  
 
by, the system.  
 
 
The participation,  
 
contributions, and  
 
interrelating of the  
 
members of the system.  
 
How is effectiveness  
 
defined?   
 
 
Viability: The system’s  
 
ability to represent,  
 
communicate and respond  
 
to the complexity of the  
 
environment.   
 
 
Joint action:  The  
 
organization’s situation is  
 
represented in the actions 
 
of its members; members 
 
subordinate themselves 
 
to system requirements. 
 
 
Where do we target  
 
interventions, for the  
 
purpose of enhancing  
 
effectiveness?   
 
Organizational  
 
consciousness:  The  
 
production of  
 
communication/knowledge  
 
that reduces the systems’  
 
vulnerability.  
 
 
Forms of interrelating that  
 
develop the collective  
 
mind:  The care with  
 
which contributing,  
 
representing, and  
 
subordinating are done.  
 
What are measures of  
 
success?   
 
Resilience:  Ability to  
 
respond to complexity.  
 
 
Capability to meet  
 
situational demands. 
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Organizational Research and Practice 
Research on organizations that require error-free operations further informs 
the use of system theory as a framework for assessing and improving system 
resilience (Perrow, 1999; Steier & Eisenberg, 1997; Tompkins, 1993, 2005; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  For example, high reliability organizations provide important 
lessons about managing in complex, unpredictable environments because of what 
they do on the “input side” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 9)—that is, what they pay 
attention to, how they process information, and how they struggle to maintain 
alertness.  They are distinguished by a “continuous updating and deepening of 
increasingly plausible interpretations of what the context is, what problems define it, 
and what remedies it contains” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 3).  To this end, high 
reliability organizations complicate rather than simplify their processes of attention.  
They:  
1. Maintain complicated mental models of how events unfold. 
2. Treat any lapse of performance as a symptom that something is wrong. 
3. Encourage the reporting of errors. 
4. Position themselves to see as much as possible. 
5. Encourage boundary spanners. 
6. Develop situational awareness. 
7. Hold a deep knowledge of the technology, the system, one’s coworkers, one’s 
self, and the raw materials. 
8. Cultivate diversity. 
9. Defer to expertise. 
10. Push decision making down and around (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) 
High reliability organizations deal with the unexpected by engaging in activities that 
develop the system’s consciousness—that is, its ability to grasp the complexity of its 
environment.   
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The design of an electronic system at NASA that would foster “sharing what 
we learn or claim to know” (Steier & Eisenberg, 1997, p. 52) exemplifies an 
organizational intervention to develop the care or consciousness within a system.  
“In the end,” Steier and Eisenberg (1997) argued, “It is the case of one organization 
redefining its idea of learning from one of information records storage and retrieval 
to one focused on gaining insight in relationship through dialogue” (p. 52).   
The use of systems concepts such as collective mind and heedful interrelating 
theory for explaining, and potentially preventing, variance in system performance is 
illustrated by Tompkins’s (1993) case study of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC).  Tompkins reports that descriptions of certain communicative events leading 
up to the launch and the subsequent fatal accident of the Challenger in 1986 did not 
fit with the practices he had observed at the Marshall Center in the 1960s when 
Apollo was successfully launched: 
One example was the highly publicized teleconference held on Monday, 
January 27, 1986, the night before the launch. . . .  
One Marshall manager was quoted . . . as saying he was “appalled” by 
Thiokol’s recommendation not to launch . . .; apparently [the manager] had 
not been made aware of the critical nature of temperature considerations. 
(Tompkins, 1993, pp. 9-10)    
Tompkins (1993) concluded that this was inconsistent with the heedful practices of 
open communication that he had observed at MSFC in the 1960s (p. 10).   
Weick and Roberts (1993) presume the presence of consciousness and 
interrelating within all systems.  “What may vary across [systems or within a system 
at various points in time] is the felt need to develop these processes to more 
advanced levels” (p. 358).   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CASE OF 9/11 
This research project analyzes retrospective accounts of events leading to 
September 11, 2001, for the purpose of acquiring insight into narratives of system 
failure/resilience and accountability.  Specifically, this project focuses on accounts of 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability provided by participants during the 
9/11 Public Hearings and documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts. 
Although the 9/11 Commission intended a review of institutional failures, the failure 
of intelligence functions dominated the focus of the Commissioners and witnesses, 
not only in their review of the activities of the intelligence community, but also in 
their reviews of other functional areas in the government, for example, aviation 
security, border control, immigration.  In this light, my research questions are as 
follows: 
Research Question 1:  What does the language in the Public Hearing 
Transcripts reveal about the sensemaking processes and structures that shaped 
these accounts, specifically with regard to pre-9/11 intelligence failures and 
accountability?       
Research Question 2:  Viewed through the lens of autopoiesis, how does the 
analysis of  the accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability in the 
9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts inform a new vocabulary of system accountability 
and system resilience, one with practical implications for future organizational 
practice? 
The conceptual and methodological framework that informs this research 
project is Weick’s view of sensemaking (1979, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005).  This chapter presents this framework.  In addition, I explain the protocols for 
selecting and analyzing excerpts from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts for this 
research project.  Using the sensemaking perspective as a lens, my goals are to  
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(a) reveal the communication beliefs that constitute the constructions of system 
failure and accountability in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts and (b) identify 
alternative narratives for expressing system resilience and accountability.   
Sensemaking 
 Sensemaking has been conceptualized as the process of structuring the 
unknown (Waterman, 1990, p. 41); active agents constructing sensible, sensable 
(Huber and Daft, 1987, p. 154); a process through which interpretation of 
discrepancies are retrospectively developed (Louis, 1980, p. 241); “the reciprocal 
interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription, and action” (Thomas, Clark, & 
Gioia (1993, p. 240); and “the activity of ‘making’ that which was sensed” (Weick, 
1995, p. 30). 
 The sensemaking perspective is unique in that it goes beyond interpretation 
(attending to cues, interpreting, externalizing, and linking these cues) to include an 
explanation for how cues got there in the first place; how particular cues are singled 
out from an ongoing flow of experience; and how the interpretations and meanings 
of these cues are altered and made more explicit and sensible as a result of activities 
(Weick, 1995, p. 8).   
 Weick (1995) argues that autopoietic systems should be concerned with 
sensemaking, as their effectiveness and viability depend on this ability to make 
sense and respond to unanticipated events in the environment:    
It is the very openness associated with [autopoietic systems] that makes 
distinctions between out there and in here inventions rather than discoveries, 
that results in people creating their own constraints, and that triggers the 
strange sequence in which outputs become the occasion to define 
retrospectively what  could have been plausible inputs and throughputs. (p. 
70) 
These are the very problems that are the focus of sensemaking—how we construct 
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the explanations we construct, why, and with what effects (Weick, 1995, p. 4). 
Weick’s (1995) dissection of sensemaking into seven properties puts “some 
boundaries around the phenomenon of sensemaking” (p. 18), providing a rough 
guideline for inquiry into sensemaking processes. Definitions and examples of each 
of the sensemaking properties follow.  Collectively, these seven properties (pp. 18 – 
65) provide a conceptual framework for understanding how the events leading to 
September 11 were constructed by witnesses during the 9/11 Public Hearings.     
Sensemaking is Grounded in Identity Construction  
People establish and maintain identity by taking cues from others while 
simultaneously making an effort to influence the definition of self that is being 
constructed for them.  An example of this sensemaking property comes from my 
simultaneous appointments as Director of two departments during the past two 
years.  In an email confirming an impending Leadership Team Meeting, the Associate 
Vice President requested an update from the team on its succession planning project.  
Knowing that heads would turn to me as the Director of Organization Development 
and Training for this update, I prepared a report; however, to avoid the abnegation 
of my identity as the Director of Environmental Health and Safety, I recruited 
another member of the team for the presentation, and participated as a member of 
the facilities team in the subsequent discussion.  This complex mixture of proactivity 
and reaction is commonplace in sensemaking.  The sensemaking perspective on the 
construction of identity captures the essence of autopoiesis, a form of systems 
thinking that takes into account the interdependence of the parts that constitute the 
system.  Viewed from this sensemaking/systems perspective, identity is constructed 
from cues from others and one’s own efforts to influence the definition of self.  This 
nexus of self and other constitutes the self that defines and then responds to the 
world (Weick, 1995, p. 20). 
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In a similar way, a system establishes and maintains its identity.  That is, the 
core, distinctive, and enduring character of the system (Albert & Whetten, 1985; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 416) is a nexus of cues from the environment 
and the system’s own efforts to influence the definition of its identity:   
Who we think we are (identity) as organizational actors shapes what we enact 
and how we interpret, which affects what outsiders think we are (image) and 
how they treat us . . . . [Organizational] sensemaking, filtered through issues 
of identity, is shaped by the recipe “how can [we] know who we are becoming 
until [we] see what they say and do with our actions?.” (p. 416).   
According to Weick et al. (2005), the establishment and maintenance of identity is a 
core preoccupation in sensemaking, i.e., the turning of circumstances into a situation 
that, comprehended explicitly in words, serves as a springboard for action (p. 409; 
see also Weick, 1995, pp. 18-24).  For an understanding of the it that is defined, it is 
important to look at that which has informed the self conscious sensemakers who are 
engaged in making sense of the situation.  For the purpose of this project, the 
definitions of self used during sensemaking processes provide insight into the why 
and how of the explanations constructed in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, as 
well as other plausible identities that may be useful prospectively.     
 Weick (1995) places identity first on the list of sensemaking properties 
because the establishment and maintenance of identity, a core preoccupation in 
sensemaking (p. 20), influences how other aspects, or properties, of sensemaking 
are understood.  This positions identity as the primary sensemaking property in 
constructing the meanings that inform and constrain action.   
Sensemaking is Retrospective 
Meaning comes with the kind of retrospective attention that is directed to the 
experience; it “is not ‘attached’ to the experience” (Weick, 1995, p. 26).  As a result, 
many possible meanings are plausible, and the problem for the sensemaker is 
 38
equivocality.  When people are overwhelmed by equivocality, they use values, 
priorities, and preferences to help them give meaning to that elapsed experience.  
For example, when in doubt, I prefer to trust others.  Identification of the values, 
priorities, and preferences used to create meaning from equivocality can provide 
insight into how, why, and to what effect particular explanations are constructed.       
Sensemaking Enacts Sensible Environments  
Enactment is first and foremost about action.  People produce the 
environment they face, and this environment constrains their actions.  For example, 
organizational charts, position descriptions, and job titles delineate the ways in which 
employees are to participate in and contribute to organizational activities.  The 
custodial worker cleans carpets, the office assistant manages calendars, and the 
senior fiscal assistant reconciles ledgers.  This is where sensemaking most clearly 
becomes a process that creates objects for sensing.   
Creating is not the only thing that can be done with action.  Lines of action 
may be stopped, abandoned, postponed, planned but not implemented, initiated and 
then transformed, redirected, and inhibited, as well as expressed. Examples include 
the processes, or lack of processes, that shaped the widespread disappointment with 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) at the end of the 20th century.  Frequently 
organizations embarked on the use of CQI tools to generate efficiencies, customer 
satisfaction, and cost savings without building the underlying philosophy and 
structures that are required to realize the tangible results of CQI.  According to 
Weick (1995), “The act that never gets done, gets done too late, gets dropped too 
soon . . . is seldom a senseless act” (p. 37).   
Sensemaking is about action but it is also “as much a matter of thinking that 
is acted out conversationally in the world as it is a matter of knowledge and 
technique applied to the world” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 412).  The centrality of the 
“saying” in sensemaking and organizational action includes “the talk that leads to a 
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continual, iteratively developed, shared understanding of the [circumstances] and 
the persuasive talk that leads to enlistment in action” (Weick et al., p. 412).  Neither 
talk nor action, from the perspective of sensemaking, is inherently more important.  
Until talk brackets action and gives it meaning, it remains an “’indistinguishable part 
of the swarm of flux’” (Weick et al., p. 412).  The centrality of talk and action in 
organizational sensemaking has been coined as “thinking that is acted out 
conversationally” or “acting thinkingly” (Weick et al., p. 412).   
The presence (or absence) of talk and action that takes on “the form of an 
externally specified objective reality where transacting parties play out preordained 
roles and . . . ‘routines’” (Ring & Van de Ven, 1989, p. 185; see also Weick, 1995, p. 
36) is the substance of sensemaking, and contributes to an understanding of how 
current and alternative interpretations and enactments are constructed.   
Sensemaking is Social 
People actively shape each other’s meaning and conduct, whether they are 
physically present or absent.  According to Weick (1995), “What I say and single out 
and conclude are determined by who socialized me and how I was socialized, as well 
as by the audience I anticipate will audit the conclusions I reach” (p. 62).  My Type A 
personality, like so many of my colleagues, is deeply rooted in family, the Anglo 
Saxon Protestant culture of our childhood, and the work ethic of our employers.  
People who study sensemaking pay attention to the communication that socializes, 
defines connections, establishes entities to which people can orient, signifies what is 
important, and binds people’s time to projects.  Examples include “symbols, 
promises, lies, interest, attention, threats, agreements, expectations, memories, 
rumors” (Weick, 1985, p. 128), upward and downward communication, face-to-face 
and mediated communication, and centralized and decentralized communication 
(Tompkins, 1993, pp. 17-26).  The forms, qualities, and timing of relationships, 
interrelating, and coordination provide insight into various outcomes of sensemaking.   
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Sensemaking is Ongoing 
People are always in the middle of continuous flows of activity.  As we say, a 
million things are going on (Weick et al., 2005, p. 411).  All of these activities furnish 
“an undifferentiated flux of fleeting sense impressions” (Chia, 2000, p. 517), from 
which cues may or may not be extracted for closer attention.   
When a flow of taken-for-granted activity is interrupted, an emotional 
response is typically induced, which then paves the way for emotion to influence 
sensemaking.  For example, only weeks after Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans 
and the coast of Mississippi, Hurricane Rita was moving up the Gulf of Mexico toward 
the Texas coastline.  Before the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, it was often the 
case that people disregarded official mandatory evacuations of coastal areas and 
flood zones, boarded up their homes, stocked supplies, and hunkered down to wait 
out the storm.  Hurricane Rita, however, triggered a different response.  On the 
heels of Hurricane Katrina, Rita struck fear and terror throughout the state.  The 
unprecedented mass exodus of over one million evacuees, mostly from non-
evacuation zones in Houston, is a powerful example of emotion-laden sensemaking 
induced by the threat of significant disruptions to ongoing, taken-for-granted day-to-
day activities.  It is precisely when ongoing flows of activity are interrupted, or those 
flows are significantly threatened, that interpretations of events and actions are 
infused with and influenced by feelings (Weick, 1995, p. 45).  Understanding the 
influence of emotion on the construction of meaning provides insight into the various 
outcomes of the sensemaking process.   
Sensemaking is Focused on and by Extracted Cues 
Extracted cues are simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which 
people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring.  For example, the blatantly 
negative and accusatory tone in an annual report recently published by an 
institution’s Auditor General’s office generated some internal sensemaking regarding 
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the subsequent resignation of its director.  People make sense of what they extract; 
if events are not extracted from the ongoing flow of activity, they are not available 
for sensemaking.  What is and is not noticed by sensemakers provides insight into 
meanings that are, and are not, constructed.       
Sensemaking is Driven by Plausibility rather than Accuracy 
People believe what can account for a sensory experience, as well as what is 
interesting, attractive, emotionally appealing, and goal relevant.  Stories, myths, 
metaphors, epics, paradigms, etc. pull together disparate elements and provide a 
socially acceptable, credible, coherent, and reasonable accounting of events.  For 
example, the termination of senior-level employees is often accompanied by official 
explanations, for example, “small children at home” and “recent medical conditions.” 
Often these explanations are accepted as plausible explanations.       
If we are to understand the products of sensemaking, we must understand 
them as plausible explanations, judged only by their usefulness, not their accuracy:   
Sensemaking is not about truth and getting it right.  Instead, it is about 
continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more 
comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient 
in the face of  criticism. . . . Stories tend to be seen as plausible when they 
tap into an ongoing sense of current climate, are consistent with other data, 
facilitate ongoing projects, reduce equivocality, provide an aura of  
accuracy . . . and offer a potentially exciting future.  (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
415) 
The plausible explanations of pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability that 
dominate the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts are the focus of this research project.  
These accounts will be analyzed for the purpose of acquiring insight into current 
narratives of system failure and accountability and to identify alternative narratives 
for expressing system resilience.     
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Discussion and Summary 
Weick’s dissection of sensemaking into seven properties provides a 
conceptual framework for understanding sensemaking processes.  This framework  
includes an explanation of how cues appear in the environment (e.g, the enactment 
of sensible environments), how particular cues are singled out from an ongoing flow 
of experience (e.g., the identities that define and respond to extracted cues from the 
ongoing flux of the environment), and how the interpretations and meanings of cues 
from the environment become more explicit and sensible (e.g., the plausible 
retrospective explanations that emerge and become more comprehensive and 
resilient).  Focusing on how we construct our explanations, the sensemaking 
perspective provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the constructions of pre-
9/11 intelligence failures and accountability that are documented in the 9/11 Public 
Hearing Transcripts.  Revealing how these interpretations were constructed, 
alternative constructions can be considered.    
Research Protocols 
This dissertation conceptualizes the events leading to 9/11 as a system of 
organizational communication—that is, as a system of interrelated words, meanings, 
and actions that lead up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
Organizational communication is “the study of sending and receiving messages that 
create and maintain a system of consciously coordinated activities . . . of two or 
more persons” (Tompkins, 1984, pp. 662-663; 1993, p. 24; see also Bantz, 1993).  
Messages can be spoken, written, or conveyed by gestures and include not only 
content but also metacommunication—that is, the messages associated with the 
manner or mode in which the content is conveyed and interpreted (Watzlawick, 
Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).  They include simple missives (e.g., messages on the 
bulletin board) as well as more important examples such as the exercise of authority 
(Tompkins, 1993, pp. 24-25).  Additionally, they include the crucial tensions of 
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upward and downward communication, face-to-face and mediated communication, 
centralized and decentralized communication, and formal and informal 
communication (Tompkins, 1993, pp. 17-26).   
Precedents for understanding complex system performance from an 
organizational communication perspective include the analysis of the Challenger and 
Columbia accidents by Tompkins (1993, 2005), Weick’s (1990) discussion of a near 
collision of two airlines at Tenerife, and Steier and Eisenberg’s design of 
“conversational domains” at NASA (1997).   
This research project is a qualitative textual analysis of system failures  
documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  Words, sentences, paragraphs, 
discrete accounts of events, and conversational exchanges will be excerpted from the 
Transcripts.  The selection of excerpts will be guided by the research questions.  To 
this end, excerpts related to both pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability 
will be extracted from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.   
Excerpts from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts 
As researcher in this project, I aim to create insight by researching various 
views of pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability documented in the 9/11 
Public Hearing Transcripts.  To this end, both dominant and marginalized views of 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures and accountability are targeted for extraction and 
further analysis.  Examples of the kinds of excerpts to be extracted include:      
1. Definitions, descriptors and uses of intelligence, intelligence failure, and 
accountability. 
2. Struggles and negotiations over the definition of a situation. 
3. Arguments, claims, and evidence. 
4. Analogies to other situations, root metaphors, and rigid frames. 
5. Coherence and fidelity. 
6. Cross talk  
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7. Traditional and non-traditional vocabulary choices; labels; root 
metaphors; and rigid frames. 
8. Recommendations indicating alternative plausible accounts. 
Analysis 
 To guide research and practice, Weick et al. (2005) have compressed the 
properties and distinguishing features of sensemaking into a conceptual and 
methodological framework (Figure 1), called the “enactment model” or the ESR 
sequence (p. 414).   
Figure 1   
ESR Sequence 
 
 
Source:  adapted from Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414. 
 
The ESR sequence:   
 
proposes that sensemaking can be treated as reciprocal exchanges between 
actors  (Enactment) and their environments (Ecological Change) that are 
made meaningful (Selection) and preserved (Retention).  However, these 
exchanges will continue only if the preserved content is both believed 
(positive causal linkage) and doubted (negative causal linkage) in future 
enacting and selecting. (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414) 
Table 4 is my depiction of the compression of specific features of sensemaking into 
the ESR sequence (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, 414). 
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Table 4   
The relationship between ESR and sensemaking  
 
Sensemaking sequence 
 
 
Features of sensemaking  
 
Ecological change  
 
Actors (concerned with identity),  
 
extracting anomalies from the flux of  
 
circumstances, begin to change the flux  
 
of circumstances into orderliness.  
 
 
Enactment  
 
Noticing, bracketing and enacting order  
 
into flux, identities/actors are shaped by  
 
externalities. 
 
 
Selection  
 
Retrospective attention, mental models,   
 
and articulation reduce possible  
 
meanings of the bracketed material and  
 
tentative and provisional plausible stories  
 
are constructed.  
 
 
Retention 
 
Plausible stories are made more  
 
substantial when linked to past  
 
experience, connected to significant  
 
identities, and used as a source of  
 
guidance for further action and  
 
interpretation.  
 
 
With consideration of the ways in which previous knowledge (retention) informs 
selections and enactments during the sensemaking process, ESR serves as a 
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conceptual framework for analyzing system resilience (reciprocal system-
environment exchanges) and accountability.  When previous knowledge and 
experience are used ambivalently, we not only benefit from lessons learned, but also 
can update our understanding of, and responses to, our environment, including how 
“outsiders” treat us (Weick et al., 2005, pp. 414, 416).  Through growth, 
development, change, and continuous learning, systems can create, elaborate, or 
change structures.  The ESR sequence captures this dynamic, the tension between 
the ongoing reenactment of the current system and innovation and adaptation. 
Whether the system’s sensemaking resources are enacted or contested, the 
response is always a contribution to the ongoing production and reproduction of the 
system.  For these responses, both the system and individuals are accountable.   
How we construct the explanations we construct, why, and with what effects 
is the focus of sensemaking that is captured in the ESR process.  Applied to this 
research project, the ESR sequence is used as a guide for revealing the processes 
and structures that shaped the accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures and 
accountability documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  Additionally, it will 
inform a subsequent discussion on practical implications for building organizational 
resilience.    
Overview of Similar Studies 
 The research design for analyzing selected excerpts from the 9/11 Public 
Hearings has been informed by Dombrowski’s (1991) qualitative textual analyses of 
testimonies and reports relating to the space shuttle Challenger accident.  
Dombrowski’s (1991) study was designed to elucidate whether the decisions leading 
to the shuttle accident were primarily determined by procedures or by an individual 
who then used procedures to effect or justify a decision.  Descriptions of decisions 
and decision-making processes were extracted from the testimonies presented to the 
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident and the Ninety-
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ninth Congressional Committee on Science and Technology, the two principal 
government agencies investigating this disaster.  The portrayal of decisions and 
decision-making processes were also extracted from the reports of the Presidential 
Commission and Congressional Committee.  Excerpts were organized into three 
categories of judgments:  PE – people primarily; PR – procedures primarily; and AM 
– ambiguous, indeterminate, or balanced.  Findings from each of the categories were 
summarized and supported by excerpts.  Conclusions were drawn, e.g.:   
The evidence and testimony before both the commission and the committee 
show that personal judgment in all its contingency and fallibility, rather than 
procedural shortcomings, accounts for the loss of the Challenger.  The 
conclusions and recommendations of both investigations (especially of the 
[President’s] commission), however, make little mention of personal 
judgment or responsibility. (Dombrowski, 1991, p. 213) 
Implications for future practice were presented, e.g.: 
We need to be mindful in professional communication and public policy 
discussion of the nature of humans as language-using creatures guided by 
their own constructions, for these same constructions, while powerfully 
operative, are often left hidden and unacknowledged.  We should, for 
example, resist the inclination to accept uncritically the “bottom-line” 
conclusions and recommendations of reports, instead taking pains to identify 
the methodological and conceptual assumptions which condition these 
conclusions and recommendations. (Dombrowski, 1991, p. 215) 
Additional qualitative textual analyses that have informed the methodology 
for this research include Lighthall’s (2002) analysis of published and archival 
testimony of participants in the decision to launch the Challenger, for the purpose of 
identifying lessons for training engineers and management and Gross and Walzer’s  
(1997) analysis of the explanations of the cause of the Challenger disaster by the 
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Presidential Commission.   
The Case of 9/11 
The following provides an overview of the methodology I used for identifying 
and analyzing excerpts from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  In the first phase 
of this research, I printed a copy of the HTML transcripts located on the website of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.  The HTML  
transcripts (approximately 2000 pages) were chosen over PDF files (approximately 
3000 pages) due to the larger number of pages in the PDF file.  Each of the 
transcripts for the nineteen days of hearings was placed in a manila folder; each 
folder was given a name that reflected the hearing number and day of the hearing 
(e.g., 2.2 indicated the second hearing, the second day of the hearing).   
I initially read through each of the nineteen transcripts to accomplish a high 
level understanding of the content.  During this review of the transcripts, all 
testimony relating to information, intelligence, and intelligence failures was 
highlighted in yellow.  Testimony relating to accountability and performance 
management (e.g., goals, standards) was highlighted in blue.  During this reading of 
the transcripts, each of the transcripts was reviewed several times.  Before moving 
on to the next day of testimony, I reviewed and re-reviewed the transcripts to 
ensure that I had a grasp of the content of the testimony, I had color-coded the 
testimony appropriately, and there was no question in my mind that I could clearly 
articulate the link between the content of the transcript and the color coding 
assigned to it.    
 At this stage of the research, I decided to err on the side of too many 
examples.  To this end, any doubt I had about the applicability of testimony to this 
research project resulted in a decision to highlight it and include it for future review 
and decision making.  It was also during this phase of the research project that I 
came to realize that intelligence, intelligence failure, and accountability dominated 
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the focus of the 9/11 Public Hearings.  At the end of this initial review of the project, 
the majority of each of the transcripts appeared as yellow, blue, or green highlights.  
As a result, throughout the project, I vacillated between having the good luck of 
having so much data and being overwhelmed by the amount of material.   
 The second reading of the transcripts was divided into two phases.  First, I 
read all the yellow-highlighted testimony for each of the nineteen days of the twelve 
hearings.  During this reading, I labeled each of the yellow-highlighted passages in 
the transcripts by selecting language from the passage as a label to reflect its 
content (e.g., sharing of information), wrote this label on a yellow post-it note, and 
attached the post-it note to the highlighted page.  The hearing number, day of the 
hearing, and page number of the highlighted testimony were also written on the 
post-it note in the event it became separated from the transcript.  The sticky side of 
the post-it note was attached vertically to the document.  The label assigned to the 
transcript was written on the opposite end of the post-it note.  This way, I could flip 
through a file and fairly easily locate the various labels.  Second, I read all the blue-
highlighted testimony for each of the hearings.  Using blue highlighted post-it notes, 
I repeated the above process. 
 During the third review of the transcripts, I focused on the labels attached to 
testimonies on information, intelligence, intelligence failures, and accountability.  For 
each of the identified labels (e.g., access to information), I used Microsoft Excel to 
compile related excerpts, noting the hearing number, day 1 or day 2 of the hearings, 
and the verbatim excerpt on a spreadsheet.  After compiling labels and verbatim 
excerpts from only a few days of transcripts, I realized the approach was too 
cumbersome for the amount of testimony related to this project.  My second effort  
focused on compiling, for each of the labels, only the hearing numbers, days of the 
hearing, and page numbers of the testimonies.  This approach was productive, in the 
sense that it provided the location for each of the related excerpts but not a grasp of 
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the content.  At this point, I realized I must work directly from the transcripts.   
 With pads of flipchart paper, nineteen manila folders, and a copier, I moved 
the project from an office desk to the floor, walls, and dining table in the great room 
of my house.  Because of the large number of excerpts attached to various labels, I 
took each previously identified label (e.g., flow of information) and traced its path 
through the nineteen days of hearings. Label by label, I compiled topics discussed 
during the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts and related excerpts.  One label at a time, 
I took notes and taped copies of related excerpts to flip chart pages.  Similar 
statements were grouped together on the flipchart pages (e.g., copies of excerpts or 
notes from the transcripts blaming the President for 9/11 were situated on the page, 
separate from the testimonies blaming the intelligence community for 9/11).  As a 
result, categories began to appear.  After reviewing the nineteen transcripts and 
placing notes and copies of testimonies on the flipchart pages, the flipchart pages 
began to tell a story about the particular label under review at that time.  For 
example, it was during this process that I came to understand the frequency and 
consistency of the definition of intelligence that was dominating the 9/11 Public 
Hearing Transcripts.  It was also during this process that I was able to identify less 
frequently-used definitions of constructs.  This process also allowed me to review my 
previous decisions and once again assess the fit between the content of the 
transcript and the label attached to it.  Occasionally,  labels were reassigned to other 
categories.  At the end of this step, I was able to identify the constructs and 
meanings that dominated the transcripts.  Repetitive use of words and meanings was 
the criterion for identifying dominant constructs.   
 Once dominant constructs were identified, the selection of excerpts for the 
dissertation became a challenge due to the overwhelming number of examples for 
any of the dominant constructs.  I selected excerpts for this dissertation that, 
consistent with other possible excerpts, more clearly reflected the use of the 
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construct by the witnesses and commissioners.   
 Once dominant constructs were identified, they were reviewed to determine if 
system knowledge and experience (e.g., organizational constraints, organizational 
premises, plans, expectations, acceptable justifications, and traditions) (Weick et al., 
2005, p. 409) had served as a resource in the dominant constructions of pre-9/11 
intelligence failures and accountability in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  A 
system sensemaking resource qualified as such if it had informed the construction of 
multiple constructs.   Additionally, I reviewed excerpts that challenged the dominant 
explanations of events leading to 9/11, for prospects of alternative perspectives on 
system failure and accountability and a new vocabulary for constructing accounts of 
system resilience and accountability. Using the PDF search function, language from 
the HTML file was used to locate and cite the page numbers of excerpts in the PDF 
file also on the website of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States.   
 The findings from this analysis of the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts are 
presented in the following format.  Chapter Three provides a detailed discussion of 
the construction of intelligence failure documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts.  Verbatim excerpts from the 9/11 documents will be used to support 
claims.  Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the dominant accounts of 
accountability in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, along with supporting verbatim 
excerpts from the transcripts.  Chapter Five discusses the dominant sensemaking 
resources that informed the accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures and 
accountability in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  Practical implications for future 
system resilience and accountability, based on a discussion of the theory of 
autopoiesis and accounts of intelligence failures and accountability in the 9/11 Public 
Hearing Transcripts, are presented.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE 9/11 PUBLIC HEARING 
TRANSCRIPTS 
 On March 31, 2003, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States officially opened the 9/11 Public Hearings.  A number of witnesses who 
had “a particular interest” in the events of September 11, 2001 (Kean, 1.1.10)1 
appeared before the Commission during the various sessions of the 9/11 Public 
Hearings.  These included survivors of the attack, families of victims, first 
responders, public officials, scholars and practitioners in the areas of national 
security and policy, and congressional members who sponsored legislation that 
brought the Commission into existence (see Appendix A for the dates of the twelve 
Public Hearings, Appendix B for the members of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, and Appendix C for a list of witnesses cited 
in this paper).   
These Commissioners and witnesses may have had various particular 
interests for participating in the 9/11 Public Hearings (Kean, 1.1.10), but there was 
at least one point of consensus from which all subsequent testimonies ensued, not 
only during the first session of the public hearings but throughout the twelve 
hearings:  On September 11, the United States government failed at its primary duty 
to provide common defense (Push, 1.1.163) and protect its people (Gorelick, 
                                                 
1 Twelve Public Hearings were conducted by the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States.  Transcripts from nineteen days of testimony are 
retained as pdf Federal records managed by the National Archives and Records 
Administration (see Appendix A for the url to the pdf file for each of the hearings).  
These web pages were frozen on September 20, 2004, at 12:00 a.m.  Seven of the 
twelve hearings were two-day sessions. References to testimony presented during 
two-day hearings are designated in this dissertation by hearing.day.page.  For 
example, 1.1.4 cites Hearing 1, day 1, page 4. Twelve of the Public Hearings were 
single-day hearings and are cited as hearing.page.  For example, 4.19 cites Hearing 
4, page 19.  In each instance, the name of the Commissioner and witness providing 
the testimony is provided.  
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1.1.36).  For the friends and families of the victims, the survivors of the attack, the 
Commissioners, and members of Congress who had sponsored the legislation that 
brought the Commission into existence, “The September 11th attacks represented a 
massive failure in the most fundamental duty of our government:  the security of the 
American people from foreign attack” (McCain, 2.1.7). 
Commissioner Cleland, in his opening statement, admitted, “Almost without 
question, we could and should have been better prepared, we know that, to protect 
our homeland against the terrorist assault” (1.1.57).  Clearly, the pre-9/11 attacks 
by al Qaeda, such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 2000 
attack on the USS Cole, were not sufficient to: 
Make intelligence bureaucracy shed their turf-consciousness and their Cold 
War mentalities or our border-control agencies to overcome inertia and 
budget shortfalls or the airlines and airports to tighten security, even if it 
meant some added inconvenience to the traveling public or the executive or 
legislative branches to prioritize homeland security above other spending 
programs. (Cleland, 1.1.61) 
According to Commissioner Kean (2.2.7), nobody had anticipated this kind of event 
and the government was unprepared for it.   
 In portrayals such as the one presented by Cleland, the dominant 
construction of intelligence and its role in the events leading to 9/11 emerged.  9/11 
was not a failure of a single person or a department of government but rather a 
systemic breakdown, and problems associated with intelligence, as well as other 
functions, contributed to this failure.  According to the final report of the Joint 
Congressional Intelligence Committee Inquiry, quoted by Commissioner Cleland 
during the Public Hearings: 
“Prior to September the 11th, the intelligence community was neither well 
organized nor equipped and did not adequately adapt to meet the challenge 
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posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United 
States.  These problems greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an 
increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the 
United States.” (Cleland, 1.1.57-58)  
Cleland assumed the Commission would not only affirm those intelligence 
deficiencies but would find corresponding lapses in border control, aviation security, 
and a host of other fields (Cleland, 1.1.56).  Others agreed.  Whatever failures 
occurred in the intelligence agencies may have been matched in seriousness in other 
agencies (Pelosi, 2.1.5; see also Graham, 2.1.27; Kean, 2.2.1; Shelby, 2.1.26).  
Investigating these myriad failures was the charge to the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (McCain, 2.1.8). 
The 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts officially document the discourse of the 
9/11 Public Hearings.  This chapter, drawing on the documented testimony in the 
Public Hearing Transcripts, presents the recurring themes that emerged during the 
hearings.  The following are discussed: 
1. Definitions that are relevant to an understanding of the accounts of pre-9/11 
intelligence failures provided by witnesses and Commissioners in the 9/11 
Public Hearings.     
2. The themes that dominated the constructions of pre-9/11 intelligence failures 
by the 9/11 Public Hearing participants.     
3. The conditions within which these stories became dominant constructions in 
the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  
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Definitions 
“Perhaps intelligence is a term . . . that exists in an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ world 
where words can mean whatever one capriciously says that they mean” (Ransom, 
1975, p. 154). 
 In an effort to understand better how the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States could have happened in a nation that is as militarily, technologically, and 
economically strong as the United States (Kean, 1.1.6), the 9/11 Commission 
investigated, along with myriad other failures, the “failure of intelligence” (Jenkins, 
1.1.305) so it could be “improved” (Ben-Veniste, 1.1.93) or “fixed” (Harman, 
2.1.38).  The following review of definitions from scholars and practitioners in the 
areas of national security and policy are provided as a backdrop to the accounts of 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures that are presented in the next section of this chapter.   
Intelligence 
 Intelligence, in the context of national security, is information (Berkowitz, 
1996, p. 35).  What distinguishes it from other information is its purpose or use.  In 
the context of national security, intelligence is what decision makers need to know 
before choosing a course of action (Ransom, 1970; Rosenbaum, 1971; p. 114).  It is 
information that serves the interest of policymakers (Bruemmer, 1992, p. 890), 
assists those who implement policy (Berkowitz & Goodman, 1989, p. 109), and 
improves decision makers’ ability to understand issues (Goodman, 1984-85, pp. 161-
162).  It includes gathering, interpreting, and selectively communicating national 
security information to decision makers.  Ultimately, all intelligence activities should 
inform the decisions or further the policies of the President (Flanagan, 1985, p. 67).   
 In common usage, the word intelligence has come to have many meanings 
(e.g., espionage, covert political interventions, paramilitary action, and 
counterterrorism).  In fact, Ransom pointed out in 1975, the word intelligence has no 
precise meaning in common usage: “Presidents (e.g., Ford) and even secretaries of 
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defense (e.g., Schlesinger) and directors of central intelligence (e.g., Colby) have 
exhibited the common, careless habit of referring to ‘intelligence’ as meaning both 
information and secret political action” (Ransom, 1975, p. 154).  According to 
Ransom (1975), this is not just a matter of semantics.  The sloppiness of the 
definitional problems “has affected the methods of organizing and managing 
American intelligence agencies” (Ransom, 1975, p. 154).  For example, the usage of 
the word intelligence to refer to both information and secret political activity can 
result in information being excessively classified, an issue that was of great interest 
to the Commissioners during the 9/11 Public Hearings.  Ransom added, “Conceptual 
confusion about ‘intelligence’ makes solutions difficult” (Ransom, 1975, p. 154).   
Intelligence Production  
 Intelligence production is a “linear and single-tracked” process (Berkowitz, 
1996, p. 47) by which information is acquired and converted into a product for 
“’consumers’ of this information” (Flanagan, 1985, p. 62; see also Berkowitz, 1996, 
p. 47).  The process involves several functions: collecting data, analyzing it, and 
disseminating the final product (Ben-Veniste, 6.50; Berkowitz, 1996, p. 47; 
Berkowitz & Goodman, 1989; Cline, 1989-90, p. 695; Deutch, 4.30; Goodman, 
1984-85, p. 161; Kean, 6.3; Schulhofer, 6.5; Ziglar, 7.1.134).   In theory, the 
intelligence product begins and ends with policymakers who are the consumers of 
the information.  In practice, it is up to the managers to gauge and anticipate 
policymakers’ needs (Schlesinger, 4.3).   
 Among the most important sources of intelligence are foreign and domestic 
media, reports on political and social developments from various government 
agencies around the world, a number of intelligence organizations, and military 
intelligence services (Flanagan, 1985, p. 64).  These collection entities produce a 
tremendous volume of information that must be sorted, processed, and converted 
into “raw intelligence reports’ that can be disseminated to intelligence analysts and, 
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in some instances, policymakers (Flanagan, 1985, p. 64).  Analysts use the collected 
data to develop products that are then coordinated, edited, and delivered to the 
consumer (Berkowitz, 1996, p. 47).  “Finished intelligence” represents a very careful 
review of information from all available sources by analysts or analytic teams who 
are familiar with the issue or the geographic regions (Flanagan, 1985, p. 65).  In this 
context, available sources refers to agencies and departments authorized to collect 
and transmit national security information.  The Central Intelligence Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
are principal producers of national level finished intelligence (Flanagan, 1985, pp. 61, 
65).   
 Additionally, the line between raw intelligence (i.e., data) and finished 
intelligence, (i.e., information that has been reviewed for national security decisions 
and policymaking) is blurry.  In terms of the ESR Sensemaking Sequence (Chapter 
Two), the difference between data and finished intelligence is the difference between 
numerous possible meanings and fewer plausible explanations.  Guided by mental 
models acquired during work, training, and life experience, the multiple possible 
meanings of data are reduced to these fewer plausible explanations (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005, pp. 411, 414).  In this way, people make sense of, and respond, to 
equivocality.    
Intelligence Community 
For ease of reference, the agencies and departments that are involved in 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities (Flanagan, 1985, p. 60) are 
collectively known as the Intelligence Community.  Authorized by the National 
Security Act of 1947 and subsequent orders, the Intelligence Community is 
responsible for “intelligence activities ‘necessary’ for the conduct of foreign relations 
and the protection of the National Security of the United States” (Goodman, 1984-
85, p. 161).  
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The agencies formally designated as members of the pre-9/11 Intelligence 
Community included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the military and special collection 
offices in the Pentagon, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR), the Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence Support, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), and a unit of the Department of Energy (Deutch & Smith, 
2002, p. 66; Goodman, 1984-85, p. 161; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, 2004, pp. 407-408).  Figure 2 is a snapshot of the 
Intelligence Community on the eve of September 11, 2001.   
Figure 2 
Pre-9/11 U.S. intelligence community  
 
Source:  Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 66. 
An overview of the agencies reviewed by the 9/11 Public Commission follows.  
It is important to note that many of the structures and functions in place during the 
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Cold War continued to be in place on the eve of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Changes 
had been made, only slowly, “at an incremental pace” (National Commission, 2004, 
p. 407).   
On the eve of September 11, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had 
authority for the coordination of the various agencies and entities that constituted 
the Intelligence Community.  However, a number of departments with intelligence 
missions had some independence from the DCI, “in order to serve their unique 
departmental needs” (Flanagan, 1985, p. 58; see also Deutch, 4.18).  The only 
agency directly controlled by the DCI was the CIA (Bruemmer, 1992, p. 868; 
Goodman, 1984-85, p. 161; National Commission, 2004, pp. 409-410).   
 The CIA had the broadest mandate of all Intelligence Community agencies.  It 
supported the DCI in the coordination of community functions.  It was also involved 
in the production of a broad array of intelligence reports, counterintelligence 
activities abroad, clandestine collections of foreign intelligence, and the development 
of data collection systems supported by technology.  Although the CIA had the 
broadest mandate, the lion’s share of the national intelligence resources and 
personnel were in the Department of Defense (Flanagan, 1985, p. 61; Kerr, 4.72; 
National Commission, 2004, pp. 409-410). 
 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided intelligence and 
counterintelligence support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the Unified and Specific Command operations; additionally, the DIA  
coordinated intelligence activities of the military services (the foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and various 
offices that collected specialized intelligence that supported national, department, 
and military service needs) (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 66; Flanagan, 1985, p. 61; 
National Commission, 2004, p. 408).   
 The National Security Agency (NSA), under the authority of the Secretary of 
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Defense, was responsible for the operation of the nation’s technical intelligence 
systems (e.g., satellites) and the CIA carried out human intelligence (i.e., 
clandestine collection of foreign intelligence).  The Secretary of Defense and the DCI 
shared authority for setting priorities for the collection of foreign intelligence (Deutch 
&  Smith, 2002, p. 65; Flanagan, 1985, p. 61; National Commission, 2004, pp. 407, 
409).  In the case of foreign threats within the United States, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) had the responsibility for setting and implementing intelligence 
collection priorities.   
 The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) 
produced “finished” intelligence tailored to the Department’s needs and participated 
in the development of national intelligence reports, coordinated the State 
Department’s relationships with other foreign intelligence agencies, and distributed 
reports from the United States diplomatic and consular posts abroad to the 
Community (Flanagan, 1985, p. 61; National Commission, 2004, p. 408).     
 The Department of the Treasury maintained a small intelligence unit which, in 
cooperation with the State Department, collected openly available financial, 
monetary, and economic data for use in the department and in national intelligence 
products (Flanagan, 1985, p. 62; National Commission, 2004, p. 408).    
 Oversight of intelligence activities was performed by several executive and 
legislative branch entities including the President, National Security Council (NSC), 
and Senate and House permanent intelligence oversight committees.  The Office of 
Management Budget (OMB) influenced intelligence policy by reviewing budget 
proposals and justifications, monitoring the Community’s budgeting process, and 
providing the DCI with a budget (Flanagan, 1985, p. 72; National Commission, 2004, 
p. 410).   
 The intelligence activities of the Treasury and State Departments, the military 
services, and the counterterrorism role of the FBI predated the CIA.  In 1947, when 
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nation states such as the Soviet Union were the envisioned enemy of the United 
States, the National Security Act established the CIA as the preeminent U. S. 
government agency to receive and interpret foreign intelligence from all sources.  
The act also codified the position of the Director of Central Intelligence (Bruemmer, 
1992, p. 867).  The effect was the organization of U.S. intelligence functions based 
on the distinction between domestic law enforcement and foreign national security 
concerns.  The FBI was responsible for the former and the remainder of the 
Intelligence Community (e.g., the CIA, NSA, and DIA) was responsible for the latter.  
This fragmented approach to intelligence, conceived in 1947, continued to affect the 
way the U.S. organized and managed intelligence for the remainder of the 20th 
century and the beginning of the 21st century:   
Law enforcement’s focus is to collect evidence after a crime is committed in 
order to support prosecution in a court of law.  The FBI is reluctant to share 
with other government agencies the information obtained from its informants 
for fear of compromising future court action.  On the other hand, the CIA 
collects and analyzes information in order to forewarn the government before 
an act occurs. The CIA is reluctant to give the FBI information obtained from 
CIA agents for fear that its sources and methods for gaining that information 
will be revealed in court. (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 64) 
 The FBI had primary responsibility for counterintelligence and counterterrorism 
within the United States.  The CIA and DIA had primary responsibility for threats to 
the U. S. that “would come from overseas or be overseas” (Roemer, 1.1.302).   This 
fragmented approach to intelligence, in place on the eve of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks, was a concern that dominated testimonies of witnesses during the 9/11 
Public Hearings.   
 Definitions of intelligence and Intelligence Community used by scholars and 
practitioners in the fields of national security and policy have been provided as a 
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backdrop to the accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures that are presented in the 
next section of this chapter.  Keeping in mind that our definitions “create what we 
disingenuously pretend they merely describe” (Carey, 1989, p. 32), it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the following may be encountered in the reading of the 
9/11 Public Hearings:   
1. One of the uses of the word intelligence in the Public Hearing transcripts will 
denote information that has been gathered, analyzed, and disseminated for 
national security purposes (e.g., decisions and policymaking).   
2. Intelligence will be treated as a product or a thing that can be gathered, 
analyzed, and disseminated.  
3. The words intelligence and information may be used imprecisely and 
interchangeably as a matter of course. 
4. The descriptions of the methods and practices for organizing and managing 
pre-9/11 intelligence will resonate with the above definitions of intelligence 
and Intelligence Community, as these definitions dominated scholarship and 
practice during this period of time. For example, intelligence is defined in the 
literature and practice as information provided by the Intelligence Community 
for the purpose of national security decision or policymaking.  In the 9/11 
Public Hearing Transcripts, we can expect the line between what is and is not 
intelligence and who does/does not inform policymaking to be similarly 
demarcated.  In this vein, we may encounter testimony regarding valuable 
information that was generally available (i.e., information relevant to 9/11), 
but was not treated as intelligence because it was not coming from an 
intelligence official.   
5. The Commission’s charge to identify intelligence failures and provide 
recommendations will lead to an in-depth exploration of the intelligence 
process (i.e., the collection of information, its analysis, and the dissemination 
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of intelligence), as it was generally believed that “failure in any of these 
steps” would lead to intelligence failure (Cline, 1989-90, p. 695; see also 
Berkowitz & Goodman, 1989).    
6. The intelligence failures identified by the 9/11 Commission (e.g., the 
fragmented nature of U.S. intelligence) and the solutions to these problems 
(e.g., reorganization of the Intelligence Community) will be logical extensions 
of the dominant definitions of intelligence and Intelligence Community that 
were in place during the investigation of 9/11. 
Intelligence:  Constructions in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts 
 The ESR sensemaking model (Weick et al., 2005) provides a conceptual and 
methodological framework for understanding system failure/resilience.  Using this 
model, system resilience can be viewed in terms of the reciprocal exchanges 
between ecological changes (environment) and actors (system). These exchanges 
become meaningful as labels are attached to “the undifferentiated flux of 
experience,” and used as “common currency for communication exchanges” (Chia, 
2000, p. 517).  The labels that are attached to the flux of experience narratively 
reduce the stream of experience to plausible stories. These stories are important, as 
they have the potential for guiding future interpretations of events and actions 
(Weick et al. p. 415).    
 Keeping in mind the prospective as well as retrospective nature of 
sensemaking, this chapter identifies the five dominant themes in the accounts of 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures provided by witnesses and Commissioners during the 
9/11 Public Hearings:       
1. Flow of information 
2. Actionable intelligence 
3. Coordination and sharing of information 
4. Access to information 
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5. Dominance of law enforcement and prosecutorial approach to terrorism 
These stories appeared during the official opening of the 9/11 Public Hearings on 
March 31, 2003, and reverberated throughout the twelve public hearings.  With 
hindsight, we see these topics recurring and coalescing into dominant descriptors for 
the pre-9/11 failures in intelligence.   
 This section focuses on each of the five themes that dominated the 
Commissioners and witnesses’ constructions of events leading to the failure of 9/11.  
In the concluding section of this chapter, I review these five constructs to determine 
the conditions within which these stories became dominant constructions in the 9/11 
Public Hearing Transcripts.  Similarly, the next chapter identifies and discusses the 
dominant constructions of accountability in the Public Hearing Transcripts.   
Flow of Information 
 It is not surprising that flow of information was a recurring theme in witness 
accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, as this concept, flow of information, was at 
the heart of the intelligence production model that dominated scholarship and 
organizational practices at the turn of the 21st century.  In theory and practice, 
national security intelligence was defined as the product of a process in which 
information is collected from various sources in the field, disseminated to analysts for 
further analysis, and then further disseminated for the purpose of decision and 
policymaking.  Critical to this process was the movement or flow of information 
through this intelligence production process (Axley, 1984; Feldman and March, 
1981).     
 In the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, the movement or flow of information 
was generally depicted as a “one-way street” of information. For example, 
Commissioner Ben-Veniste (1.1.93) used this metaphor to characterize the flow of 
information from the FBI to state and local authorities.  The flow of information to 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was similarly characterized.  According to 
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Schiavo, former Inspector General for the Department of Transportation, it was the 
responsibility of the FBI to assess a threat and then provide intelligence, which the 
FAA “fans out” to the airlines (2.2.95); that is, they transmitted advisories, warnings, 
etc. (Canavan, 2.2.60).  The process from December 2000 until October 2001 was 
outlined by Canavan, FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security:     
 Throughout 2001, as the intelligence reporting volume increased . . . my 
 office issued at least 15 information circulars . . . focusing on domestic and 
 international terrorism threats directly against aviation. . . .  
For example, one information circular . . .  issued in the summer of 
2001 updated airline security personnel of developments that terrorists and 
criminals had in disguising firearms. . . .  
  We pushed real hard to get everything we got from the intelligence 
 community into the field. (Canavan, 2.2.60-61, 68) 
The FAA, cast as consumers of intelligence, relied completely on the Intelligence 
Community (U.S. agencies and departments authorized to conduct foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence agencies) to provide the best quality of 
intelligence so they could issue information circulars to the aviation industry, security 
professionals, corporate security directors, senior management personnel, ground 
security coordinators, supervisory personnel at overseas locations, local airline 
managers, and law enforcement when appropriate and on a need-to-know basis 
(Canavan, 2.2.61).  During the summer of 2001, the entire United States 
Counterterrorism Group, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, sent 
out notifications that heightened security measures should be put into place 
immediately.  During this period, the FAA advanced this information in the form of 
Security Directives and Information Circulars to airlines, airports, and all officials for 
whom it had regulatory oversight (Canavan & Fielding, 2.2 84).  These initiatives 
were intended to “get them to conform to the existing regulations” (Canavan & 
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Lehman, 2.2.69). 
 During the 9/11 Public Hearings, witnesses from North America Air Defense 
(NORAD) also relayed an account similar to the one presented by the FAA.  
Restricted by law from collecting domestic intelligence (Verga, 7.1.144), the 
department of Defense relied on the other in the Intelligence Community for 
domestic intelligence.  This intelligence served as the basis for developing training, 
tactics, and procedures for combatant missions.   
 In accordance with pre-9/11 reports from the Intelligence Community, 
NORAD defense forces were positioned for external threats to the United States and 
were therefore looking “outward” (Verga, 7.1.159).  The FAA was also looking 
outward, as they too had received intelligence indicating the impetus of the 
heightened state of alert during the summer of 2001 was “overseas” (Garvey, 
2.1.91, 93, 98).  In both instances, according to witnesses from FAA and NORAD, 
neither had any specific intelligence indicating a domestic terrorist threat to 
commercial aviation prior to the attacks.   
Commissioner Lehman found the un-preparedness of FAA and NORAD for the 
terrorist attacks on September 11 to be an incredulous sequence of events:       
Despite [a] long litany of events and intelligence reports of the growing 
probability that aircraft would be used as weapons, nothing ever got to 
[Mineta, Secretary of Transportation], nothing apparently got to [General 
McKinley], and I assume, General Arnold, nothing got to you. (2.2.31). 
This according, to Lehman, was a significant failure.  The United States intelligence 
community existed “to provide product precisely” to the users who were tasked with 
defending the country (Lehman, 2.2.31).   
 There are numerous examples in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts where 
consumers of information testified that the flow of critical information had been 
impeded such that they had not received the intelligence that might have assisted 
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them with foreseeing or deterring the attacks of 9/11.  For example: 
1. The FAA had no knowledge of the “Phoenix” memo, an internal FBI memo 
written in July 2001, suggesting the Bureau investigate the use of civil 
aviation schools by individuals who may be affiliated with terrorist 
organizations (Raidt, 7.2.7).   
2. The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was not 
briefed or advised of a heightened period of alert with respect to the 
possibility of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist activity when he assumed the 
position of Commissioner in August of 2001, nor was he aware of anyone in 
the National Security Section of INS who was aware of it (Ben-Veniste & 
Ziglar, 7.1.146-147).   
3. The Bureau of Consular Affairs had not received intelligence on any of the 
9/11 hijackers from “the agencies designed to collect it,” although some 
agencies possessed information on two of the terrorists who would participate 
in the September 11 attacks (Ryan, 7.1.19).   
4. Two of the hijackers were on a watch list established by the State 
Department, but these names were not provided to the FAA; consequently, 
two hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, were not subject to 
additional scrutiny or barred from flying (Zelikow, 7.2.14-15).   
5. Information from the FBI and CIA on al Qaeda’s use of fraudulent passports 
was not available to Customs, Immigration, or Consular officials who 
examined hijacker passports before 9/11 (Ginsburg, 7.1.4-5).   
6. Immigration inspectors were not given any information that would have 
prevented them from admitting any of the hijackers into the country (Fine, 
1.2.39).   
 These examples are presented to illustrate how flow of information, a 
dominant construct in the 9/11 Public Transcripts, was used by the Commissioners 
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and witnesses in their accounts of the pre-9/11 intelligence failures.  Commissioner 
Ben-Veniste stated it as a “fact” (7.1.146):            
We had a considerable amount of collected intelligence prior to 9/11, but it 
seems as though our failures involved the inability to disseminate . . . the 
information in a way in which we could interdict those individuals who 
participated in the 9/11 plot. (Ben-Veniste, 7.1.146) 
The question was, how could it be that “the product did not get” to those who could 
use it? (Lehman, 2.2.32)  
 Discussions on flows of information in the Public Hearing Transcripts centered 
on the distribution of intelligence; that is, the Intelligence Community had not 
distributed the information to its consumers.  Primarily, consumers of intelligence 
testified that they were not provided or did not receive the intelligence that would 
have assisted them with foreseeing or deterring the attacks.  This emphasis on 
information transfer (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, pp. 22-24) reflected several 
fundamental assumptions that dominate organizational practice and scholarship, 
including the fields of communication and national security and policy, during the 
20th century and the early years of the 21st century:   
1. Intelligence is a concrete substance that travels, or is moved, from one place 
to another.  In the Intelligence Community, as well as in the 9/11 Public 
Hearing Transcripts, intelligence was referred to as a product that was 
disseminated by the Intelligence Community to its various consumers.   
2. The receipt, or non-receipt, of intelligence causally or quasi causally affected 
the performance of the consumers of intelligence.   In the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts, consumers of information testified they were not prepared for, or 
in a position to deter, the 9/11 attacks because they had not received 
relevant information from the Intelligence Community.   
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3. Success of intelligence transmission is mitigated by breakdowns, defined as 
problems during the transmission of information that cause the flow to stop 
completely; barriers, defined as obstacles that simply impede or slow down 
the message during the transmission process; or gatekeeping, defined as the 
control of the information flow by the source, with the source of the 
information determining who receives what information (Krone, Jablin, & 
Putnam, 1987, p. 23).   In the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, it appears that 
information was purposefully withheld from those who could have deterred or 
mitigated the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  For example, the FBI provided 
information to consumers when the bureau had something that was credible, 
specific, and relevant to their operations (Flynn, 7.2.41; Manno, 7.2.42).  
However, where there was no direct connection to a specific operation, it was 
very difficult to obtain clearances from the FBI to obtain access to information 
(Manno, 7.2.37).  It appears, from this example and others, that the FBI 
played a gatekeeping role and controlled the distribution of intelligence 
information.     
 Although there are accounts of gatekeeping in the 9/11 Public Hearings, they 
are few and far between and do not in themselves account for the numerous stories 
of consumers not receiving information.  In the end, only on a few occasions, during 
moments of expressed frustration, did I find the Commission struggling to gain 
additional insight into the recurring stories on the difficulties with the flow of pre-
9/11 intelligence.  On those rare occasions, and only momentarily, mainstream 
thinking appeared to be challenged by the Commissioners.  The following two 
examples exemplify the occasional on-the-margin observations, if not judgments, 
from Commissioners.   
 In one example, it appears that the taken-for-granted passive role for 
consumers of intelligence (e.g., policymakers) was challenged:   
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[Should consumers of intelligence] take a much more active role in directing 
the priorities of what is to be collected, and direct the intelligence community 
to find a way to collect it rather than taking a more passive role and saying 
okay, tell me what’s happening. (Lehman, 4.38)   
In the next two examples, the standard definition of intelligence as that which is 
provided by the Intelligence Community was under fire.  This exchange occurred 
between Commissioner Lehman and Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Consular Affairs from May 1993-July 2002:   
 Ryan:  So I think that knowing certainly what we did in Consular Affairs, prior 
 to September 11th, 2001, we did—we took every step that we could . . . .
 Lehman:  I would respectfully disagree with you.  I don’t think the record 
 shows  that at all.  In some of the interviewing of some of your officials that 
 were doing the actual consular functions in Saudi Arabia at the time, they said 
 in so many words, gosh, if we only knew . . . . Well, hello.  I mean, did 
 anybody read the newspapers?  I mean, there were books. . . . 
Did you only have robots . . . ?  Don’t they read the papers?  (Lehman 
& Ryan, 7.1.29-30) 
Similarly, Commissioner Ben-Veniste found it “a bit fatuous” that the United States 
was so unprepared on September 11, given the generally available information on 
terrorists using airplanes (2.2.27), as well as “reports floating around in the 
intelligence community” and “about a half a dozen novels and movies” about 
airplanes being used as weapons (Lehman, 2.2.14). 
 In the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, a dominant construct shaping the 
accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failure was flow of information; information that 
was not sent, provided, or disseminated was the meaning most often attached to this 
construct by the Commissioners and witnesses.  On the surface, it may appear as a 
gatekeeping issue; that is, the Intelligence Community was withholding critical 
 71
information.  And in some instances, that was the case.  A closer look, however, may 
challenge the conceptual and definitional models of intelligence and Intelligence 
Community that had informed both pre-9/11 intelligence work and its analysis by the 
9/11 Commission.   
Actionable Intelligence 
“We really had no credible or actionable intelligence that told us this was really going 
to happen.  In other words, this is a real threat, we are hearing, this, this, this, this 
and this” (Canavan, 2.2.85). 
 One of the questions posed by the Commissioners on the first day of the 9/11 
Public Hearings was, “How do we improve . . . actionable intelligence . . . the 
specifics of that information . . . the right information” (Roemer, 1.1.103)?  
References to receiving, or not receiving, specific, right, hard, credible information, 
that is, actionable intelligence, from the Intelligence Community was a dominant 
theme in the 9/11 Public Hearings.  The following composite of testimonies by 
various FAA witnesses exemplifies the use of this term in the public hearings.   
 During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community issued 
reports, at a “near frantic level,” suggesting some type of terrorist attack somewhere 
in the world (Gorelick, 2.2.15). The entire counterterrorism community including law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies were placed on the highest alert, and 
information circulars were distributed to all interested parties (e.g., airlines, airports, 
and all security officials) (Canavan, 2.2.61; Fielding, 2.2.84).  For example on July 
18, the FAA issued information circulars stating, “We have no specific information on 
[a] threat to civil aviation.  The FAA urges all civil aviation security personnel to 
continue to demonstrate a high degree of alertness” (Canavan, 2.2.83).  
 In the United States, this heightened level of intelligence warning about 
impending attacks (Gorelick, 2.2.15) was interpreted as “chatter” (Mineta, 2.2.15).  
The term chatter appears in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts as an antonym to 
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actionable intelligence.  Actionable intelligence refers to specific information about a 
terrorist attack (who, what, when, where, how) disseminated by a credible source 
(e.g., an agency in the Intelligence Community).  Chatter, on the other hand, refers 
to increases in communication activity without corresponding increases in its 
specificity or credibility.  Reports issued by the Intelligence Community, before 
September 11, 2001, weren’t specific about what the threat might be and, as a 
result, did not result in any action by the government. For example, there was no 
indication that attacks would be focused specifically against airlines (Canavan, 
2.2.61; Mineta, 2.2.14); therefore additional prevention or mitigation measures were 
not initiated.     
  The FAA responded only to specific, actionable information that was provided 
to them by the CIA and FBI. For example, the twenty names on the pre-9/11 FAA 
no-fly list had been specifically identified to the FAA by the Intelligence Community 
as the terrorists that the FAA ought to be concerned about (Mineta, 7.2.28).  In the 
months preceding September 11, in response to the specific credible threat 
information provided to them, the FAA “worked hard to make changes in the aviation 
security baseline” (Garvey, 7.2.17).  Where there was specific and credible 
information that people were actually targeting civil aviation, the names of those 
individuals were put on security memos directing the air carriers not to transport 
these people (Manno, 7.2.27).  Additionally, the 61,000 names in TIPOFF (the U.S. 
government’s only pre-9/11 terrorist watchlist) could be searched “if you had a 
name” to search against the database (Manno, 7.2.27).  Pre-9/11, the kinds of 
protocols that the FAA had in place anticipated specific kinds of crises (e.g., bad 
weather and Y2K) (Garvey, 2.1.108).   
 Although information regarding the use of airplanes as weapons of mass 
destruction and the possibility that this could happen in the United States was 
accumulating, the FAA (working with the intelligence community) in each case 
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deemed the source of information as not actionable; that is, it was not specific and 
did not come from credible sources (Garvey, 2.1.106,114).  There was “hard 
intelligence” indicating serious threats against aviation in the Pacific (Flynn, 7.2.18), 
but the FAA had no specific knowledge of a terrorist plot to hijack aircraft and use 
them as weapons against targets in the United States, or any plot that resembled 
such an operation prior to 9/11 (Garvey, Gorton, & Manno, 7.2.23).  In her 
testimony, Garvey reported, “The FAA did not have any credible or any specific 
information which indicated the type of [domestic] attack we saw on September 11” 
(Garvey, 7.2.17).  There was no actionable intelligence that even hinted that there 
was a real threat to aviation (Canavan, 2.2.85).  According to the testimonies 
provided by a number of FAA consumers of intelligence, the Intelligence Community 
was providing national security information, but it was not actionable; therefore, it 
did not result in the kind of preparation that one, with hindsight, might expect.  
 The meaning ascribed to actionable intelligence in the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts resonates with the use of finished intelligence in the intelligence 
production model that dominates current public administration scholarship and 
practice (Flanagan, 1985, p. 65).  That is, finished intelligence is actionable 
intelligence; it can guide policy and decision making.  In contrast, information does 
not qualify as finished intelligence to be acted upon if it does not specify threats or 
does not originate from formal intelligence production processes.   An overview of 
the kinds of information that was generally known prior to the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, based on the testimony of various witnesses during the 9/11 Public 
Hearings, is provided in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3  
Information that was generally known before September 11, 2001 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
Information that was generally known before September 11, 2001 
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According to multiple witnesses in the 9/11 Public Hearings, intelligence had to be 
actionable (i.e., provide information about a specific attack) if it were to be useful 
(Manno, 7.2.21).  “Solid intelligence” (Fielding, 2.1.105)—that is, intelligence that 
had been run to the ground by the intelligence community (Garvey, 2.1.106 )—was  
was not provided; therefore appropriate actions were not taken.     
 During the 9/11 Public Hearings, a number of accounts of pre-9/11 
intelligence failures focused on information that was not disseminated.  That is, 
information did not flow from the Intelligence Community to national security 
decision makers.  When witness testimonies specifically attributed the failures of 
9/11 to a lack of actionable intelligence, the failures were constructed as a specificity 
of intelligence that was not disseminated by the Intelligence Community.  This 
emphasis on accuracy, specificity, and completeness of information reflected two 
fundamental assumptions dominating organizational scholarship and practices during 
this period of time:  (a) communication is about perfection, fidelity, and accuracy 
(Berlo, 1960, p. 40) and (b) “accuracy begets effectiveness” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
415).  This focus on accuracy, grounded in models of rational decision making, 
dominated organizational thinking and practice during the end of the 20th century 
and the early years of the 21st century.  Using rational decision making models:  
A given problem is evaluated in relation to stable goals and a course of action 
chosen from a set of alternatives.  In this model, accurate information is 
important in evaluating the feasibility and utility of alternative actions, and 
accurate perceptions increase decision quality. (Weick et al., p. 415) 
Rational models of decision making are best suited for organizations that reside in 
stable, predictable environments.  However, they are ill suited for organizations that 
reside in complex, dynamic, unpredictable environments, where organizations must 
be capable of continuously noticing, bracketing, and responding to novel events in a 
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continuously changing environment (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 415).  
Generally, according to Wheatley (1994), our efforts to keep “the lid on”  until we 
“get to the bottom of” unexpected, different, disconfirming, conflicting information 
have left our organizations “dying, literally” (p. 108).  That is, in complex, dynamic 
environments, organizations do not have the luxury of compiling information to the 
point that a threat is fully understandable and, as a consequence, actionable.     
 Additionally, the discussion on actionable intelligence during the 9/11 Public 
Hearings suggests how a focus on finding and connecting dots (e.g,. Ashcroft, 
10.1.142, 166; Baird, 1.2.146; Ben-Veniste, 11.1.146; Fetchet, 1.1.218; Fielding, 
10.1.19; Jenkins, 1.1.305; Lehman, 12.2.48; McLaughlin, 10.2.46; Reno, 10.1.62; 
Roemer, 10.1.110) or pieces of information draws attention away from patterns and 
relationships of events that unfold over time.  Testimonies throughout the hearings 
suggest that there was “a considerable amount” of information prior to 9/11 (Ben-
Veniste, 7.1.146) reflecting trends or patterns of activity leading to 9/11.  This 
generally available information, however, was distinguished from the pieces or “dots” 
of information (the who, what, when, where, and how of terrorist attacks) compiled 
by the Intelligence Community for national security purposes.   
Coordination and Sharing of Information 
 In their first report, the Commission staff (National Commission, 2004, xiii) 
set out to reconstruct a “story” that, in the end, is “more telling about the system 
than the people” (Zelikow, 7.1.78, 88).  In this system, the staff concluded, no one 
was ensuring seamless handoffs of information or coordinating an overall interagency 
strategy for operations (Zelikow, 7.1.88).  The staff account of pre-9/11 events, 
presented by Dr. Philip Zelikow (7.1.78-86), the Commission’s Executive Director, 
provides an opportunity to gain a greater understanding of the meaning of lack of 
coordination and sharing in the 9/11 Public Hearings.   These events, reconstructed 
by the staff, began with the analysis of signals intelligence (SIGNET) by the National 
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Security Agency (NSA).   
 Near the end of 1999, NSA analyzed communications associated with three 
men, Khalid, Nawaf, and Salem.  Combining the NSA analysis of these 
communications with information from other sources, officials in the intelligence 
community concluded that “Nawaf and Khalid [were] part of . . . ‘an operational 
cadre’ [and] something nefarious might be afoot” (Zelikow, 7.1.78).   
 If NSA had been asked to further investigate these individuals, NSA would 
have started by checking its own database and the following events would have been 
set in motion (7.1.81):     
 Analysts would quickly have identified Nawaf as Nawaf al Hazmi.  Someone 
 then could have asked the State Department to check that name too.  State 
 would promptly have found its own record on Nawaf al Hazmi.  That record 
 would have shown that he . . . had been issued a visa to visit the United 
 States.  They would have learned that the visa had been issued at the same 
 place, Jeddah, and on almost the same day as the one given to Khalid al 
 Mihdhar.  (7.1.81) 
But information was not requested from NSA, and NSA did not think it was its job to 
initiate research on its own (7.1.78).   
 Information reported from, and to, the intelligence community continued to 
reinforce “the picture of an emerging operation” (7.1.79).  On January 4, 2000, 
officials tried to track Nawaf’s scheduled departure from Pakistan for Malaysia, only 
to discover that he had already left the country.  Other officials had more success in 
tracking Khalid.  They learned that his name was Khalid al Mihdhar and that he held 
a Saudi passport with a visa to visit the United States.  When the CIA headquarters 
searched its database for the names that were being identified, no hits were 
produced.  They did not check the databases at NSA and did not specifically ask NSA 
to do so.   
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 January 12, 2000, officials reported that the “Arabs had dispersed and the 
tracking was falling apart” (7.1.82).  It was not until March 2000, when another 
matter generated renewed interest in “those missing Arabs” (7.1.83), that Nawaf al 
Hazmi’s departure on a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles on January 15 was 
reported.  Sharing this information with the FBI, from an intelligence perspective, 
was vital; however, the Commission staff found “no evidence that this information 
was sent to the FBI” (7.1.83).  Mihdhar, officials later learned, had also been on the 
United flight to the United States of America. By March 2000, Mihdhar and Hazmi 
had already established a residence in San Diego.  At the time, no one in the 
intelligence community knew this (7.1.83). 
 In August 2001, an FBI agent, working with a CIA agent detailed to the FBI, 
put together the pieces of the puzzle and “nominated” Hazmi and Mihdhar for 
TIPOFF, the U.S. government’s only pre-9/11 watchlist dedicated to catching 
terrorists (7.1.84-85).  Zelikow added: 
 It is worth noting that the Federal Aviation Administration’s own no-fly list 
 was totally independent from TIPOFF. . . . So, to be specific, adding Hazmi 
 and Mihdhar to TIPOFF did not put them on a no-fly list and did not keep 
 them from flying on September 11. (7.1.85) 
Mihdhar and Hazmi were involved in the hijacking of American Airlines 77, which hit 
the Pentagon.  The Commission staff also reported that these hijackers had 
previously met up with a hijacker who later joined the hijacking team assigned to 
United 175.   
 Zelikow concluded with the observation that the staff’s account of the events 
leading to 9/11 revealed how difficult it was for the intelligence community (e.g., the 
CIA, FBI, and NSA) to assemble “puzzle pieces” gathered by the different agencies, 
make sense of them, and then coordinate needed action with relevant agencies 
(e.g., FAA) (7.1.86).   
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 It is impossible to overlook issues relating to initiative, ownership, 
accountability, and oversight—all of which will be discussed in the following chapters.  
Setting those aside for now, we can focus on the construction of coordination and 
sharing of information in the staff report.      
 According to the staff report, no one was ensuring a seamless handoff of 
information or coordinating an overall interagency strategy.  That is: 
1. NSA was not asked to further investigate, and the State Department was not 
asked to check their records, for Nawaf and Khalid once they had been 
identified as part of a disreputable operational cadre. 
2. Although the State Department had its own records on Nawaf al Hazmi, the 
CIA did not have the names in its database. 
3. Information on Hazmi’s flight to Los Angeles was not reported to, or shared 
with, the FBI. 
4. Putting the names of Hazmi and Mihdhar on the government’s terrorist 
watchlist, TIPOFF, did not prevent them from flying because the FAA’s own fly 
list was totally independent of TIPOFF and the FAA did not have these names 
on its list.   
In the staff’s reconstruction of this event, there are numerous instances where 
pieces of the puzzle were gathered by different agencies but not shared; that is, it 
was not handed off or transmitted to other agencies.  Information and requests were 
not given to the NSA, the State Department, or the FBI.  Similarly, information was 
not in (i.e., it had not been moved into) the CIA database or the FAA no-fly list.   
 Despite the pieces of information residing in various locations from late 1999 
to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community lost track of Nawaf al Hazmi and 
Khalid al Mihdhar.  In January 2000, they entered the United States. On September 
11, 2001, they hijacked an airplane, and with two other hijackers, crashed it into the 
Pentagon.   
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 This construction of  events by the Commission staff was dominated by 
instances where interagency sharing and coordination did not occur; that is, agencies 
did not move information from one place to the next as one would expect, according 
to the defined process of intelligence production.  In the end, the Commission staff 
had reconstructed an account of devastation caused by intelligence failures, a failure 
to move national security information along.   
 In this account, as well as other similar accounts in the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts, the constructs, coordination and sharing of information referred to the 
transmission of information from one place to another.  This construction of 
information as a “’thing,’ as an inert entity to disseminate,” is reminiscent of “several 
decades of information theory that treated information as ‘bits’” that could be 
moved, tracked, passed back and forth and managed (Wheatley, 1994, pp. 101-
102), and, in this sense, coordinated and shared.     
Access to Information 
 Who did, and did not, have access to intelligence was a topic of various 
testimonies during the 9/11 Public Hearings.  The following is presented to reflect the 
ways in which access to information surfaced as a dominant theme in the 
construction of pre-9/11 intelligence failures in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.   
In the summer of 2001, an FBI agent and a CIA agent detailed to the FBI put 
the pieces together and figured out that two terrorists, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al 
Mihdhar, were in the country and were “clearly here to kill Americans” (Baker, 6.38).  
Baker, former General Counsel, National Security Agency, recounted the events:      
The FBI agent who discovered this . . . made it his mission to try to find these 
guys. . . .  
When he asked for the authority to get the assistance of [the] law 
enforcement [side of the FBI] . . . , he was told by FBI headquarters, not on 
your life.  You cannot capitalize, cannot do that because there’s a wall 
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between law enforcement and intelligence. 
And [the response of the FBI agent] was to say, the American people 
will not understand this, someone is going to die because of this. (Baker, 
6.39-40) 
In addition to not having access to FBI law enforcement information and personnel, 
the FBI agent did not have access to “a lot of government information” that would 
have assisted him with tracking down the two terrorists.  After seeking and acquiring 
authorizations to access the government information that could be available to him, 
he encountered a second access issue.  He did not have computer access to the 
records that he had acquired the legal authority to review (Baker, 6.39).   
Two terrorists were living openly in San Diego.  They had California IDs, were 
making purchases and engaging in financial transactions, signing rental agreements 
in their own names, and booking flights on the plane that they would ultimately 
crash into the Pentagon.  The FBI agent who was pursuing the trail of the terrorists 
had access to databases for arrests and certain automobile registrations, but these 
two terrorists had not registered any vehicles and had not been arrested.  Because 
the agent did not have access to other information, it took him nearly two weeks to 
figure out and check out the hotel address one of them had put on his visa when he 
entered the country.  Baker concludes: 
If [the FBI agent] could have been able to find those two guys and then check 
the links that they had to many of the other terrorists—there were direct 
shared addresses as I remember, links to the people who flew into the south 
tower and the north tower.  We had a chance to stop this.  The one chance 
that I can see in all of the errors that were made where we really could have 
prevented this. (Baker, 6.39) 
While Baker called it a failure of tools and rules, in the end he had constructed a tale 
of the agent’s inability to access the people who may have had knowledge and the 
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databases that may have had relevant information.  Had this information been 
pursued, according to Commissioner Ben-Veniste, we certainly could have found the 
two individuals (6.47). 
  A number of post-9/11 accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures centered on 
whether the law enforcement community had too much or too little access to 
information.  For the most part, these discussions occurred in the context of the 
debate between privacy and civil liberties interests.  On December 8, 2003, the 9/11 
Commission and witnesses examined legal authorities relating to intelligence 
collection and the law enforcement community’s access to information.  Areas 
scrutinized by the Commission included:  the ease with which a field agent, with 
approval from her supervisor, could issue a National Security Letter authorizing 
access to any individual’s telephone records; whether the FBI should be able to issue 
administrative subpoenas when conducting investigations relating to terrorism; 
support for a national identification card; the Wiretap Act of 1968; the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); the Federal Privacy Act of 1974; the Posse 
Comitatus Act; and the Patriot Act (Baker, Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, Gorton, Kean, 
Miller, Roemer, Rotenberg, Schulhofer, Thompson, 6.2-61).    
 This section is not intended to review the security/privacy debate but to 
underscore the saliency of the construct access to information for the Commissioners 
and witnesses examining the why and how of September 11.  The question for the 
participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings is, Who should and should not have access 
to national security information?  This issue is control, and its saliency reflects 
common practices for most 21st century organizations where, as a matter of course, 
“rigid chains of command keep people from talking to anyone outside their 
departments . . . and protocols define who can be consulted, advised, or criticized” 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 17).   
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 A  Law Enforcement and Prosecutorial Approach to Fighting Terrorism 
A dominant theme in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts was the failure of 
the Intelligence Community to prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11.   
Descriptions of these failures included the one-way street of information from 
Federal agencies, particularly the FBI, to state and local authorities as well as a lack 
of coordination, cooperation, relating, and sharing of information among the various 
agencies of the Federal government.  A central explanation for these failures was 
“the dominance of the law-enforcement and prosecutorial approach to terrorist 
issues” (Lehman, 1.1.106).  The following is a synthesis of these testimonies.   
 The collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the United States 
has been divided between the FBI and the CIA since 1947.  The FBI produced  
domestic intelligence for prosecution and law enforcement, and the CIA produced 
strategic foreign intelligence for national security policy and decision making.  The 
consequence was a lack of sharing of information between the FBI’s tracking of 
radicals at home and the CIA’s tracking of radicals abroad (Byman, 1.1.241).  This 
“gap,” exacerbated by minimal effort “to marry up . . . privileged information,” left 
only the FBI holding some information and the CIA with other information (Byman, 
1.1.241). As a result, for example, indications that airlines might be used by al 
Qaeda hijackers for “destructive purposes or cataclysmic terrorism,” known to the 
portion of the intelligence community that dealt with foreign intelligence, was not 
available for domestic use (Cleland, 2.1.109).    
Within the FBI, the sharing of information was impeded by the central mission 
of the FBI.  The FBI was primarily a law enforcement agency that focused on 
prosecuting cases (Byman, 1.1.243).  Agents were responsible for investigating and 
bringing terrorists to justice.  This involved capturing them and making a case that 
would result in conviction and imprisonment (Lehman, 1.1.268).  When the FBI is 
trying to make a case, prosecution superseded the sharing of information:   
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[When] the FBI . . . provides information for the Department of Justice, their 
indictments come down.  Suddenly all the information goes into the black 
hole.  It can’t be shared, it is grand jury information, it is law enforcement 
information, but it is being used in the adjudication of criminal cases and, 
therefore, doesn’t get disseminated.  (Fielding, 1.2.189)  
As a result, evidence that a national security strategist within the FBI or CIA might 
think is very important was treated as unimportant by someone who wanted to build 
a case.  An FBI agent was always, and only, thinking about whether the evidence 
was admissible in a courtroom (Sofaer, 1.1.270).  This is a second way in which the 
prosecutorial approach to terrorism fostered a lack of intelligence sharing in the 
intelligence community.   
September 11, 2001, according to all accounts in the Public Hearing 
Transcripts, was a massive failure of the U.S. government, and problems associated 
with the intelligence function contributed to this failure.  A dominant accounting for 
this failure by the 9/11 Commissioners and witnesses was the law enforcement 
approach to terrorism that created two barriers, the divide between foreign and 
domestic intelligence and the divide between law enforcement and strategic 
intelligence (Steinberg, 4.42).  This approach, according to the witnesses, fostered a 
lack of sharing of information between intelligence agencies and within the FBI.   
The ineffectiveness of a law enforcement/prosecutorial approach to fighting 
terrorism, described by witnesses in the 9/11 Public Hearings, is characteristic of the 
structures of many modern organizations, and the problems created by these 
structures:   
The difficulty of achieving effective responses to changing circumstances is 
often further aggravated by the high degree of specialization in different 
functional areas within the organization. . . . Interdepartmental 
communications and coordination are often poor, and people often have a 
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myopic view of what is occurring, there being no overall grasp of the situation 
facing the enterprise as a whole.  As a result the actions encouraged by one 
element of the organization often entail negative consequences for others, so 
that one element ends up working against the interests of another.  (Morgan, 
1997, p. 29)  
The challenge, according to Commissioner Lehman, is to “come up with procedures 
to insure that there is full sharing among all the offices, . . . even at the expense of 
perhaps weakening the evidentiary sanctity of a prosecution” (1.1.107).  This 
challenge is not to be minimized.  The highly functional silos that dominate our 
current way of thinking about organizational structure, communication, efficiency 
and effectiveness have their origins in 17th century Newtonian science and have been 
deeply rooted in management practices since the Industrial Revolution (Wheatley, 
1994, p. 27). 
Summary and Discussion 
 The constructs information flow, actionable intelligence, sharing and 
coordination of information, access to information, and a law 
enforcement/prosecutorial approach to fighting terrorism dominated the accounts of 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures in the 9/11 Public Hearings.  In the terms of the ESR 
model (Weick et al., 2005) presented in Chapter Two, constructs dominate as a 
result of redundant and consistent use of institutional frameworks to make sense of 
an experience: 
Explicit efforts at sensemaking tend to occur when the current state of the 
world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world . . . . 
To make sense of the disruption, . . . “reasons” are pulled from frameworks 
such as institutional constraints, organizational premises, plans, expectations, 
acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors. (Weick, 
et al., 2005, p. 409)  
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 In this section, the transmission view of communication is presented as an 
institutional premise that significantly in-formed the dominant accounts of pre-9/11 
intelligence in the Public Hearing Transcripts.   
 In testimonies on flow of information, the focus was on the dissemination of 
information by the Intelligence Community to its consumers. In debates over access 
to various kinds of information, the focus was on information that was or was not 
made available to various individuals and agencies within the Intelligence 
Community. In accounts of sharing and coordination of information, the focus was on 
the hand off of information within the Intelligence Community.  In discussions on 
actionable intelligence, the focus was on the specificity of information that was 
handed off.  The dominant explanation for these failures was the dominance of the 
law enforcement and prosecutorial approach to terrorist issues.  With each of the 
constructs, the focus was on whether information was moved through the 
intelligence production process.   
 Fundamentally, each of the constructs assumed a flow of information from a 
source in the Intelligence Community to a receiver or consumer of national security 
intelligence.  Peeling away the language that marks the differences among these 
constructs, we find resounding similarities regarding the sense that was made of the 
pre-9/11 intelligence failures.  Each can be understood in terms of what was or was 
not sent, imparted, transmitted, transferred, passed, conveyed, given to others, or 
“otherwise gotten from person to person”  (Axley, 1984, p. 430).  In the language of 
the transcripts, the underpinning construct is what was and was not disseminated.   
 Portrayed as a linear single-tracked process by which information is acquired 
and converted into a product for consumers of information, the intelligence 
production process constructed by the 9/11 Public Hearing participants reflects the 
transmission model of communication, the dominant view of communication in 
modern Western society.  During the 19th century, the movement of information and 
 88
the movement of goods and people were seen as essentially identical processes, and 
both were described as communication (Carey, 1989, p. 15).  This transmission view 
of communication has dominated American thought and culture, and possibly all 
industrial cultures, since the 1920s (Carey, 1989, p. 23) and continues to be the 
most common view of communication (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, p. 22): 
Our basic orientation to communication remains grounded, at the deepest 
roots of our thinking, in the idea of transmission:  communication is a process 
whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of 
distance and people. (Carey, 1989, p. 15) 
When communication is viewed as transmission, it is constructed as a process and 
technology that spread, transmit, and disseminate knowledge, ideas, and 
information, with the goal of controlling space and people (Carey, 1989, p. 17).  In 
this view, communication has been called “a metaphorical pipeline through which 
information is transferred from one person to another,” to accomplish their goals and 
objectives (Axley, 1984, p. 429).  This metaphor figuratively depicts communication 
as a conduit where: 
(1) language transfers thoughts and feelings from person to person; (2) 
speakers and writers insert thoughts and feelings in words; (3) words contain 
the thoughts and feelings; and (4) listeners or readers extract the thoughts 
and feelings from the words. (Axley, p. 429) 
A communication model that represents the transmission view of communication is 
David Berlo’s SMCR model (1960):  Communication occurs when a sender (S) 
transmits a message (M) through a channel (C) to a receiver (R) (Berlo, 1960, pp. 
30-38). This transmission view of communication continues to dominate dictionary 
definitions of communication.  Accounts of individual and collective behaviors, 
informed by this model of communication, organize experience so that:             
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1. Meaning is treated as a commodity to transfer from one place to another. 
Communication involves the physical transfer of thought, emotion, meaning, 
etc. from one place to another (Axley, 1984, p. 429; Wheatley, 1994, p. 
101).   
2. Communication is presented as a uni-directional process, or at best, a 
sequential process (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, p. 23). 
3. The message receiver is portrayed as passive and uninvolved (Eisenberg &  
Goodall, 1993, pp. 23-24).  Once the sender finds the right words to 
accomplish the transfer of thought, emotion, meaning, etc., then the fidelity 
becomes guaranteed, even routine.  All the receiver or listener needs to do is 
“unpack the thoughts from the words” (Axley, 1984, p. 433).   
4. Accurate, perfect information is regarded as a tool for accomplishing goals 
(Berlo, 1960, p. 40; Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, p. 22).    
5. Success is defined in terms of message distribution, or the passing of ideas or 
meaning from one person to another.  To achieve desired results, the 
message must be distributed (Axley, 1984, p. 433; Carey, 1989, p. 15).  
The intelligence production process constructed by the 9/11 Public Hearing 
participants resonates with the conduit or transmission model of communication:   
1. Intelligence is constructed as a product and the U.S. Intelligence Community 
exists “to provide product” (Lehman, 2.2.31) precisely to the users who are 
tasked with defending the country.  Analysts collect data to develop products 
for consumers. 
2. Finished intelligence (i.e., actionable intelligence)  is solid, specific, credible.  
The finished product, in contrast to raw intelligence data, is used as the basis 
for action, national policy development, and decision making. 
3. Action is causally or quasi-casually affected by the receipt or non-receipt of 
intelligence. For example, witnesses testified they could not prepare for 
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terrorist attacks to the American homeland in 2001 because they had not 
received actionable intelligence.     
4. Intelligence production is a one-way street of information and consumers of 
information are passive recipients of information.  For example, despite the 
“great deal of information that [came] in, sometimes 300 messages in a day,” 
the FAA administrator never asked “for additional assessments” from the 
Intelligence Community (Fielding & Garvey, 2.1.106-107).   
Authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, dozens of agencies and 
departments were formally charged with performing the intelligence activities (i.e., 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information) that are necessary for the 
conduct of foreign relations and national security of the United States.  These 
agencies, linked by their charge, have come to be known as the Intelligence 
Community.  With this legislation, an official definition of what is and is not 
intelligence was clearly demarcated:  Intelligence is the product of a process 
(collection, analysis, and dissemination of information) performed by the Intelligence 
Community for officials who are responsible for national security.   
With these definitions, we see an invisible hand shaping the accounts of the 
Commissioners and witnesses in the 9/11 Public Hearings.  In their review of pre-
9/11 intelligence failures, the participants turn their attention to the intelligence 
production processes that have been charged to the Intelligence Community.  Using 
“unquestioned constructs” (Schutz, 1967; see also Axley, 1984, p. 428) to 
apprehend and organize witness testimony, the Commissioners embarked on an 
analysis within a taken-for-granted framework, the transmission model of 
communication, that narratively reduced the kinds of explanations and solutions that 
were available to them.   
According to the transmission view of communication, success is defined in 
terms of message distribution.  Similarly, the success of the Intelligence Community 
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is defined in terms of its dissemination of national security information to consumers.  
Axley (1984) reminded us that little doubt remains about the capacity of metaphors 
(such as the conduit metaphor) to create perspective, to structure points of view (p. 
129).  In this vein, it not unexpected that the dominant accounts of pre-9/11 
intelligence failures are accounts of failures in dissemination.  To wit, the consumers 
of intelligence testified that they depended on information from the Intelligence 
Community and that they did not receive it.   
 As we discuss the dominant constructs of pre-9/11 intelligence failures in the 
Public Hearing Transcripts, it is important to remember that experience is the 
“moment of vision” before intellectualization takes place (Weick, 1995, p. 24).  For 
example, many of us can vividly recall an instance in a young child’s life (e.g., falling 
off a bed, or stumbling and falling onto a rough sidewalk) when the wide-eyed child 
looked for others’ reactions before laughing, wailing, or merely getting up and 
brushing himself off before resuming play.  This example exemplifies not only the 
moment of experience before intellectualization or meaning takes place, but also the 
multiplicity of meanings that could be attached to a single instance of experience.  
Additionally, it exemplifies the partial nature of the experience that is captured in the 
interpretation that is constructed (e.g., the fallen child may respond differently to the 
parents’ but not a stranger’s reaction).   
 The intellectualization of the events leading to September 11, 2001, includes 
the labels, e.g., lack of coordination, that were being employed in the 9/11 Public 
Hearings and discussed in this paper.  In an effort to understand the complexity of 
9/11, we (i.e., first the Commission and witnesses, then the writer of this paper) are 
singling out events and organizing them into plausible explanations (Weick, 1995, 
pp. 55-61); that is, we are intellectualizing the experience of 9/11 with the 
constructs we use to make sense of our experiences.  The products of our efforts will 
not mirror the events leading to 9/11, but are a retrospective accounting of the 
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experience based on the constructs we have available to make sense of the world.  
As a result of the complexity of experience and the partial, partisan interpretations 
we apply to experience, the constructs that we create to explain the world are not as 
clear cut and mutually exclusive as we might like them to be. The event is always 
more complex than the stories we can tell about it, and the stories reflect the 
individual and collective theories we use to make sense of the world.  This chapter 
presented a detailed discussion of the construction of intelligence failures 
documented in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  Chapter Four provides a detailed 
analysis of the dominant accounts of accountability in these transcripts.  By looking 
at the constructions that were front stage in the 9/11 Public Hearings, we are 
creating opportunities to also consider alternative constructions that are not 
currently informing how America prepares its defense against this newly-
acknowledged enemy.  One of these, an autopoietic open systems perspective, will 
be explored in Chapter Five.     
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 9/11 PUBLIC HEARINGS  
 
 Throughout the 9/11 Public Hearings, Commissioners and witnesses declared 
their goal to assign accountability for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
For the most part, the participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings stated their intentions 
not to “point fingers” (Kean, 1.1.11), participate in a “blame game” (Ben-Veniste, 
1.1.30), or conduct a “witch hunt” directed at one particular agency or particular 
individuals (McCain, 2.1.7), as there was nothing to be gained by finding, placing, 
asserting, or assigning blame or pointing fingers (Corzine, 2.1.63; Waizer, 1.1.116). 
According to the testimonies of many of the participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings, 
it wasn’t about blame but about accountability (Corzine, 2.1.63):  Americans needed 
and wanted to know how their government may have failed them (Lautenberg, 
2.1.80).  Commissioner Roemer stated:  “As our Declaration of Independence 
proclaims, those holding power, ‘deriving their powers from the consent of the 
governed,’ should be accountable to their citizens” (1.1.49-50).  Holding government 
officials and employees accountable was what the American people needed, wanted, 
and demanded (Fetchet, 1.1.187; Lautenberg, 2.1.80; Lieberman, 2.1.16), and that 
was what the Commission set out to do (Roemer, 1.1.49).   
 As the hearings proceeded and the events leading to 9/11 were 
reconstructed, the search for accountability prompted accounts of blame and 
exoneration.  In the end, we find that the initial search for accountability for 9/11 
was subsequently enacted as stories of: 
1. Exoneration (i.e., I fulfilled my responsibilities).  
2. Finger pointing and blame (i.e., the deflection of accountability for 9/11 to 
others who did not fulfill their responsibilities).  
 This chapter has four sections. The first section presents the constructions of 
blame and exoneration, the dominant responses by participants in the 9/11 Public 
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Hearings to the often unstated, but ever present question:  Who was accountable for 
September 11, 2001?   As the construct oversight is a core element of accountability 
in government institutions (Kearns, 1998), the constructions of “oversight” by the 
9/11 Public Hearing Commission and witnesses are also presented.  Excerpts from 
witnesses’ accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, the dominant focus of the 9/11 
Hearings, are used to illustrate the constructions of blame, self exoneration, and 
oversight in the Public Hearing Transcripts.    
 Whereas the first section of this chapter focuses on the construction of pre-
9/11 events, the second section focuses on various post-9/11 recommendations for 
securing America against future terrorist attacks.  These recommendations provide 
the greatest opportunity to review the meaning of accountability in the Public 
Hearing Transcripts.  Because self exoneration and blaming dominated witnesses’ 
accounts of the events leading to September 11, these accounts provide very little 
insight into witnesses’ views of accountability.  Additionally, there was no agenda 
item on the Public Hearing dockets entitled accountability.  Therefore, various 
recommendations for post-9/11 accountability are compiled to provide insight into 
what the Commission had in mind when they demanded accountability for officials 
with critical national security responsibilities (Lieberman, 2.1.16).  This compilation is 
presented in the second section of this chapter.   
 In the 9/11 proceedings, witnesses and Commissioners used the words 
responsibility and accountability interchangeably.  I attempt to distinguish between 
these in the third section of this chapter.   The dominant themes of accountability 
presented in the first three sections of this chapter are summarized and discussed in 
the final section of the chapter.   
Who Was Accountable for September 11, 2001? 
 Whatever the witnesses and Commissioners said about not attributing blame, 
the pointing of fingers was pervasive and far reaching during the Public Hearings, 
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ranging from the “dysfunctional society in the Arab Muslim countries” (Push, 
1.1.222) and “the murderous group of thugs that hijacked and crashed those planes” 
(Shelby, 2.1.22) to our Western sense of invulnerability and the complacency in 
which we all shared (Cleland, 1.1.61).  Those who were targeted in the 9/11 Public 
Hearing transcripts as being culpable for September 11 included:   
1. The United States government (Thompson, 1.1.55)—that is, U.S. 
policymakers (Gasiorowski, 3.59), senior political decision makers (Lehman, 
4.38), Congress (Cleland, 1.1.58; McCain, 2.1.10; Roemer, 6.21; Shays, 
2.1.78; Wermuth, 1.2.142), the Clinton and Bush administrations 
(Schulhofer, 6.20; Shays, 2.1.78), Presidents Clinton and Bush (Kerrey, 
7.1.55), elected officials with oversight responsibilities (Fetchet, 1.1.183)  
2. The intelligence community (Cleland, 1.1.57; Fetchet, 1.1.182; Gunaratna, 
3.28; Kleinberg, 1.1.192; Lieberman, 2.1.15) 
3. Other government agencies (Barr, 6.104)—that is, border control, aviation 
security (Pelosi, 2.1.5; Shelby, 2.1.26), the State Department (Fine, 1.2.40)  
4. The airline industry (Push, 1.1.216), airport security (Bloomberg, 1.1.72),  
aviation security program (Mead, 2.1.104), the FAA (Mead, 2.1.110) 
5. The CIA (Lehman, 4.73-74) and FBI (MacGaffin, 6.93) 
 
6. The many bureaucratic steps between the development of a counterterrorism 
budget within the FBI, or a CTC budget within the CIA, and a final 
administration budget request from the Office of Management and Budget 
(Shelby, 2.1.23) 
7. The whole political campaign contribution system (Push, 1.1.216)  
 
8. T-U-R-F (Harman, 2.1.46)  
 
9. Policy failures (Ranstorp, 1.1.257) 
 
10. Our systems, our bureaucracies, and our inflexibility toward change (Sincock,  
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1.1.157) 
 
11. The media (Shays, 2.1.78) 
 
12. Human, budgetary, and organizational deficits (Schulhofer, 6.6) 
 
 In testimonies provided by those who were targets of blame for the events 
leading to 9/11, there were recurring accounts of self exoneration and deflection of 
accountability, based on the fact that they were fulfilling what they understood to be 
their responsibilities.  The following testimony provided by Ms. Garvey, Administrator 
of the FAA from August of 1997 until August 2002, exemplifies this stance:     
On September 10th, 2001, by statute, civil aviation security in the United 
States  was a shared responsibility.  Air carriers had the primary responsibility 
for screening passengers and baggage, and for applying security measures to 
everything that went on their planes.  Airports were responsible for keeping a 
secure ground environment and for providing law enforcement support.   
Government’s role, that is the FAA’s role, was regulatory.  By 
rulemaking, the FAA set the security standards for U.S. airports, for U.S 
airlines worldwide, and for foreign air carriers flying in the United States.  The 
FAA also ensured compliance with those standards. . . .  
  On September 10th, aviation security was responsive to the assessed 
 threat based on information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies.   
Within the FAA, the Office of Civil Aviation Security was the primary 
office responsible for security.  The FAA, as others may point out, was not an 
intelligence gathering organization.  Threat analysis was . . . based on raw 
and finished intelligence products supplied to the FAA from these 
communities. . . .    
And on September 10th, based on intelligence reporting, we saw 
explosive devices on aircraft as the most dangerous threat. . . . 
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We were also concerned about what we now think of as traditional 
hijacking. (Garvey, 2.1.87-90) 
 According to Garvey, the FAA was exonerated for the events leading to 9/11.  
By being responsive to threats identified by the Intelligence Community, they were 
fulfilling their understanding of their responsibilities.  By not providing solid 
intelligence on the attacks that would occur on 9/11, the Intelligence Community 
was culpable (Garvey, 2.1.88).  Similar accounts of exoneration and deflection of 
accountability were relayed throughout the 9/11 Public Hearings.   
 The FAA, NORAD, and Consular Affairs were among those who pointed to the 
Intelligence Community as the cause of their failure to prepare for, mitigate, or 
prevent the attacks on 9/11.  As a result, there was considerable discussion during 
the Public Hearings about the Community’s failures, responsibilities, and 
accountability.  These discussions, however, also quickly prompted stories with 
themes of self exoneration and blame.  For example, according to Senator Shelby, 
the Intelligence Community’s performance prior to September 11 was not the fault of 
Congress:  
Defenders of the intelligence community’s performance during the Clinton 
administration and prior to September 11th, insinuated that it was really the 
fault of Congress that the intelligence community failed to detect and deter 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon . . . . 
Unfortunately, a surprising number of my colleagues in Congress 
seemed to give credence to the suggestion that September 11th was in some 
way our fault.  I have at times been a harsh and I believe a constructive critic 
of the intelligence community.  I have never asserted, however, that the 
attacks of September the 11th were anyone’s fault other than the murderous 
group of thugs that hijacked and crashed those planes into the symbols of 
American military and economic power.  We should all keep that in mind as 
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we search for the truth here. (Shelby, 2.1.22) 
Congress, according to Shelby, had emphasized counter-terrorism and counter-
intelligence as fundamental policy priorities for years.  As part of his testimony, 
Shelby provided an overview of the “aggressive steps” taken by the Senate 
Intelligence Committee to address “what were becoming very clear indications of 
fundamental weaknesses in our ability to attack the terrorist target” (Shelby, 
2.1.23).  These steps included:   
1. Identifying counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence as two of the five 
highest priorities of the intelligence community.  
2. Listing terrorism, and the ability of the U.S. to combat it, as one of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee’s highest priorities in every one of its bills, since 1996. 
3. Revealing, in 1998, that the FBI was failing to address the significant 
technological challenges that were degrading its ability to track terrorists. 
4. Highlighting serious FBI-wide deficiencies in information technology and 
modernization, and the absence of a plan to address them. 
5. Recognizing a critical shortage of language skills, including Arabic and Farsi, 
in the FBI and directing the FBI to review its language recruiting efforts. 
6. Working to remove restrictions that unnecessarily hindered the collection of 
terrorism information. 
7. Detailing serious problems in information sharing between intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement organizations. 
8. Registering its concern that there was no comprehensive intelligence 
community estimate on present and emerging terrorist threats and directing 
the Director of Central Intelligence to produce such an estimate. 
9. Working to effect structural and organizational changes within the 
community.  
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10. Creating three Senate-confirmable management positions to address 
community-wide problems with coordination on collection, analysis, and 
production issues. 
11. Engaging in efforts to increase funding for counterterrorism. 
These, according to Shelby, were just “a few examples of congressional actions” 
(2.1.24).  Congress, according to Shelby’s understanding of its responsibilities, was 
doing what it could and should be doing—that is, encouraging “these things” 
(2.1.25).  “Ultimately,” according to Shelby, “the intelligence community is led and 
run by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who deserves most of the credit or 
blame for the decisions he makes and the results that he produces” (Shelby, 2.1.25).  
In his testimony, Shelby identified pre-9/11 decisions made by the DCI that reflected 
a “complete disregard for congressional direction” (2.1.25).  Examples included:   
1. In 2001, prior to September 11, the CIA reported that it would not spend 
millions of its counterterrorism funds, despite the fact that Congress had fully 
funded the administration’s request for a Counter-terrorism Center (CTC).      
2. The DCI resisted efforts by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to 
remove restrictions that unnecessarily hindered the collection of terrorism 
information.  
3. The DCI, at the time of the Public Hearings in 2001, had not yet submitted 
names to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for Senate-confirmable 
high visibility management staff positions, which were created in 1996  to 
“help . . . manage the intelligence community” (Shelby, 2.1.24).   
4. The DCI, at the time of the Public Hearings, had not complied with the 1997 
request of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee to produce a 
comprehensive intelligence community estimate on present and emerging 
terrorist threats. 
Shelby’s testimony serves as an additional example of  the recurring themes of self 
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exoneration and the deflection of accountability that dominated the responses to the 
question most frequently posed during the 9/11 Public Hearing, Who was responsible 
for the pre-9/11 intelligence failures? 
Oversight 
 It is not surprising that oversight surfaced as a dominant construct during the 
9/11 Public Hearings.  Kearns (1998), reviewing basic definitions of accountability, 
identified oversight as a core element of accountability in government institutions; 
that is, at “the heart of any accountability system” is “a higher authority vested with 
the power of oversight” (p. 144).  Recognizing the prominent role that oversight 
plays in public sector accountability, this section explores definitions and issues that 
inform our understanding of the constructions of accountability in the 9/11 Public 
Hearing Transcripts.    
 Definitions of oversight include watchful care, management, supervision, and 
management by overseeing the performance or operation of a person or group.   
Similarly, synonyms for oversight include supervision, supervising, and 
superintendence.  Definitions of legislative oversight include legislative control of 
bureaucracy, legislative supervision and monitoring of the executive, the intention to 
influence the performance of administration, formal and informal efforts to bring 
agencies into compliance with congressional demands, monitoring the fidelity of 
elected leaders and their subordinates, and maintaining accountability (Johnson, 
1985, p. 550; Ogul, 1976; Ogul & Rockman, 1990, pp. 5, 6, 21).   
 The purpose of oversight is to ensure that those to whom authority is 
delegated remain responsive (Ogul & Rockman, 1990, p. 7).  The question is, to 
whom or what should governmental agencies be responsive – Professional norms?  
Democratic values?  Internal constituencies?  Public interest constituencies?  
Committee preferences? Congress as a whole?  Multiple principals, for example, the 
President, the courts, interest groups, and the agencies themselves (Ogul & 
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Rockman, 1990, pp. 7–12)?   
 Acknowledging that they are reiterating what many have pointed out, Ogul 
and Rockman (1990) described oversight of U.S. executive agencies as “an unusually  
political” undertaking, one that is especially responsive to well-articulated political 
demands and “possibly subject to excesses of parochial influences” (p. 21).  Ogul 
and Rockman concluded, “The United States political system fails to resolve the 
issues of who is boss” (p. 12).  In fact, it was impossible for Ogul and Rockman to 
imagine the U.S. system of government being otherwise.  In a system that 
emphasizes the independence of institutions and the relative autonomy of 
congressional committees and sub-committees, it was unimaginable that the 
multiplicity of efforts to influence and control agencies could be easily reconciled into 
a feasible coordinating mechanism for oversight (pp. 21-22).      
 The U.S. intelligence community—that is, executive agencies such as the CIA 
and FBI—is not exempt from the diffuse nature of is oversight.  Inspectors general, 
oversight boards within the executive branch, Congress, courts, and even the media 
have assumed responsibility for monitoring intelligence activities (Johnson, 1985).  
Pre-eminent among the overseers of the intelligence communities have been 
Congress with its congressional committees (p. 550) and the President:   
In theory, the director of central intelligence, as the president’s principal 
intelligence adviser, presides over the allocation of resources of this entire 
system.  Just so, Congress with the constitutional power of the purse, 
theoretically oversees the policies, organization, and efficiency of this vast 
army of intelligence workers. (Ransom, 1975, p. 158)  
However, the reality has been, and may continue to be, considerably different. 
According to Ransom (1975), neither Congress nor the director of central intelligence 
appeared to provide meaningful oversight of the intelligence community.   
A tug of war for oversight of, and accountability for, the intelligence agencies 
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was at the heart of an unprecedented comprehensive investigation of the intelligence 
community in the 70s (Ransom, 1975, p. 160).   In 1976 Congress established the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI); in 1977 the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) was established.  With the Intelligence and 
Intelligence-Related Activities Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies became subject to the 
congressional authorization and appropriation procedures imposed on other 
executive agencies (Bruemmer, 1992, p. 874).  Authorities delegated to the SSCI 
and HPSCI included supervising intelligence policy, monitoring the analysis and 
production of intelligence, developing legislation that guides and regulates the 
operations of the intelligence community, authorizing the annual budgets of the 
Community, and overseeing and advising the President and the Director Central 
Intelligence on the conduct of clandestine activities (Bruemmer, 1992, pp. 874, 878; 
Flanagan, 1985, p. 62; Johnson, 1985, p. 550).   
 However, in 1985, Johnson noted that full accountability for enforcing the 
accountability of intelligence agencies remained elusive, as Congress could not agree 
on how much accountability it should require and how they could ensure it (p. 549).  
In 1985, Flanagan also reported that all was not well with the Intelligence 
Community.  However, he acknowledged that intelligence analysis and collection 
activities were generally improving, and believed this course could be maintained if 
effective management by the DCI were coupled with “judicious guidance and 
oversight by the President and Congress” (p. 95).  
 In 1987, Goodman noted the long standing problems stemming from 
alarming defects in the executive and congressional oversight of the Intelligence 
Community (p. 123).  For example, existing laws, executive orders, and regulations 
did not outline the process by which Congress should conduct oversight of the U.S. 
intelligence operations (p. 124).  Goodman called for a “new charter” to address the 
 103
problems that had repeatedly led to intelligence failures or abuses (Goodman, 1984-
85, pp. 162–169; Goodman, 1987, p. 135).  This charter was to delineate the 
process for Congress to exercise operational and fiscal oversight of U.S. intelligence 
(p.135).   
 Berkowitz (1996), referencing at least six official and unofficial studies within 
the previous three years on how to improve U.S. intelligence, asserted, “If we have 
not figured out how to fix the intelligence community, it is not for lack of trying” (p. 
35). The approaches to reform summarized by Berkowitz in 1996 included various 
efforts to ensure the intelligence community obeyed the law and complied with 
oversight requirements.  The focus was on efficiency and responsiveness (p. 37) by 
clarifying roles, missions, and priorities in the intelligence community.  Efficiency 
studies, streamlining and better prioritization and planning implied that there was 
nothing wrong with the intelligence system that better management (i.e., oversight)  
could not fix (p. 40).   
In 1975, Ransom had written: 
Neither Congress nor the director of central intelligence appears to have 
meaningful control.  Therefore, it is difficult to focus policy or managerial 
responsibility or accountability on any particular place within the executive or 
legislative branches.  In the absence of such accountability, “oversight” as 
currently exercised is best defined in the dictionary’s other meaning of the 
word—“overlooking” or the absence of careful attention. (pp. 158-159) 
Ransom’s observation in 1975 reverberates in numerous comments, questions, 
and recommendations provided by witnesses and Commissioners during the 9/11 
Public Hearings held in 2002 and 2003:   
1. Comments, e.g., “I never really understood who was in charge” (Cleland, 
2.1.18); “I very much endorse Senator Graham’s views that congressional 
oversight is an area that screams for your attention” (Goss, 2.1.35); and “We 
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must . . . provide meaningful oversight of the intelligence community” (Goss, 
2.1.32). 
2. Questions, for example, “More than 12 different agencies under six different 
cabinet officers were part of the intelligence community. But who was 
accountable (Cleland, 4.30)?  “Short of the President, who do we look to for 
these things” (Steinberg, 4.48)?   
3. Recommendations, for example, “There’s got to be somebody in charge of the 
intelligence community” (Cleland, 2.1.55), and “There has to be continual 
oversight” (McCarthy, 4.74). 
Oversight:  The Intelligence Function 
 This section focuses on the dominant constructions of oversight that appear in 
the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  It begins with a description of the duties of the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), an independent, non-partisan investigative arm of 
Congress:          
 We make recommendations to the agencies who in turn are responsive to the
 U.S. Congress. . . .  
It is for us to present the information to the policymakers, and from 
there, they can make them do it . . . . 
We are a congressional agency and our mission is oversight, generally, 
of the executive agencies. 
I don’t want to sound like [the agencies] don’t do anything, but 
generally the implementation [of GAO recommendations] is not the way we 
want it to be.  Some of the recommendations that have been made  . . . have 
been around for years.  They were either not implemented or partially 
implemented.  (Dillingham, 1.2, 104-105) 
As early as 1975, it was noted that the potential of the GAO as an overseer of the 
intelligence community had not been realized (Ransom, 1975, p. 163).   During cross 
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examination by the Commissioners, Dillingham added, “It has to be a congressional 
priority that is followed through” if a GAO recommendation is to be implemented 
(Dillingham, 1.2.104).   
According to the GAO officer, the GAO can not get things done, but Congress 
can.  Senator Shelby, however, presented a different perspective: 
Congress can encourage these things, and they should.  And we have 
certainly tried, but the legislature merely conducts oversight.  We do not and 
should not, I believe, direct the operational activities of our intelligence 
agencies . . . . We can legislate, but there is little we can do to compel 
compliance. . . .   
While Congress oversees the intelligence activities of the U. S., 
ultimately, the intelligence community is led and run by the Director of 
Central Intelligence. (Shelby, 2.1.25) 
 The threats to the United States on the eve of  9/11 included growing threats 
from Iran, Iraq, and Korea; the military modernization in China; threats in regional 
areas (e.g., Bosnia and Africa); terrorism in all its dimensions (e.g., chemical, 
biological, and nuclear; refugee flow; and humanitarian disasters).  When asked by a 
Senator at an Armed Services Committee meeting which were the most important 
threats, CIA Director George Tenet replied, “If any of those happens, I’m 
accountable, I can’t prioritize” (Gannon, 4.67). 
 On the one hand, the accountability for various threats was assumed by the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); on the other hand, others testified at the 9/11 
hearings that the DCI, or the people working for him, could not be held accountable 
for the events leading to 9/11 for a variety of reasons: The pre-9/11 Intelligence 
Community consisted of more than twelve different agencies reporting to six or more 
Cabinet officers; most of the resources belonged to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the committees that provided oversight of the DOD; and the DCI 
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controlled no more than 20 percent of the budget (Shelby, 2.1.46).  Insufficient 
authority, lack of resources, and no “report card” (Kleinberg, 1.1.224) have 
mitigated the accountability of the DCI for the events leading to 9/11.  This 
according to Kleinberg is why “congressional oversight becomes extremely 
important” (1.1.224).  With this last statement, however, we have come full circle.  
According to various participants in the 9/11 hearings, the responsibility of Congress 
is to encourage but not direct and compel compliance; the intelligence community is 
run and lead by the DCI, but he can not be held accountable for the events leading 
to 9/11 because he did not have the authority and resources; because the DCI does 
not have the resources and authority, congressional oversight, post-9/11, is 
extremely important.   
 A higher authority vested with the power of oversight is a core element of 
basic definitions of accountability in the literature on public administration (Kearns, 
1998, p. 144).  On October 14, 2003, the dominant construction of institutional 
oversight in the Public Hearing Transcripts was captured in Gorelick’s assessment of 
the situation: “Right now we have a situation where there is no accountability for the 
entire government’s intelligence capacity, except in the person of the President of 
the United States and the National Security Advisor as his aide” (Gorelick, 4.14).   
 The testimony of the National Security Advisor at the 9/11 Public Hearing 
provides an additional opportunity to view various but similar constructions of 
oversight by the witnesses and Commissioners.  On April 8, 2004, Dr. Condoleezza 
Rice, the assistant to the President for national security affairs, appeared before the 
Commission and outlined the strategy to eliminate al Qaeda that had been developed 
by the Bush administration over the spring and summer of 2001 and approved by 
the President’s senior national security officials on September 4.  Excerpts from Dr. 
Rice’s statement to the Commission provide insight into her interpretation and 
enactment of oversight:   
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The strategy set as a goal the elimination of the al Qaeda network and threat 
and ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to 
make the elimination of al Qaeda a high priority and to use all aspects of our 
national power – intelligence, financial, diplomatic and military—to meet that 
goal.  And it gave Cabinet secretaries and department heads specific 
responsibilities. (Rice, 9.5) 
The goal was set, and leadership was ordered to meet the goal.  For example, the 
FBI was charged with determining the domestic threat.  However, during his cross 
examination of Dr. Rice, Commissioner Roemer reported that the Commission had 
not found anybody who knew anything about a “tasking” of field offices, despite 
thousands of interviews and a review of millions of pieces of paper:    
Mr. Roemer:  The director . . . of the FBI during this threat period, Mr. Pickard  
. . . says he did not tell the field offices to do this.  And we have talked to the 
special agents in charge.  They don’t have any recollection of receiving a 
notice  of threat.  Nothing went down the chain to the FBI field offices on 
spiking of information, on knowledge of al Qaeda in the country, and still the 
FBI doesn’t do anything.  Isn’t that some of the responsibility of the national 
security advisor? 
Ms. (sic) Rice:  The responsibility for the FBI to do what it was asked 
 was the FBI’s responsibility.  Now, I – 
 Mr. Roemer:  You don’t think there’s any responsibility back to the  
 advisor of the President?   
 Ms. (sic) Rice:  I believe that the responsibility—again, the crisis  
management here was done by the CSG [Counterterrorism Security Group].  
They tasked these things.  If there was any reason to believe that I needed to 
do something . . . , I would have been expected to be asked to do it.  We 
were not asked to do it.  In fact, as I’ve mentioned to you –  
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Mr. Roemer:  But don’t you ask somebody to do it?  You’re not asking 
somebody to . . . do it.  Why wouldn’t you initiate that (Rice & Roemer, 
9.68)? 
  A question posed by Commissioner Gorelick during the 9/11 Public Hearing 
was, “How do you get the organization, the imagination, the leadership, the urgency 
if you haven’t invested someone with authority to move resources to where they 
need to go” (4.14)?  This overview of the testimony on oversight of the executive 
offices, however, reveals that Congress, the GAO, the DCI, and the National Security 
Advisor are among those who have been vested with oversight authority for 
executive offices.  In this light, the question that might be posed, based on the 
above discussion of oversight, is:  How does someone (e.g., Congress, the GAO, the 
DCI, and the National Security Advisor) exercise oversight once they have been 
granted official authority to provide leadership?   
This section has focused on looking backwards, i.e., the construction of 
oversight of, and accountability for, the events leading to September 11.  The next 
section looks forward.  In recommendations for building accountability into 
government, there are indirect, if not direct, references to what the 9/11 
Commissioners and witnesses had in mind when they demanded accountability for 
those who have national security responsibilities.    
Accountability:  Constructions in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts 
 The greatest opportunity to review the construction of accountability in the 
9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts comes in the form of  witnesses’ recommendations 
for building greater accountability into the government.  These recommendations 
included:         
1. Making individuals responsible for doing their jobs properly (Kleinberg, 
1.1.224; Zelikow, 7.1.77), including following rules, procedures, and 
guidelines (Kean, 6.119; Steinberg, 4.36) and fulfilling their assigned 
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responsibilities (Yim, 5.84) with honesty and professionalism (Schulhofer, 
6.26)  
2. Providing resources, for example, sufficient time and agents (Schulhofer, 6.7, 
11)  
3. Giving them both responsibility and authority for budgets, resources and 
programmatic efforts (Gorelick, 4.26; Deutch, 4.19) 
4. Establishing and reporting according to specific, tangible standards, goals and 
specific timetables (Brill, 1.2.123; Kleinberg, 1.1.224; Yim, 5.81) 
5. Integrating annual performance and accountability plans of individuals and 
agencies and linking them to key national indicators (Yim, 5.84) 
6. Holding individuals personally accountable for failing or faltering in their 
duties (Lieberman, 2.1.16)  
7. Having consequences for abuses (Kean, 6.119) and poor performance, for 
example, firing and voting them out of office (Kleinberg, 1.1.224), fines 
(Schiavo, 2.2.87), court martials (Gorelick, 2.7.51) 
 Cumulatively, the composite of performance management techniques recommended 
by the participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings echoed definitions of accountability  
found in the current literature on political science and public administration (Kearns, 
1998, p.143).  For example, Kearns (1998), reviewing basic definitions of 
accountability relating to government institutions, identified: 
three core elements that are at the heart of any accountability system:  (a) a 
higher  authority vested with the power of oversight, (b) an explicit reporting 
mechanism for conveying information to the higher authority, and (c) a 
measure or criterion  used by the higher authority to assess compliance by 
subordinate institutions. (Kearns, 1998, p. 144) 
Each of these core elements is identified or implied in the composite of performance 
management techniques recommended by participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings.   
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Similarly, the features of accountability advocated by the 9/11 Public Hearing 
participants resonate with Fenstermacher’s (1979, pp. 330-331) four conceptual 
features of accountability:   
1. Accountability is a relational term. To say that A is accountable to B implies 
that A is held accountable and that B is holding A accountable. 
2. The accountability holds between persons.2  
3. The relation holds with regard to some standard of performance.   
4. The parties to an accountability relation are obligated to provide or receive 
information.   
Summarized, “Accountability is a relation between persons, wherein person A is 
engaged in the performance of specific tasks, and is obligated to inform person B of 
the standard of performance that is attained in these tasks” (Fenstermacher, 1979, 
p. 331).   
 The literature on accountability distinguishes between basic or narrow 
definitions of accountability and broader definitions.  The narrower definition of 
accountability refers to “answerability” for one’s actions or behaviors to a higher 
authority (Kearns, 1998, p. 144) and focuses on tangible outcomes (Kearns, 1998, 
p. 140).  A broader definition in the literature on accountability in government 
institutions includes assessment of intangibles (Kearns, 1998, p. 144), for example, 
Schulhofer’s recommendation during the public hearings that honesty and 
professionalism be considered as criteria for assessing performance (6.26).  This 
broader definition reaches beyond obeying instructions (Kearns, 1998, p. 144), to 
include managing diverse expectations within and outside the organization (Romzck 
& Dubnick, 1987, p. 228) and responsiveness to societal demands (Kearns, 1998, p. 
144).  According to Kearns (1998), broader definitions that include responsiveness to 
                                                 
2 In the deflection of accountability for events leading to 9/11, participants in the 
9/11 Public Hearings also blamed organizations, processes, and structures for the 
attacks on 9/11.  
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stakeholders and persons in positions of authority are better suited to public 
organizations whose mandates are to preserve the public trust and serve the public 
interest (p. 141).   
 When the testimonies on pre- and post-9/11 accountability are extracted from 
the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts and compiled, a construction of accountability 
emerges that is consistent with the scholarship and practices that dominate Western 
society.  Used by practitioners and scholars, the construct often refers to the 
delegation of authority by “B” to “A,” followed by the answerability of “B” to “A” for 
the performance of assigned tasks.  Satisfactory performance is achieved by 
measuring up to the expectations of “A.”  At the core of this generally-used 
construction of accountability is the notion of fulfilling one’s responsibilities; this is 
the sense of accountability that also dominated the construction of accountability in 
the 9/11 Transcripts (e.g., representatives of FAA, Consular Services, and NORAD 
each testified they were fulfilling their responsibilities).  Therefore, to understand this 
construction of accountability more fully, we must dig deeper into the construction of 
responsibility.   
 In “On Being Responsible,” Haydon (1978) focused on the “notion of 
responsibility” and the various senses we make of it.  Two “senses” that are 
particularly relevant to the constructions of accountability by the 9/11 Public Hearing 
participants are liability-responsibility (p. 47) and virtue-responsibility (p. 46).  
Someone may be held responsible in the liability sense (and hence blamed or 
praised), when:  (a) an agent has particular responsibilities as a function of 
occupying a distinct role and we refer to those as his responsibilities and (b) the 
agent’s action or omission of action is involved in the causation of an event for which 
he has the responsibility (p. 46).  Haydon’s definition of liability-responsibility  
resonates with the construction of accountability by the 9/11 Public Hearing 
participants (e.g., assignment of responsibilities, evaluation of performance based on 
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a person’s performance of those responsibilities, and consequences).   
 This sense of responsibility/accountability, according to Haydon, is unitary 
and monolithic (p. 47); that is, judgments of responsibility and irresponsibility are 
made in relation to a person’s performance of particular roles (p. 51).  It does not 
account for virtue-responsibility, a judgment that a person is responsible in the 
“undertaking” of a responsibility (p. 50).  This sense of responsibility, virtue 
responsibility, according to Haydon (1987) can best be elucidated in terms of 
accountability:   
We need not assume that the notion of responsibilities has sense only in a 
context of roles.  I suggest that while the responsibilities constitutive of a role 
are paradigmatic for “role-responsibility”, ‘responsible’ can be used in the 
same sense without reference to a role (this use can, I think, be elucidated 
independently in terms of accountability). (Haydon, 1978, p. 50) 
The narrower sense of responsibility/accountability restricts accountability to fulfilling 
delegated responsibilities; the broader definition of accountability is not tied to 
particular responsibilities, but extends to any agent in regards to any decision to act 
in one way or another (p. 52).  The components of this broader notion of 
accountability, or virtue-responsibility, are: 
Having regard for consequences. . . . it is required not merely that one act 
with regard for the consequences, but that one evaluate and weigh the 
consequences properly.  The agent is expected to pay special attention to 
consequences involving harm and benefit to others, and to modify his conduct 
so as to promote benefit or at least minimize harm. . . . (Haydon, p. 52) 
Being autonomous. . . .The autonomous [human], it would generally 
be agreed, forms his own judgments; it is often added that he forms them 
rationally; and sometimes that he also acts on them.  The requirement in any 
case goes beyond . . . the notion of a conscientious . . . follower of some 
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conventional code.  (pp. 52-53)  
 Using this broader sense of accountability, the accountable person has an 
appreciation of her situation as an agent in a social world and understands that she 
is expected to perform in a way that promotes benefit or at least minimizes harm.  
An example of this sense of accountability is taken from the 9/11 Public Hearing 
Transcripts.    
On January 26, 2004, Jose Melendez-Perez, a twelfth-year immigration 
inspector, appeared before the 9/11 Commission to testify on his encounter with a 
Saudi male at the Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001.  Mr. Melendez-
Perez opened his testimony (7.1.57) with two “things” he wanted the Commission to 
know.  On the day in question, he was “just doing [his job],” and he was honored 
and proud that the work he did apparently prevented an alleged terrorist from 
participating in the September 11 attacks on America’s homeland (7.1.57).  Second, 
he relied on his experience, training (7.1.57), and “a gut feeling that something 
wasn’t right” (7.1.69).   
 At approximately 17:35 hours on August 4, 2001, Mr. Melendez-Perez was 
assigned the case of a Saudi national who had arrived on Virgin Atlantic flight 15 
from London Gatwick Airport.  The excerpts from the cross-examination of Mr. 
Melendez-Perez by Commissioner Ben-Veniste provide insight into the 
Commissioners’ construction of a first class professional doing his job (Lehman, 
7.1.72; see also Roemer, 7.1.69): 
Mr. Ben-Veniste:  Let me ask whether it is correct that at no point during the 
summer of 2001 did you receive any notification that there was a higher 
danger or threat level of potential terrorists coming into the United States? . . 
. . 
 Mr. Melendez-Perez:  Not that I recall, sir.   
Mr. Ben-Veniste:  And in looking back at this matter, had you received any 
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information as to whether this individual, Mr. Kahtani, had actually been 
interviewed in connection with his visa application to obtain a visa to visit 
 the United States? 
 Mr. Melendez-Perez:  That is negative, sir. 
 Mr. Ben-Veniste: And that is the case that our staff has found no 
 indication that Mr. Kahtani was physically interviewed by a consular officer.  
 Let me ask you this, as of August ‘01, when this incident occurred, among the 
 INS inspectors in Orlando, was there a recognition, sir, that greater deference 
 would be given to a Saudi national than, say, a Mexican or a Jamaican? . . .  
 Mr. Melendez-Perez:  Well, since I came in the service in 1992, the 
 [consensus] of the Saudi people was they have to be treated with more tact 
 for their nation. . . . basically, that feeling is communicated by the more 
 experienced inspectors.   
.    Mr. Ben-Veniste: That if you hassled a Saudi citizen or that you took  more 
 time up to the point even of permitting entry but you gave them more 
 attention that you might catch some kind of negative criticism? 
 Mr. Melendez-Perez:  That is correct.  Normally, as a matter of fact, the day 
 that I was working on this particular incident, one of my co-workers stated 
 to me, “You’re going to get into trouble because you’re trying to refuse a 
 Saudi.”  My answer was, “You know, I have to do my job and I cannot use 
 nationality as  guidance how to do or conduct my interview or take care of 
 business” (7.1.61-62). 
   Mr. Ben-Veniste continued the cross examination by verifying the factors that 
Mr. Melendez-Perez considered during his secondary inspection of Mr. Kahtani.  Mr. 
Kahtani, a twenty-six-year-old man, was traveling alone, whereas the vast majority 
of Saudi visitors to Orlando travelled in family groups.  He appeared fit and had 
possibly undergone military training.  He appeared unable to speak or understand 
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English.  Despite his lack of facility in the English language, he had no hotel 
reservation and gave contradictory answers as to who was supposed to assist him 
either immediately or within three days of his arrival.  He was traveling on a one-way 
ticket and had no good explanation about where he was going once he departed 
from the United States; he did not have sufficient funds to spend six days as a 
tourist in the United States and then to purchase a return ticket to Dubai.  He 
refused to provide information about the identity of the individual who would be 
meeting him or the friend who was going to lend him money.  And he refused to 
answer questions once Melendez-Perez administered an oath.  His attitude was 
unusual. He was arrogant and combative from the start, fixing Melendez-Perez with a 
piercing glare, and became even more confrontational as the interview process 
proceeded.  The language interpreter confirmed there was something seriously 
suspicious about Kahtani (7.1.63-64).  Commissioner Ben-Veniste continued his 
cross examination:        
   Mr. Ben-Veniste:  And on the basis of all these factors, you concluded that 
Kahtani might well be a hit man here in the United States to do harm.  
  Mr. Melendez-Perez:  That is correct.   
 Mr. Ben-Veniste: And yet, despite all these factors, because you were 
dealing with a Saudi national, you were not certain by any means that your 
superiors would agree with your determination to deny entry.   
  Mr. Melendez-Perez:  That is correct. (7.1.64) 
 After Melendez-Perez presented his case to the supervisor, the assistant 
airport director (AAPD) was contacted for further instructions.  The supervisor 
provided the synopsis and Melendez-Perez answered a number of questions from the 
AAPD. Additionally, Melendez-Perez explained to the AAPD, “When the subject looked 
at me, I felt bone chilling cold . . . bottom line, he gave me the chills.  You would 
have to be present to understand what I’m trying to explain” (7.1.60).   
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 Based on the fact that Melendez-Perez was able to convince the AAPD that 
Kahtani was “malafide,” i.e., “his true intent in coming to the United States was not 
clear and he appeared to be very evasive” (Melendez-Perez, 7.1.60), Kahtani was 
asked to withdraw his application or be set up for expedited removal.  Along with 
another immigration inspector, Melendez-Perez escorted Kahtani to his departure 
gate.  Perez-Melendez testified, “’Before boarding the aircraft, the subject turned to 
the other inspector and myself and said in English something to the effect, ‘I’ll be 
back’” (7.1.61).  On August 4, 2001, Kahtani departed via Virgin Atlantic flight 16 to 
London for a connection flight to Dubai (7.1.61).   
 Ben-Veniste closed his cross examination of Melendez-Perez with the 
following:   
    Mr. Ben-Veniste:  Now, as we now know, with the benefit of investigations 
subsequent to 9/11, Mohamed Atta, perhaps the ringleader of all the 
terrorists here in the 9/11 plot, was at Orlando International Airport on 
August 4, 2001, the very day that Mohamed Kahtani claimed at least in part 
of his interview with you that someone was upstairs to meet him.  And we 
know that Mohamed Atta made a telephone call from that location to a 
telephone number associated with the 9/11 plot.  On the basis of that 
information, as well as significant additional information which we are now not 
at liberty to discuss in public session, it is extremely possible and perhaps 
probable that Mohamed al Kahtani was to be the 20th hijacker.   
Based on that premise, and taking into account that the only plane 
commandeered by four hijackers, rather than five, crashed before reaching its 
target, it is entirely plausible to suggest that your actions in doing your job 
efficiently and competently may well have contributed to saving the Capitol or 
the White House, and all the people who were in those buildings, those 
monuments to our democracy, from being included in the catastrophe of 
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9/11.  (7.1.65)   
Melendez-Perez stated that he “was just doing [his] job” (7.1.57).  According to 
Lehman, Melendez-Perez was “a first class professional” who did his job (7.1.72). In 
this context, it appears that doing your job included using skills and common sense 
(Ben-Veniste, 7.1.68); “feeling in your heart and your gut” (Roemer, 7.1.69); and 
“doing [a] job in a way that makes us all proud” (Ben-Veniste, 7.1.68). 
 Melendez-Perez chose certain sets of consequences, recognizing that he could 
be called to account for the consequences of his action.  Guided by a sense of 
responsibility that was not defined by a narrow interpretation of his position 
description, he did what he felt he had to do.  He stated, “You’re better off to make a 
wrong decision and send somebody home . . . than to admit somebody because we 
will be afraid of . . . congressional letters or letters from somebody” (7.1.66).  Mr. 
Melendez-Perez’s expectation, or his understanding of his job, was to promote 
benefit or minimize harm.  His advice to the higher ups from the people on the line 
everyday doing their job was “understand that we have to do what we have to do” 
(Melendez-Perez, 7.1.66).   
 Melendez-Perez pushed the edge of the envelope with his persistent 
secondary inspection of the Saudi traveler, and risked getting into trouble and 
negative criticism (Ben-Veniste, 7.1.62).   With this broader construction of 
accountability, the primacy of promoting benefit or minimizing harm to others takes 
precedent over fulfilling role responsibilities.  As a result, a person’s decision or 
action might be judged responsible even though it runs counter to those particular 
responsibilities for which he has been charged (Haydon, 1978, p. 51).   
 The testimony of Major General Retired Arnold, Commander of North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) on the day of the terrorist attacks, 
provides a clear example of an instance where the right thing to do ran counter to 
protocol.  Hijacking is a law enforcement issue and any assistance the military might 
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provide in these circumstances must first be requested from law enforcement.  On 
September 11, the Boston Center of NORAD had called a possible hijacking within 
the system and had put the aircraft at Otis on battle stations.  According to protocol, 
Boston had to call NORAD for permission to scramble the planes; NORAD in turn was 
to obtain permission from someone representing the Secretary of Defense.  Once the 
request is approved, aircraft are scrambled.  On September 11, General Arnold 
testified, “We didn’t wait for that.  We scrambled the aircraft, told them [to] get 
airborne, and we would seek clearances later” (2.2.33).  With the benefit of 
hindsight, Commissioner Gorelick applauded Arnold’s blatant disregard of protocol:   
In fact, General Arnold, I am glad to see and hear that when faced with the 
judgment of whether you should do your job in defending the United States or 
wait for someone from the FBI to call you, you decided to get the authority 
later.  (2.2.50-51) 
At the same time she praised his decision to act, she paradoxically acknowledged the 
risk, “It probably could have gotten you court-martialed.  But one appreciates that 
sort of leadership” (2.1.51).    
Summary and Discussion 
 The initial plans of the 9/11 Public Hearing Commissioners and witnesses to 
assign accountability for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was subsequently 
enacted as  
1. Accounts of exoneration (i.e., I was doing my job). 
2. Blame (i.e., deflecting accountability to others who weren’t doing their job). 
3. Recommendations for securing America’s future. 
Similar to the previous discussion on the accounts of intelligence failures, this section 
begins with the ways in which the transmission model informed the Commission’s 
construction of pre- and post- 9/11 accountability.  
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 According to the transmission view of communication, speakers and writers 
insert thoughts and feelings into words and transfer them to listeners and readers.  
The process is a uni-directional or sequential process.  Listeners are passive and 
uninvolved.  All they have to do is unpack the information and use it to accomplish 
goals.  Success is defined in terms of message distribution.   
Accountability for the events leading to September 11, 2001, was similarly 
constructed in the Public Hearing Transcripts.  There are disseminators of 
information who claimed exoneration.  They were doing their jobs.  Senator Shelby 
testified, for example, that it was not the fault of Congress that the Intelligence 
Community failed to detect and deter the attacks on the World Trade Center 
(2.1.22).  The “aggressive” steps taken by the Senate Intelligence Committee to 
deter terrorism included emphasizing, identifying, listing, revealing, highlighting, 
detailing, and registering problems and concerns (2.1.23).  Congress, according to 
Shelby, was doing what it could and should have been doing.  In the same way, Dr. 
Rice, Assistant to the President for national security affairs, set goals and charged 
leadership and field offices to eliminate the al Qaeda network. The responsibility of 
the FBI was “to do what it was asked” (Rice, 9.68).      
 Similarly, we find examples of receivers of information who claimed 
exoneration.  The FAA, NORAD, Consular Affairs and other consumers of information 
passively received and used the information that was provided.  Despite evidence of 
the growing threat to American assets and a history of airlines being used as 
weapons of mass destruction, additional information was not sought out.  They were 
also doing their jobs.   
 Likewise, blame was deflected to senders and receivers of information who 
were not disseminating and using information in ways that are assumed by the 
transmission model of communication.  The Intelligence Community, disseminators 
of national security information, did not provide actionable intelligence to its 
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consumers.  As receivers of communication, the CIA and FBI, respectively, did not 
respond to the direction that was provided to them by Congress and the Assistant to 
the President for national security affairs.  
 Viewed from a transmission model of communication, the dominant 
constructions of accountability for pre-9/11 intelligence failures in the 9/11 Public 
Hearings can be summarized in terms of senders and receivers of information who 
were/were not doing their jobs.   
Similarly the strategies for accomplishing post-9/11 accountability that were 
recommended during the Hearings is consistent with the conduit or transmission 
view of communication, i.e., accountability is the delegation of authority by “A” to 
“B,” followed by the answerability of “B” to “A” for her performance of assigned 
tasks.  Satisfactory performance is achieved by measuring up to the expectations of 
A.  Depicted in this construction of accountability is a transmission view of 
communication.  More specifically, accountability is a process whereby:       
1. The content of each job, what the worker is supposed to do while at work, is 
formalized, explicated, and made routine in approved descriptions and 
training.   
2. Workers are expected to extract the rules, responsibilities, and expectations 
and perform in a corresponding manner.   
3. Evaluation of employee performance is subsequently based on how well the 
employee has extracted and enacted the responsibilities and expectations 
that had been set forth in detail. 
The features of the conduit view of communication inhered in this definition include: 
use of language to transfer thoughts and feelings from one person to another; a 
sequential flow of information between those who delegate and those who are held 
accountable; the extraction of meaning from words by a passive listener or speaker, 
for the purpose of accomplishing a goal; and success defined in terms of the fidelity 
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between intended and enacted meaning (Axley, 1984, p. 433).       
For the most part, approved position descriptions are the tools that define 
performance requirements for a position; however, it is also acknowledged that 
position descriptions cannot “fully mirror” or define all requirements (Edwards, 1984, 
p. 110).  Two instances from the 9/11 Public Hearings where this was the case 
included: 
1. General Arnold’s appropriate disregard for protocol when the unprecedented 
situation on 9/11called for a scrambling of aircraft before acquiring standard 
clearances.  
2. Mr. Melendez-Perez’s relentless interrogations of an arrogant, combatant,  
Saudi national at the Orlando International Airport despite concerns from his 
colleague that he may lose his job for hassling a Saudi national.   
Setting aside irregular duties or even the occasional exceptional circumstances 
requiring efforts outside the job description, desired performance in organizations is 
generally formalized, explicated, and made routine by way of precisely specified 
tasks in position descriptions.     
 In Chapter Three, the transmission view of communication is presented as the 
institutional premise that significantly in-formed the dominant constructions of pre-
9/11 intelligence in the Public Hearing Transcripts.  Similarly, this view of 
communication appears as the dominant institutional premise that significantly 
informed the constructions of accountability by the participants in the Public 
Hearings.  Dominant frameworks used retrospectively to make sense of our past also 
prospectively inform our future.  By looking at current frameworks, we create 
opportunities to consider alternative ways of constructing both the past and future.  
In this vein, Chapter Five searches for a deeper understanding of the institutional 
and cultural frameworks that informed the construction of intelligence and 
accountability in the 9/11 Public Transcripts.  Also presented is an alternative 
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framework for retrospectively constructing past accounts of 9/11 and prospectively 
organizing ourselves in ways that more effectively address the complexities of 
today’s world.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ALTERNATIVE VOCABULARIES FOR MAKING SENSE OF SYSTEM RESILIENCE:   
MECHANISM AND AUTOPOIESIS 
Mental models acquired and retained through life inform the interpretations 
of, and responses to, events (Weick et al., 2005, p. 411). In the case of the 9/11 
Public Hearings, the transmission view of communication has emerged as the 
dominant mental model informing the retrospective construction of the events 
leading to September 11, 2001.  This observation is aligned with Carey’s (1989) 
perspective of nearly two decades ago that the transmission view of communication 
is a dominant “motif” of Western Society; therefore, “Our thought and work have 
been glued to a transmission view of communication” (p. 19).  
 Additionally, the transmission view of communication is “congenial with the 
underlying wellsprings of American culture” (Carey, 1989, p. 19)—that is, the 
instrumental, machine-like view of society, organizations, and communication 
(Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, p. 22).  We live in a mechanistically-oriented nation.  
Not only have machines raised levels of productivity, they also have influenced 
virtually every aspect of our lives; for example, scientists, philosophers, and 
psychologists have produced mechanistic interpretations of the natural world and 
human mind and behaviors (Morgan, 1997, p. 12).  This is readily seen in the 
mechanistic construction of communication and intelligence production processes as 
the transmission of information from a sender (e.g., the Intelligence Community) to 
a receiver (e.g., consumers of intelligence).  This “dialectic” between our material 
and subjective worlds was explored in The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 61):  Our understanding of the world is not only shaped by our 
taken-for-granted reality, but also re-enacted and perpetuated, as this 
understanding informs our participation in, and contributions to, this world (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, pp. 21-22).   
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 With the goal of further revealing the sensemaking structures and processes 
that shaped the 9/11 Commission’s accounts of accountability and pre-9/11 
intelligence failures, this chapter explores the mechanistic view of Western society 
(i.e., the underlying wellspring of American culture) that has significantly informed 
these accounts.  Additionally, this chapter presents autopoiesis as an alternative 
descriptor for system resilience and accountability for organizations residing in 
complex, dynamic, unpredictable environments.   
 The 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts and the following discussion on 
mechanism and autopoiesis also reflect the changing meaning of systems in 
organizational research and practice.  Essentially, general systems theory is a 
science of organizing and organization (Ruben, 1979, p. 95).  Aspects of it can be 
traced to Aristotle who conceived of a state as “villages, which are in turn made up 
of households, which contain families” (Ruben, 1979, p. 96).  Conceiving of things in 
terms of wholes and interrelated parts continues to be a basic concept in general 
systems thinking.  The more recent history of general systems theory dates back to 
the 1950s when the theoretical biologist Ludwig van Bertalanffy, credited by his 
peers as the father of modern general systems theory (Ruben, 1979, p. 97), 
developed the open systems approach to organizations.  This approach builds on the 
principle that organizations, like organisms, must achieve appropriate relations with 
their environment if they are to survive (Morgan, 1997, p. 39).  The basic framework 
emerging from an open systems approach includes the following: 
1. A system implies wholeness and suggests the presence of parts in 
relationship with one another (Ruben, 1979, p. 99). 
2. Systems are embedded within physical, spatial, temporal, and sometimes 
symbolic sets of environments and conditions (Ruben, 1979, p. 101).   
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3. Boundaries not only hold together the components which make up a 
system, but also selectively admit and block out various inputs (Ruben, 
1979, pp. 100-101). 
Open systems survive only through continual exchanges with their environments, 
maintaining themselves through “metabolism of matter-energy and the metabolism 
of information” (Ruben, 1979, p. 104).  In contrast, “closed” systems, a mechanistic 
model which comes from conventional physics, function in isolation from their 
environment (Ruben, 1979, p. 104).   
 Much of organizational theory since the 1920s has sought to overcome the 
limitations of the mechanistic perspective, and many of the most important 
developments in organizational theory over the past sixty years reflect a definite 
move away from a closed to an open system perspective as a source of ideas for 
thinking about organizations.  However, mechanistic models of organizing haven’t 
simply disappeared with the advent of open systems theory.  In fact, there are 
schools of system theory (e.g., structural functionalism) that are extremely 
mechanistic. Part of the appeal of systems theory is its ability to account for the 
environment, while allowing for description, prediction, and control (e.g., norms, 
rules, procedures, hierarchy), concepts that have roots in mechanistic thinking 
(Eisenberg & Goodall, 1997, p. 98).  Additionally, people often rely on the language 
of the old vocabularies of mechanism because they have not yet acquired fluency in 
new ones.  The following discussion on mechanism and autopoiesis, with examples 
from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, provides a contemporary snapshot of how 
these dynamics appear in practice and the ways in which scholars and practitioners 
are turning to systems concepts to keep abreast with increasingly complex 
environments.    
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Mechanistic View of Organizations, Intelligence Failures, and Accountability 
 Generally, when speaking of organizations, we have in mind a state of orderly 
relations between clearly defined parts that have some pre-determined order for 
delivering a pre-determined product.  For example, the Intelligence Community was 
created to collect, analyze, and disseminate information for the purpose of national 
security.  Although the image that undergirds this process is implicit, we are 
referencing a set of mechanical relations created to achieve other ends (Morgan, 
1997, p. 13).  Guided by the implicit image of a machine, we expect organizations to 
perform similarly: to produce predictable outcomes by performing “in a routinized, 
efficient, reliable, and predictable way” (Morgan, 1997, p. 12).    
 Organizations have become progressively more mechanized since the 
widespread use of machinery during the Industrial Revolution, as evidenced by the 
increased presence of the following in the workplace:  division and specialization of 
labor; control of outcomes by supervision and use of machinery; reduced discretion 
of workers; the separation of planning and labor; and the introduction of new 
procedures and techniques for the purpose of routinizing employee performance 
(Morgan, 1997, p. 15).  This is the cultural milieu in which Senator McCain, 
congressional sponsor of the 9/11 Public Commission, charged the Commission to 
“recommend . . . reforms [that] . . .rationalize the way intelligence information is 
collected, analyzed, disseminated and acted upon to improve the effectiveness of our 
efforts to deter, preempt and counter extremist terrorism” (2.1.8). 
 Table 1 (Chapter 1, p. 6) provides an overview of the influence of mechanistic 
thinking on organizational research and practices.  For example, an analysis of 
organizations based on a mechanistic mode of thought focuses on a review of the 
labor, materials, instruments, and tools (including goals, tasks, roles, processes, and 
techniques) that are being used to attain a goal or outcome.  Similarly, the 
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interventions designed to improve mechanistically-driven performance focus on 
efforts to further routinize and automate human thought and action.  Potential 
targets for these efforts include revisions to the machinery, materials, instruments, 
tools, and labor involved in the production of specified outcomes.  The ways in which 
mechanistic thinking influences organizational analysis and interventions can be seen 
in the 9/11 Commission’s investigation of the events leading to September 11, 2001.   
 For example, On April 1, 2003, Glenn Fine testified before the 9/11 
Commission “about the work of the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General [OIG] on border security issues” (1.2.5).  Based on the “significant body of 
work by the OIG” during the previous several years, Fine presented “several broad 
themes that the Commission may want to examine relating to border security” 
(1.2.13).  The following excerpt from Fine’s testimony is presented to exemplify the 
ways in which mechanistic thinking framed issues during the 9/11 Public Hearings:     
First, information and intelligence sharing among all levels of government 
remains a critical component of the effort to prevent terrorist attacks in the 
United States.  Without adequate intelligence, the ability of front line 
employees to screen effectively those who seek to enter the country is 
limited. 
 Second, our reviews have found that the current systems for 
 identifying when aliens enter and leave the country are clearly inadequate.  
 Implementing an effective entry-exit tracking system is a daunting challenge 
 that will require substantial efforts and a large investment of resources. 
 Third, we encourage the Commission to focus on the often-overlooked 
 issue of human capital.  To fulfill its mission, the Department of Homeland 
 Security must have sufficiently trained immigration staff and supervisors.  
 Historically, this has been a challenge for the INS. 
 Fourth, I think it is also important to note that timely and consistent 
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 processing of the millions of benefit applications has been a longstanding 
 problem for the INS, and now for the DHS.  An enhanced focus on border 
 security should not override this important service-related responsibility. 
And finally, the transfer of the INS to the Department of Homeland 
Security presents enormous management challenges. The transfer will not, in 
itself, resolve  the issues I have identified today. Solutions to border security 
issues will require innovation and aggressive management oversight. (Fine, 
1.2.13-14)  
 When issues are framed in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of flows 
of information, tools, people, processes, and structures, proposed solutions also 
focus on these phenomena.  For example, better training for baggage screeners and 
more effective use of the explosive detection machines were included in 
recommendations for making us safer when we fly (Dzakovic, 2.1.138; Mead, 
2.1.92).   
 These examples have been presented to illustrate the dominant thinking that 
was in play during the Commission’s investigation of the events leading to the acts of 
terrorism on September 11, 2001.  The next section specifically considers the 
influence of mechanism on the discussion of intelligence and accountability during 
the 9/11 Public Hearings.   
Mechanistic Thinking:  Pre-9/11 Intelligence Failures and Accountability 
 In Chapter 3, we saw how the pre-9/11 intelligence production process 
constructed during the 9/11 Public Hearings resonates with the transmission model 
of communication, a mechanistic view of the world.  As witnesses and 
Commissioners constructed their accounts of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, they also 
recommended “fixes” (e.g., Fielding, 7.2.119; Tenet, 8.2.39), for example, the 
solutions for addressing problems of information flow and sharing and coordination 
information.  The two strategies that dominated these discussions during the 9/11 
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Public Hearings were: (a) revamping or restructuring the Intelligence Community 
and (b) deploying a performance management system or system of accountability.   
 The following quotes from Commissioners illustrate the marriage of 
mechanistically-framed problems (i.e., failures to disseminate information) and 
mechanistically-driven solutions in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts (e.g., 
restructuring the Intelligence Community for the purpose of holding a single person 
accountable, increasing centralization, and ensuring division and specialization of 
labor).    
1. Commissioner Roemer:   A little bit about the problems of communication 
and information sharing between the CIA and the FBI. . . . How do you fix 
it?  Do you create more agencies to do it and more stove piping . . . or do 
you create this new Terrorist Threat Integration Center?  Where do you 
put it, Homeland Security or outside of it? (1.1.307) 
2. Commissioner Kean:  We’ll be asking ourselves whether the FBI . . . or 
whether a new entity should be established to perform collection, analysis 
and dissemination of intelligence within the United States, primarily to 
prevent, curtail and combat terrorism. (6.2-3) 
Similarly, the following recommendations for organizing the post-9/11 
 Intelligence Community are presented to further illustrate the influence of 
mechanism on the construction of solutions, as well as problems, during the 9/11 
Hearings.  Proposed strategies for preventing, preempting, or deterring future 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland included:     
1. Making do with the current organization of domestic intelligence with 
significant improvements; fulfilling existing authorities, as there is no real 
need for additional organizational structure  (Fielding & Wermuth, 
1.2.180-183). 
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2. Developing a virtual organization that pulls information into central places 
within the Federal Government and then moves it to people who need it, 
when they need and want it (Baird, 1.2.147-149). 
3. Starting with “a blank piece of paper” (Larsen, 1.2.188-189) and ending 
up with an information integration center that will help with prevention, 
mitigation and response (Larsen, 1.2.162), but cannot report to the 
Director of Central Intelligence (Baird, 1.2.185; Larsen, 1.2.187) or the 
Department of Justice (Larsen, 1.2.187).    
4. Using a different model (for example, a separate British MI5 type of 
organization) (Deutch, 4.20; Gorton & Push, 1.1.212); the Canadian 
bifurcation or French models; or something else (Ben-Veniste & Larsen, 
1.2.199-200).   
5. Instituting a system or a new organization of domestic intelligence, for 
example, creating a separate domestic security organization in Justice, but 
separate from the FBI, in the Department of Homeland Security, or as an 
independent agency reporting to a Director of National Intelligence 
(Gorton & Steinberg, 4.46).   
6. Placing a new domestic intelligence service under the direction of Central 
Intelligence, reporting along with the CIA and Department of Defense 
Intelligence Service to a Director of Central Intelligence (Deutch, 4.18-
19).   
7. Creating a Director of Central Intelligence (Deutch & Fielding, 4.22) or a 
Director of  National Intelligence, somebody with centralized power and 
authority within the intelligence community, including budget, 
implementation of policy and marshaling resources in the war against 
terrorism (Ranstorp, 1.1.315). 
Many of these discussions were driven by the need to “break down the walls” 
 131
(Deutch, 4.20; Mueller, 10. 118, 122; Rice, 9.10; Thompson, 6.15) within the FBI, 
and between the FBI and the CIA, for the purpose of ensuring  appropriate access, 
information flow, and the sharing and coordination of information.  In this light, the 
discussion on the restructuring of the intelligence community appeared as a 
dominant solution to many of the issues that were most frequently discussed in the 
9/11 Public Hearings. Similarly, the second dominant fix recommended by the 
participants in the 9/11 Public Hearings was a performance management system or 
system of accountability that clearly delineated performance expectations, processes 
for reporting outcomes, and rewards or consequences for performance (Chapter 4).  
In each of the two recommendations that dominated discussions on deterring future 
terrorist attacks, the focus was on  improving the current practices of the 
Intelligence Community by further routinizing processes and delineating structures 
and lines of authority.     
Mechanistic Thinking:  Discussion of the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts 
  In the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, we find proposed system responses 
(two dominant recommendations informed by mechanistic thinking) to perceived 
environmental exigencies.  This section focuses on the environmental exigencies 
constructed by the 9/11 Public Hearing participants (i.e., international terrorism in 
the 21st century) for which these recommendations are a proposed response.         
 September 11, 2001, according to a number of the 9/11 Public Hearing 
participants, was a “wake up call” (e.g., Fetchet, 1.1.180-181; Ranstorp, 1.1.312; 
Shays, 2.1.77).  That is, as a nation, we came to realize that we live in a world in 
which threats developed an ocean away can strike with “horrifying impact within our 
own borders” (Hamilton, 1.1.17).  Our “downfall” before 9/11, according to 
Commissioner Cleland, was a blind eye to the changing dynamics in the environment 
(Cleland, 1.1.62).    
 Since 9/11, according to a number of the 9/11 Public Hearing witnesses, we 
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are a changed nation. However, we are reminded by various witnesses during the 
9/11 Public Hearings that our mindsets, not the attacks on 9/11, have changed 
everything.  Nearly 60 years ago with the 1947 National Security Act, intelligence 
structures, responsibilities, and authorities were established to address the 
challenges of the Cold War.  On the eve of the terrorist attacks, however, 
communism had not posed a national security threat to United States for nearly ten 
years; yet, our national intelligence agencies had not re-oriented its mindset, 
culture, and institutions to the new form of terrorism that was emerging  (Graham, 
2.1.42):   
Our [pre-9/11] collective policy intelligence minds weren’t tuned to look the 
right way, even though there probably should have been plenty of evidence 
that we should have. . . . Our mental filters aren’t designed right . . .  
You want to proactively . . . try to properly tune your filters before 
something happens.  (Hamre, 6.99)   
In the 1980s and 90s, a new terrorism based on ethnic hatreds or religious 
fanaticism had emerged.  Enabled by technology, the modus operandi of terrorists 
had changed from “we ‘will cause damage and terror but not kill lots of people’ to ‘we 
will terrify people and kill thousands of them to get their attention’” (Roemer, 
1.1.52).  With technology to aid in the planning, coordination, and implementation of 
terrorist acts, “small groups” had become serious threats to national security 
(Cleland, 1.1.63).   
 This new form of terrorism was characterized by various witnesses during the 
9/11 Public Hearings as: 
1. An “open-ended thing” (Jenkins, 1.1.318), with no end state (Mead, 
2.1.91)  
2. A global network with a presence in over ninety-eight different countries 
(Ranstorp, 1.1.313) 
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3. A changing adversary, continually changing the way it operates (Mineta, 
2.2.3) 
Additionally, it was characterized as being:   
1. Unencumbered by physical and international borders (Cleland, 1.1.63); for 
example, a terrorist with a wireless Internet connection in a cave in 
Afghanistan can learn as much about America as any of us know 
(Schumer, 2.1.66) 
2. Empowered by technology “to the point that small groups, or even 
individuals, can now inflict a degree of death and destruction heretofore 
reserved to great armies” (Cleland, 1.1.63) 
3. Emboldened by the fact that terrorism has breached the borders of the 
United States (Wermuth, 1.2.212) 
This synthesis of post-9/11 testimonies suggests a view of the environment that 
did not exist prior to September 11.   
 In response to these environmental exigencies (an open systems concept), 
the witnesses recommended further routinizing and controlling the activities of the 
Intelligence Community by restructuring the Community and implementing a 
performance management system.  On the one hand, the 9/11 Public Hearing 
witnesses acknowledged dynamic environments; on the other hand, their 
recommendations were largely informed by mechanism, an approach that is most 
effective when the environment is stable, there is a straightforward task to perform, 
one wishes to produce exactly the same product time and again, and the human 
“machines” will perform as they have been instructed to perform (Morgan, 1997, p. 
27).   This nexus of the mechanistic and open system views of organizations is 
clearly articulated in Katz and Kahn’s The Social Psychology of Organizations (1966), 
“a landmark application of system theory to organizations” (Eisenberg & Goodall, 
1993, p. 97): 
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Katz and Kahn argued that organizations were fundamentally open systems in 
 which people were bonded together by psychological constructions and 
 symbolic as well as behavioral responses to their environments. Furthermore, 
 organizations contain a great deal of variety and therefore uncertainty, owing 
 to the individualistic nature of the humans within them.  Variety and 
 uncertainty are in turn balanced by certain control mechanisms (e.g., norms, 
 rules, procedures, hierarchy) that subordinate individual needs to the 
 requirements of effective organization. Creating ways to integrate and 
 coordinate these components—while remaining open to the changing 
 demands of the environment—required systems management by 
 persons sensitive to the dynamic interdependencies at work. The goal was 
 to ensure that the system remained open and hence capable of adaptation.   
(Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, p. 97)  
This discussion on “remaining open to changing demands of the environment” 
(open systems concepts) and “certain control mechanisms” (mechanistic concepts) 
reveals the mix of sensemaking structures that shaped both the investigation and 
recommendations during the 9/11 Public Hearings.  It is useful to note the 
disconnect.  On the one hand, the 9/11 Public Hearing witnesses and commissioners 
took into account the variety and uncertainty in the environment of the 21st ventury;  
on the other hand, they adopted a largely mechanistic framing of problems that, in 
the end, narratively reduced solutions to mechanistic responses that are better 
suited for stable, predictable, certain environments. 
Autopoiesis:  An Alternative Descriptor for System Resilience and Accountability 
 An alternative to mechanistic descriptions of organizations, autopoiesis offers 
powerful “images, metaphors, and ways of thinking” and talking about system 
failure/resilience and accountability (Wheatley, 1994, p. ix).  Resilience, defined in 
terms of autopoietic structures, is the system’s ability to create new knowledge and 
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reconfigure itself so it can deal with flux in the environment.  Rather than preserve a 
given, fixed structure, the system adapts through continuous learning and change; 
that is, it creates, elaborates, and changes structures in order to remain viable as 
ongoing systems (Buckley, 1967, p. 5).  For this reason, autopoietic systems are 
frequently referred to as self-organizing or self-renewal systems (Wheatley, 1994, p. 
88).  Table 5, a summary of the theory on autopoiesis presented in Chapter One of 
this paper, presents ways in which the language of autopoiesis or self-organizing 
systems offers an alternative vocabulary to that of mechanism for theorizing 
organizational resilience.   
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Table 5  
Building system resilience:  Contributions of autopoiesis, a form of systems theory 
Autopoiesis, a new vocabulary for building system resilience: 
• Unpredictability and flux in the environment are viewed as opportunities for 
system growth and resilience. 
• Knowledge of the environment and the tools and processes for generating 
knowledge are resources for system development. 
• Because people have some control over the tools and processes for 
generating knowledge, there are opportunities for shaping the future of the 
system. 
• Key to shaping the future is ensuring the tools and processes for creating 
knowledge are as complex, dynamic, and diverse as its environment. 
• Tools and processes for leveraging system resilience in dynamic environments 
include (a) a clear sense of identity that guides the action of its members and 
(b) processes that facilitate participation, the continuous generation of 
knowledge, and action.   
 
Resilient self-organizing systems survive by responding to new environmental 
conditions.  This sort of agility, however, exists only when systems continuously 
generate information/communication/knowledge about the ever-changing 
environment.  It is important to note, however, that the creation of new information, 
in the case of self-organizing systems, is not a mechanistic transmission of 
information from one place to the next.  Focusing on insights from connections of 
various people/expertise, advocates for self-organizing systems encourage a new 
form of exchange, interactions, relationships, engagement, and participation for 
organizations.  The difference, according to Ruben (1979), is between an information 
system and a communication system: 
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 As long as the primary focus is upon the mechanical flow of messages . . . it 
 would still be termed an information system.  Only when the significances, 
 competencies, purposes, functions, and desires which [participants bring] to 
 the situation were defined as a crucial aspect of the system, would it meet the  
 definition of communication system. (p. 110) 
Table 6 presents assumptions from the theory of self-organizing autopoietic 
systems that are relevant to this project on system resilience, and their implications 
for organizational action.  
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Table 6 
Autopoiesis:  Assumptions and implications for organizational practices 
Autopoietic assumptions Implications for organizational practices 
There are “no pre-fixed, definitely 
describable” environments (Wheatley, 
1994, p. x).  A system places a variety of 
responses into the environment and 
determines what works.  Through action, 
we develop not only our systems, but 
also our environment.   
Action over planning is preferred by  
advocates of autopoiesis (Weick, 1979; 
Wheatley, 1994, p. 37).  
 
An autopoietic perspective assumes flux 
in the environment.  Knowledge is 
provisional, as “everything is always new 
and different and unique” to us 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 7).    
An autopoietic system fosters resilience 
and sustainability through its continuous 
generation of knowledge (Wheatley, 
1994, p. 104).       
Autopoiesis assumes every act of 
observations loses more information than 
it obtains, as each interpretation of an 
event is specific to the observer 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 65).   
The broader the distribution of 
information, viewpoints, and 
interpretations, the greater the 
opportunity to create new knowledge, 
resilience and sustainability (Wheatley, 
1994, p. 64). 
“Innovation is fostered by information 
gathered from new connections” 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 113). 
 
Autopoiesis encourages relationships that 
foster the connection of 
people/information, e.g. inter-disciplinary 
relationships (Wheatley, 1994, p. 113). 
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Building System Resilience:  An Autopoietic/Sensemaking Model 
Autopoiesis conceptualizes system resilience in terms of the system’s ability 
to represent its environment—that is, its descriptions/communication/knowledge of 
the environment (Luhmann, 1990).  As a consequence, this theory brings to our 
attention the importance of continuous learning for organizations that reside in ever-
changing environments.  Similarly, the construct sensemaking furthers our 
understanding of system-environment relations by focusing on organizational 
activities at “moments of flux” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 413), i.e., “when the current 
state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world” 
(Weick et al., p. 409).   
How organizations construct relations with the environment, why, and to what 
effect is the focus of sensemaking (Weick, 1995, p. 4).  In an effort to guide 
research and practice in this area, Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005) compressed 
the seven sensemaking activities (discussed in the second chapter of this paper) into 
a sequence of activities that “mobilize around moments of flux” (p. 413).  Depicted 
graphically in Figure 4, the ESR model conceptualizes system-environment relations, 
or resilience, as “reciprocal exchanges between actors (Enactment) and their 
environments (Ecological Change) that are made meaningful [by being Selected] and 
preserved (Retention)” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, p. 414).   
Figure 4 
Resilience, in terms of the ESR sensemaking sequence (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005, p. 414) 
 
 
Source:  adapted from Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414. 
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Using the ESR sensemaking model, we can conceptualize the kinds of organizational 
practices that foster continuous learning, self organizing, and system resilience.  
Keeping in mind the difficulty of translating open systems concepts to organizational 
practices, this section focuses on bringing together two theoretical concepts, self 
reference and ambivalence, from autopoiesis and sensemaking for the purpose of 
identifying the kinds of organizational practices that foster system resiliency.   
Self Reference 
 A fundamental principle of all self organizing principles is self-reference 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 94): 
 In response to environmental disturbances that signal the need for change, 
the system changes in a way that remains consistent with itself in that 
environment.  The system is autopoietic, focusing its activities on what is 
required to maintain its own integrity and self-renewal.  As it changes, it does 
so by referring to itself; whatever future form it takes will be consistent with 
its already established identity.  Changes do not occur randomly, in any 
direction.  They always are consistent with what has gone on before, with the 
history and identity of the system. . . .  
When the environment demands a new response, the [system] is a 
reference point for change.  (Wheatley, 1994, p. 94)  
Examples of points of reference available to systems when the environment signals a 
need for change include the system’s values, vision, culture, competencies, 
procedures, processes, and practices. Each, according to Weick (1979) is a “historical 
document,” stored as part of the system’s memory or retention processes that serve 
as plausible guides for subsequent activities (p. 229). 
Figure 4 graphically portrays the activities of selection, enactment, and 
retention and the role these activities play in establishing points of self-reference as 
guides for subsequent activities.  During the process of selection, a number of 
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possible meanings for equivocality in the environment are reduced to plausible 
accounts of the events.  It is important to note that these accounts are 
simultaneously the adoption of a description of the environment and a loss of other 
possible descriptions.  Stored as “historical” documents (Weick, 1979, p. 229), 
selected descriptions are available to guide future descriptions of unexpected flux in 
the environment.  Similarly, previous actions by the system are available to guide 
current and future responses to equivocality in the environment.   
Ambivalence 
Self-reference, however, does not mean that members of an organization 
must be “victimized by . . . their parochial volition” (Weick, 1979, p. 177).  
Experience retained as memory can serve as a constraint on the ways in which new 
experiences are interpreted and responded to, or experience can serve as a point for 
interjecting “chronic doubt” (Weick, 1979, p. 177) or ambivalence (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414) about previous interpretations and responses.  For 
example, in contrast to mechanistic views of organizing, agents in self-organizing 
systems are continuous learners whose lessons from past experience are always 
open to change.    
 In fact, this ambivalent use of previous knowledge is the crux of autopoietic 
systems; that is, ambivalence distinguishes open, developing autopoietic systems 
from mechanistic systems that are closed and static.  To avoid stasis, entropy and 
death, systems must be able to view the system’s history/memory ambivalently, 
both believing and doubting it in future enacting and selecting (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
414): 
 Only with ambivalent use of previous knowledge are systems able both to 
 benefit from lessons learned and to update either their actions or meanings in 
 ways that adapt to changes in the system and its context. (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
 & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414) 
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Self-reference and Ambivalence:  The Case of 9/11 
 Organizations that assume a stable environment tend to be preoccupied with 
the past, following prescribed procedures and improving standardized processes and 
procedures when errors occur.  In short, history is believed to be the best lesson.  
This tendency to prepare for the future by reactively responding to past failings was 
an expressed concern of witnesses in the 9/11 Public Hearings.  According to the 
witnesses, this tendency is a “recurring theme in the government,” both pre- and 
post-9/11 (Push, 1.1.171).  For example, when al Qaeda mounted land suicide 
attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, 
Americans increased the perimeter  security of their land targets.  When al Qaeda 
attacked a maritime target, the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, Americans increased the 
perimeter security of their maritime targets.  But then al Qaeda again fooled the 
United States and conducted an airborne suicide attack (Gunaratna, 3.3). 
Additionally, it was noted during the Public Hearings that the pre-9/11 
aviation security model had been based on lessons learned from previous disasters; 
for example, screening check point security was the direct result of aircraft hijacking 
worldwide during the 60s and 70s, airport access controls were strengthened after 
the crash of Pacific Southwest Airlines flight 1777 in 1987, and checked baggage 
security was strengthened during the 90s after the bombing of Pan Am 103 (Mead, 
2.1.92).   
 Similarly, post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives continued to focus on lessons 
learned.  Examples provided by witnesses included the airport checks on everybody’s 
shoes after Richard Reid boarded an airline with a shoe bomb (Push, 1.1.171; 
Thompson, 1.2.82), and the State Department’s temporary denial of visas, 
immediately after 9/11, to students wanting to study flying in the United States 
(Dillingham, 1.2.37). 
 Consistent with the creativity of sensemaking, witnesses in the post-9/11 
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public hearings looked for alternatives to “closing the barn door after the horse is 
out” (Cleland, 2.1.104).  These included looking to the future as well as 
understanding our historic shortcomings, “to better order our future steps in 
security” (Ranstorp, 1.1.256; see also Corzine, 2.1.62).   
 Post-9/11 we find a greater openness for seeking an understanding of, and 
responding to, the complex dynamic environment of the 21st century.  From the 9/11 
Public Hearing Transcripts, for example, there is an expressed interest in achieving a 
better understanding of: 
1. The psychological makeup of the terrorists, their decision making 
procedures, and how they identify targets and attack modes (Ranstorp, 
1.1.264-265). 
2. How terrorism is structuring, changing, and adapting (Ranstorp, 1.1.263); 
what drives and motivates it; the source of its power; the resources at its 
command; its internal strengths and weaknesses; and the identity, roles, 
and motives of its allies, enablers, and supporters (Kean, 3.1). 
3. The web of relationships in the Muslim world (Fandy, 3.5).  
4. The context and forces that make al Qaeda appealing to its recruits in the 
Muslim world (Fandy, 3.5). 
The 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts suggest that there is a growing 
recognition of the need for a new perspective and language for building system 
resilience, one that links knowledge, environment, innovation, and accountability.  
While autopoiesis and sensemaking offer theoretical concepts (e.g., self reference 
and ambivalence) for understanding the dynamics of stability and innovation in 
dynamic complex environments, the question remains, How do we move from theory 
to practice?   
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An Autopoietic/Sensemaking Model 
 Figure 5 graphically portrays the ways in which both autopoiesis and 
sensemaking can inform organizational practice.  This model presents the ESR 
Sensemaking Sequence of enactment-selection-retention (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
414) as activities that constitute the system’s ability to represent the environment.  
Additionally, it expands the ESR model to include the concept of ambivalence.  Along 
with their graphic depiction of the ESR sequence, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 
(2005) also identified the critical role that ambivalence plays if systems are to have 
meaningful exchanges with their environments. That is, “These exchanges will 
continue only if the preserved content is both believed . . . and doubted” (2005, p. 
414). However, this critical activity was not visually depicted in the Weick et al. 
(2005) model.  Additionally, Figure 5 specifies the kinds of retained plausible stories 
that inform, according to an autopoietic view of organizations, system-environment 
activities—that is, the system’s plausible stories of previous system-environment 
experiences and stories on how members of the system engage with one another as 
well as with the environment (Wheatley, 1994, p. 91).  A summary of the concepts 
from autopoiesis and sensemaking that have informed this model are presented in 
Table 7. 
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Figure 5 
Building system resilience: An autopoietic/sensemaking model 
 
Source:  adapted from Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414. 
 
Table 7 
Building system resilience:  An autopoietic/sensemaking model  
 
Figure 5 also suggests ways in which leaders can foster a coordinated system-
informed response to the environment.  The system’s knowledge (i.e., its previous 
experiences) is the history that informs the system’s future.  However, a self-
organizing system assumes that every experience is unique (Wheatley, 1994, p. 38).  
Autopoietic/sensemaking assumptions  
• The future form of an autopoietic system will be consistent with its previous 
history.  
•  How selections and enactments are chosen can be both an acceptance and 
rejection of the system’s past or conventional way of seeing things. 
• The system’s ability to be innovative can exist only if the organization has 
access to new information about external conditions and internal resources 
(Wheatley, 1994, p. 91).  
• The knowledge that is generated and the tools and processes that generate 
new knowledge are viewed as resources for building system resilience.   
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Therefore, self reference as a guide for future action is most effective when it is 
coupled with an ambivalence about the usefulness of previous experiences and the 
ways in which new knowledge is continuously generated.  Given the critical roles that 
ambivalence and new knowledge play in the responsiveness and sustainability of 
organizations, the development of these sensemaking processes and structures are 
the kinds of contributions for which leaders should be held accountable.   
Practical Implications for Future Organizational Practice 
 An organizational sensemaking model (e.g. ESR) is a composite of multiple 
sensemaking processes that occur in organizations.  For example, the repertoire that 
informs how we participate in organizational life includes the knowledge, skills, 
abilities, values, identity, etc. that I bring to the position, as well as the 
organizational premises, plans, expectations that I find in the workplace.  
Additionally, my ongoing performance in the organization, also retained in memory, 
may influence how I interpret and respond in the future.  When we recognize that 
organizational sensemaking is the composite of an array of diverse sensemaking 
processes that individuals engage as they go about their work, we realize the 
multiplicity of individual frameworks, as well as organizational frameworks, that 
inform individual and organizational performance.  With this in mind, we cannot 
escape the critical role of leaders as sensemakers within the system whose task is to 
provide their members with a self-referential system of organizational enactments 
for making sense of, and responding to, changes in the environment.  In this 
capacity, leaders are uniquely positioned to significantly influence the contributions 
of individual members to organizational life.  An overview of the following discussion 
on the ways in which leaders can uniquely influence system resilience and 
accountability is presented in Table 8.     
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Table 8 
Building system resilience:  Leadership 
Leadership Sensemaking Roles  Leadership Practices  
 Building system consciousness  Developing key principles that express 
the overall identity of the system 
 
Saturating the organization with 
consistent messages about the 
organization, what it is, what it stands 
for 
Designing heedful interrelating  Engaging a greater number and diversity 
of people 
 
Loosening controls on engagement, 
participation, and action 
Legitimizing ambivalence in the 
workplace  
Admitting, “We don’t know.” 
 
Asking, “What is new?”  
 
The Role of Leaders:  Building System Consciousness 
Building system consciousness 
• Developing key principles that express the overall identity of the system 
• Saturating the organization with consistent messages about the organization, 
what it is, what it stands for  
 
 In mechanistic organizations, leaders attempt to control performance by 
standardizing organizational inputs and outputs, such as communication.  For 
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example, at a recent planning meeting attended by middle management, the desired 
outcome for the meeting was a process for improving communication from the 
executive vice president (EVP) to the staff who report directly to her.  Agenda items 
for accomplishing this task included:  What information do we want the executive 
vice president to share with us, how often should she communicate this information, 
and to whom should this information be disseminated?  The problem was identified in 
previous meetings as a need for the various administrative units to work as a team.  
After multiple meetings, the issue was framed as a need for better communication 
from the EVP, and the solution was to be found in established processes for 
channeling particular kinds of information from the EVP to subordinates.  This 
example serves as a prototype of how processes, procedures, and practices are often 
accomplished in mechanistically-driven organizations.  A problem is identified, 
solutions are generated, and rules are established for the purpose of guiding future 
actions. 
 Organizations that are viewed as autopoietic processes, in contrast to the 
above approach, foster organizational coherence by using a few key patterns or 
principles to guide organizational activity.  To this end, leaders of these organizations 
are accountable for creating an organizational environment where ideas connect, 
cohere, and inform members’ actions. The goal is system consciousness; that is,  
throughout the system, ideas guide individuals’ interpretations of, and responses to, 
the environment.  Leadership practices that foster system consciousness include 
developing, and saturating the organization with, principles that can guide 
organizational activity.           
Leadership Practice:  Developing Key Principles that Express the Overall Identity of 
the System 
 These principles can be articulated in the form of inspiring visions, strong 
values, organizational beliefs, and concepts.  For example, the mission of an 
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academic institution stated in terms of teaching, research, and service qualifies as an 
inspiring vision.  On both the academic and administrative sides of educational 
institutions, we often find faculty and staff who have joined the institution for this 
very reason.  They want to be part of something worthwhile, something they believe 
in.  In practice, however, this mission seldom guides the whole institution and is 
often adopted and perpetuated only by the academic leadership.  On the non-
academic side, each vice president typically has a mission statement for her area,  
and within each vice presidential area, divisions often have their own mission 
statements.  For example, the mission of a Division of Physical Plant is to:   
Maintain and improve a physical environment conducive to teaching, learning, 
 and research. To this end, the Physical Plant Division is responsible for the 
 operation, maintenance and repair of the educational buildings, utilities, and 
 rounds of the University campus. 
And the mission of a Division of Environmental Health and Safety is to promote and 
assist in the achievement of a safe and healthful University environment.  To 
whatever extent an employee of either of these divisions might find the missions 
exciting and inspiring, the fact remains that the university is fragmented into 
competing units to which individuals identify and commit.  In organizations guided by 
the spirit of autopoiesis, leaders are accountable for constructing ideas that connect, 
rather than perpetuate, discrete and distant actions and events.    
Leadership Practice:  Saturating the Organization with Consistent Messages about 
the Organization  
 In organizations that are guided by the spirit of autopoiesis, information is 
treated as “the primal energy that structures matter into form” (Wheatley, 1994, p. 
xi). In these organizations, leaders are responsible not only for creating but also for 
saturating the system with clear messages about the organization—i.e., what it is 
and what it stands for—to serve as self-referential resources that guide current and 
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future actions.  Recognizing the array of diverse sensemaking frameworks that 
individuals bring to the framework, not to mention competing sensemaking 
frameworks that can be found in organizations, it is important for these messages to 
be ever present as a resource in the workplace.  This requires a presence greater 
than the kind that can be found by hanging vision, mission, and value statements on 
the wall, i.e., it requires an engaged, participating manager such as the one 
described in the following excerpt from the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts:   
I’ve been working for George Tenet [Director, Central Intelligence Agency] in 
the last month and a half, I’ve gone to his 5:30 meeting which is a meeting of 
George and his principle officers that are involved in clandestine services . . . 
.  
 That meeting, I would guess, is the closest you can come to an 
operational meeting where somebody says, I want to do the following, go do 
it, talk to somebody in this country and tell them not to do this tonight, 
because we’re worried about it, do something else.  It is an operational role . 
. . that kind of operational level detail. 
 Now I don’t know how to replicate that, and at what level you do it, 
but I know it needs to be done.  And quite honestly, I’ve talked to some 
people about this and they’d say, well, you talk about micromanagement, 
that’s the ultimate in micromanagement.   
 Now, can someone else do that?  It’s not obvious to me that someone 
more distant than George Tenet from the people who do real stuff, who send 
real messages . . . if you get much farther away from that ability I think 
you’re in a fair amount of trouble . . . . It does sound like micromanagement 
to me but from my perspective that’s really damn good micromanagement, 
that’s doing the hard work at the right place . . . .  
 Now, how do you institutionalize that and make that a part of the 
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system?  (Kerr, 4.62-63) 
Although Thompson can’t determine whether Tenet is a micro-manager, his 
description of Tenet’s hands-on, engaged management style suggests a process for 
building system consciousness that, if replicated system wide, can cohere discrete 
and distant activities in the system.  Tulgan (2004) agrees.  Hands-on management 
is not the same as micro-management:  
 There has been so much emphasis on empowerment in recent years, and fear 
 of micro-management, that managers have moved too far afield of providing 
 direction.  If you want to empower direct reports, you must define the terrain 
 in which they have power. (Tulgan, 2004, p. 7).   
 While the articulation of these underlying principles is important, Wheatley 
(1994) warns, “It’s only half the task” (p. 55): 
Creating the field through the dissemination of those ideas is essential.  The 
field must reach all corners of the organization, involve everyone, and be 
available to everywhere. . . . We need to imagine [leaders] as broadcasters, 
tall radio beacons of information, pulsing out messages everywhere . . . 
stating, clarifying, discussing, modeling, filling all of space with the messages 
we care about.  If we do that, fields develop—and with them, their wondrous 
capacity to bring energy into form.  (pp. 55-56).  
Hands-on leaders in organizations guided by the spirit of autopoiesis engage in 
saturating the organization with self-referential information about its identity, for the 
purpose of guiding and cohering the various activities throughout the system.  The 
activity of these sensemakers, resembling broadcasters, pulse out messages 
everywhere.    
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The Role of Leaders: Designing Heedful Interrelating 
Designing heedful interrelating 
• Engaging a greater number and diversity of people 
• Loosening controls on engagement, participation, and action  
 
 In mechanistic organizations, leaders attempt to harness variety and 
complexity by regulating inputs from the environment and following standardized 
processes.  This can be seen in the narrow definition of national security intelligence 
that was in place before September 11, 2001.  National security intelligence, 
according to various participants in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, was the 
information collected, analyzed, and disseminated by the Intelligence Community.  
Information that did not originate from formal intelligence production processes did 
not qualify as actionable intelligence.  This approach fragments information, drawing 
lines between what (and who) informs the system.  Similarly, with its focus on 
standardization, mechanistic organizations tend to regulate, standardize, and 
homogenize the training and development of staff—that is, people develop the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to work within the current system.   
 In contrast to mechanistic organizations, organizations that are guided by the 
spirit of autopoiesis respond to environmental complexity by developing the variety 
and complexity of the system’s knowledge base.  No one has a more sweeping 
opportunity to accomplish this than leaders. That is, leaders not only have a unique 
opportunity to saturate the organization with principles that cohere and coordinate 
discrete and distant actions, they also are uniquely positioned to develop the people, 
processes and structures in ways that develop complex responses to complex 
environments.  The goal is what Weick and Roberts (1993) call heedful interrelating.   
 The concept of heedfulness designates behaviors suggestive of “’noticing, 
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taking care, attending, applying one’s mind, concentrating, putting one’s heart into 
something, thinking what one is doing, alertness, intentness, studying and trying’”  
(Ryle, 1949, p. 136; see also Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 361).  It is about seeing, 
taking note of, being attentive to, competence, and know how, and requires a kind of 
learning and training that is not often found in mechanistically-structured 
organizations:    
 Heedful performance is not the same thing as habitual performance.  In 
 habitual action, each performance is a replica of its predecessor, whereas in 
 heedful performance, each action is modified by its predecessor (Ryle, 1949:  
 42).  In heedful performance, the agent is still learning.  Furthermore, heedful 
 performance is the outcome of training and experience that weave together 
 thinking, feeling, and willing.  Habitual performance is the outcome of drill 
 and repetition. (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 362)   
Heedfulness, according to Weick and Roberts (1993) is “a kind of capacity in an 
ongoing activity stream [that] emerges in the style with which activities are 
interrelated” (p. 365).  The unique opportunity for leaders is the actualization of this 
capacity by developing both the “know how” that individuals contribute to the system 
and the patterns of interrelated activities among members of the system. Discussion 
of the kinds of leadership practices that enable creative, responsive, heedful 
responses to emergent environmental demands follows.      
Leadership Practice:  Engaging a Greater Number and Diversity of People  
The ESR sensemaking sequence, a model that continues to inform this 
discussion on implications for future organizational practices, defines the system’s 
relationship to the environment in terms of “reciprocal exchanges between actors 
(Enactment) and their environments (Ecological Change)”  (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
414).  With this model, we can visualize how reality is revealed “through an active 
construction in which we participate” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 293; see also 
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Wheatley, 1994, p. 65). Additionally, taking into account Buckley’s (1967) 
observation that “only variety can regulate variety “ (p. 495), the relationship 
between the numbers and diversity of individuals engaged in the interpretation of, 
and response to, the environment is made clear.  According to Wheatley (1994), the 
environment is a potential relationship that can be realized by way of participation, 
and the more participants we engage in this relationship, the greater the opportunity 
for evoking multiple interpretations and building system heedfulness (p. 64).   
This was a dominant observation also made by witnesses during the 9/11 
Public Hearings.  At the core of a call for “a systematic rethinking about the way we 
do business” was the realization that the kind of counterterrorism that we are facing 
in the 21st century is a task that is much broader than any national security issue 
previously experienced by the United States (Steinberg, 4.34).  As a result, it 
became clear to a number of witnesses that the information and expertise needed to 
fight the war against terrorism was “not going to be picked up in traditional collection 
systems” (Gannon, 4.52).  To this end, a number of witnesses called for “an 
approach that reflects this far flung, highly decentralized universe of critical actors” 
(Steinberg, 4.34).  Suggestions for being more inclusive in the engagement against 
terrorism included unprecedented involvement from the following:   
1. Local level police departments (Roemer & Jenkins, 1.1.302-303). 
2. Front line employees who need to use information to screen people who 
come to the United States (Fine, 1.2.13) and need to use initiative and 
their brains to do the job they are trying to do (Dzakovic, 2.1.139). 
3. Linguists (Harman, 2.1.41).  
4. Individuals with the worst kinds of backgrounds, the worst kinds of 
criminal and humanitarian deficiencies (Deutch, 4.33), bad guys who 
know a lot about what is going on in their respective communities 
(Thompson, 6.18). 
 155
5. The private sector (Brill, 1.2.126). 
6. Academia (Jouejati, 3.58). 
7. The public (Gunaratna, 3.25). 
System resilience, according to 9/11 Public Hearing witnesses is not just a task of 
government.  Participation “seriously done” (Wheatley, 1994, p. 64) provides the 
multiplicity of viewpoints, perspectives, and interpretations that are needed to make 
sense of the world and build system heedfulness.  Designing structures that foster 
inclusiveness, participation, and diverse contributions is an opportunity uniquely held 
by leaders and one for which leadership should be held accountable.  
Leadership Practice:  Loosening Controls on Engagement, Participation, and Action 
 Mechanistic organizations draw boundaries everywhere.  Examples include  
boxes on organizational charts, chains of command, job titles, and position 
descriptions.  Each of these distinctions aims to limit individuals’ participation, 
responsibility, authority, and accountability.  With each designation, workers are 
further fragmented. The accountant, for example, is to bring his analytic mind to his 
work but, for the most part, his emotions and intuitions are to be restrained, if 
present at all, in the workplace.  Those who step out of their designated places risk a 
range of disciplinary actions, including reprimands, loss of merit increases or 
opportunities for promotion, and dismissal.  This selective recruitment of parts of 
human beings to perform clearly specified tasks robotizes the work place.  In this 
distinctly anti-human context (Senge, 1990; Wheatley, 1994), it is not unusual or 
surprising that individuals are unwilling to look beyond the performance of their own 
jobs, to the survival and well being of the whole organization.   
 The survival and growth of organizations guided by the spirit of autopoiesis, 
in contrast to mechanistic organizations, depend on increased levels of participation 
from individual system members.  The concept “Think globally; act locally” captures 
the essence of these organizations.  Not to be confused with previous misconceptions 
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of empowerment (i.e., individual workers were to be set loose to do what they 
thought was best for the customer or the organization), these organizations build 
resilience by: 
1. Encouraging autonomy, constrained only by the guiding principles or 
identity of the organization. 
2. Holding individuals accountable for the survival and viability of the 
organization.  
In line with the holistic perspective that system thinking offers, the focus is on 
honoring, appreciating, and engaging the totality of the individuals.   
 In this sort of individual-organization relationship, leaders foster ownership.  
By inviting the whole individual to engage in circumstances greater than the day-to-
day routine tasks of a job, leaders foster personal emotional attachments to the well 
being of the whole organization.  This kind of participation and ownership can be 
seen in the performance of two witnesses who appeared before the 9/11 Public 
Hearing.  Mr. Melendez Perez, the immigration inspector at the Orlando airport who 
persistently questioned a Saudi traveler despite the possibility of reprimands and 
disciplinary action, may have prevented a twentieth 9/11 hijacker from entering the 
country.  And General Arnold, risking court martial, scrambled aircraft on September 
11 without obtaining required clearances.  In each case, the heroism of these 
individuals on 9/11 looks different from the heroes of a mechanistic system where 
heroism is defined in terms of following the rules, and individuals such as Mr. 
Melendez Perez and General Arnold would be perceived as, if not reprimanded for, 
being loose, uncontrollable cannons.   
 Not only do mechanistic organizations restrict the kinds of knowledge, skills, 
and talents that individuals are to contribute to the organization, they also keep a 
tight rein on interactions among individuals.  This can be seen clearly in 
organizations with silos and rigid chains of command.  For example, protocols in 
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some 21st century organizations require Employee A to transmit a message to 
Employee B by having it travel “up” A’s chain of command and then down B’s chain 
of command, until it reaches Employee B.   
In organizations guided by the spirit of autopoiesis, the issues are not 
controls on the contributions of its members and flows of information, but dynamic 
connectedness (Wheatley, 1994, p. 23).  With its focus on continuous learning and 
change, these organizations strive to make connections that previously did not exist.  
In language frequently used in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts, these 
organizations strive to connect the dots (Armitage, 8.2.185; Ashcroft, 10.1.142, 166, 
166; Baird, 1.2.146; Ben-Veniste, 11.1.146, 12.1.114; Clark, 8.2.121; Cleland, 
2.1.18; Fetchet, 1.1.218; Fielding, 10.1.19; Gorton, 4.8-9; Hamilton, 8.2.189, 199; 
Kerr, 4.61; Kerrey, 11.1.147, 11.2.108; Lehman, 12.1.117, 12.2.48; Lieberman, 
2.1.15; Reno, 10.1.62; Rice, 9.20; Roemer, 10.1.110; Rumsfeld, 8.1.133).  
However, in the case of autopoietic systems, the focus is not on collecting sufficient 
dots of data from the environment in order to act with certainty.  The dots to be 
connected are the dots of information held by individuals within the various parts of 
the system.  “These unseen connections between what were previously thought to be 
separate entities,” according to Wheatley (1994) “are the fundamental elements” of 
new knowledge (p. 10).  As a result, with circular flows of information throughout the 
system, systems can connect various understandings of small fluctuations that vary 
from the norm (Wheatley, 1994, p. 19) and increase the number and complexity of 
its interpretations of the environment.  These circular flows of information can be 
likened to a train on a toy railroad, circling through its recurring journey (Senge, 
1990, p. 76).  Coursing through the system in recurring loops, the sense that has 
been made of bits or dots of information can become more complex. That is, 
sensemaking “grows in strength” (Wheatley, 1994, p. 19) as it continuously informs, 
and is informed by, those who are participating in the conversation.  These circular 
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flows of information, according to Senge (1990), are “reciprocal flows of influence” 
(p. 75).  In this way, systems can connect dots and increase the variety and 
complexity of its knowledge base.  That is, they can build “the variety that regulates 
the variety in the environment” (Buckley, 1967, p. 495)—that is, the variety that is 
fundamental to system heedfulness, resiliency, and viability.  Such opportunities can 
be found in the establishment of interdisciplinary programs, cross-functional teams, 
task forces, and cross training.  Fundamental to the success of these efforts is the 
organization’s ability to fully engage its workers.   
 Also fundamental to the development of the system’s knowledge base is the 
development of its members.  Foremost among the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
that are needed for autopoietic processes are:  ongoing development of general 
knowledge and skills, in contrast to the precise knowledge or skills that are needed 
for one’s current position; the development of a system consciousness, one that 
focuses on the whole of the organization, rather than the innumerable fragments 
that we have been enculturated to believe and see in our organizations; and the 
development of skills (e.g., facilitating groups and listening to others) that build 
strong relationships and foster learning (Senge, 1990; Wheatley, 1994).   
 Organizational leaders hold a unique opportunity for developing people, 
processes and structures that develop system-wide heedful interrelating.  
Opportunities for building heedful interrelating can be found in:  
1. Designing organizations that more fully engage the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities that individuals bring to their positions. 
2. Creating opportunities for circular flows of information through the 
organization so that its members can continuously contribute to the 
variety and complexity of the system’s stock of knowledge (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966) and learn from others. 
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3. Expanding the potential of the organization by expanding the knowledge 
and skill base of its members beyond the requirements of their current 
positions. 
The Role of Leaders:  Legitimizing Ambivalence in the Workplace 
Legitimizing ambivalence in the workplace 
• Admitting, “We don’t know.” 
• Asking, “What is new?” 
 
 The two previous sections have focused on more commonly discussed topics 
in organizational development, including providing guiding principles for 
organizational action, fostering inclusiveness and diversity, and more fully engaging 
workers in the workplace.  The focus of these discussions has been a realignment of 
these frequently discussed practices to the newer view of organizations as 
autopoietic systems.  This section continues to explore the application of autopoietic 
concepts to organizational practices.  In this case, the focus is not on re-defining old 
labels, but on introducing a concept that is, for the most part, novel to current 
organizational practitioners.  This is the concept of “legitimizing doubt” (Weick, 2001, 
pp. 91-102) or ambivalence in the workplace (Weick et al., 2005, p. 414).   
 Sensemaking models, such as the ESR Sensemaking Sequence, highlight the 
significance of ambivalence for systems whose environments are dynamic, complex 
and ever changing.  What these models reveal are the potential for system learning 
and autonomy that occurs during system-environment exchanges.  These exchanges 
are made meaningful by the system when it retrospectively notices, brackets, labels, 
and categorizes these experiences, using mental models acquired over time to make 
sense of the experiences.  However, only with ambivalent use of previous knowledge 
are systems able both “to benefit from lessons learned and to update either their 
actions or meanings in ways that adapt to changes in the system and its context” 
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(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 414).  For systems that reside in complex 
environments, ambivalence is fundamental to continued learning, resilience, and 
viability.       
 Mechanistic organizations view the world as stable and knowable. Thus, in 
these sorts of organizations, we find routines, standardized practices, and searches 
for actionable intelligence—that is, a search for sufficient amounts and specificity of 
information in order to act with certainty, accuracy, and efficiency.  In contrast, 
organizations guided by the spirit of autopoiesis view the world as unfolding events 
that require an ongoing updating of the system’s experiences with the environment. 
In this updating of its experiences, the system builds the variety and complexity of 
its stock of knowledge. The focus of these organizations is not the day-to-day 
application of what is known, but an ambivalent use of its stock of knowledge, 
honoring both what is known and what must also be created.  This is the crux that 
distinguishes mechanistic and autopoietic views of organizations.  One assumes a 
stable environment, and relies, for the most part, on what is already known, and the 
other sets forth as a priority the ongoing development of plausible explanations 
(stories) of its environment.  
 In autopoietic organizations, “Newness [is played up]. . . . What’s new is the 
context . . . . What’s new is a premium on updating [our explanations or stories of 
the system’s context or environment]” (Weick, 2001, p. 94).  Through circular flows 
of information, previous experiences with the environment are validated, and the 
organization benefits from lessons learned, or previous experiences are reworked or 
updated “in relation to unanticipated ideas that are conceived, shaped, and 
transformed under the special conditions of a current performance” (Weick, 2001, p. 
97). This flexible treatment of previous experiences is about “making something 
[new] out of previous experience, practice and knowledge” (Weick, 2001, p. 97), and 
can only be accomplished through ambivalent treatment of current experiences.  
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 The variety and complexity of stories that are available to the system are its 
resources for managing flux in the environment, resilience and viability.  The 
challenge, however, is this new way of working for workers who have been 
enculturated in the mechanistic wellspring of American culture.  In mechanistic 
organizations, managers think and workers do.  According to Tannen (1998), 
Americans regard doubt as “synonymous with intellectual inquiry, a sign of 
intelligence” (p. 273).  However, rigid roles in the workplace “disable” and “cow” 
many; paralyzed by roles, many do no participate; fearful, many offer only the 
meekest agreement (Senge, 1999, xviii-xix).   
 As a result, a role for which organizational leaders should be held accountable 
is establishing ambivalence as a system-wide priority and a new way of working in 
the complex, dynamic environment of the 21st century.  The goal, in the words of 
Weick et al. (2005), is system-wide “acting thinkingly” (p. 412); that is, members 
simultaneously use trusted frameworks to interpret experience, “yet mistrust those 
very same frameworks by testing new frameworks and new interpretations” (p. 
412).  By “legitimizing doubt,” or circulating an attitude of ambivalence in the 
workplace (Weick, 2001, pp. 91-102), leaders position organizations for ongoing 
sensemaking, in contrast to the set-in-stone decision making that typifies 
mechanistic organizations.  Leadership practices that foster system-wide 
ambivalence, sensemaking, creativeness, and resilience include:  
1. A mixture of puzzlement, ambivalence, and honesty.  Autopoiesis assumes 
a world that is unknowable and unpredictable.  In this kind of world, a 
world that unfolds, leaders approach life “from a creative as opposed to 
reactive view” (Senge, 1990, p. 141).       
2. Admitting when they don’t know. Talking about ambivalence “may open 
people’s minds somewhat, but actions always speak louder than words” 
(Senge, 1990, p. 173).  There’s nothing more powerful that leaders can 
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do to legitimize doubt, foster acting thinkingly, and nurture ambivalence 
than admitting, “We don’t know.”      
3. Saturating the organization with the question What is new? by articulating 
it as a guiding principle for interpreting and responding to the 
environment; designing processes that engage a diversity of perspectives; 
and developing people on this new way of interpreting and responding to 
the environment. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and other major human-made 
national disasters (for example, the Columbia and Challenger accidents) have been 
attributed to institutional failures, with no explanation of the ways in which 
individuals were responsible and accountable for these events.  This approach is 
easier to understand when we take into account the mechanistic view that informs 
every aspect of our lives, including how we think about and manage organizations.  
Mechanistic organizations standardize the way in which individuals are to contribute 
on a day-to-day basis.  Through practices such as policies, procedures, position 
descriptions, and disciplinary and reward programs, behavior is habitualized, 
thickened, and hardened (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 59), attaining such a 
firmness in practice and consciousness that it is assumed that this is the only way 
things can be done.  This way of doing things “becomes real in an ever more massive 
way and it can no longer be changed so readily” by individuals (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966, p. 59).  In our institutions, a world of habituated thoughts and actions, it 
appears that only the massive workings of the institution can be held accountable for 
failures when they occur.   
 Mechanistic practices, however, are being challenged.  Assuming they reside 
in stable environments that have minimal impact on day-to-day organizational 
operations, mechanistically-structured organizations have institutionalized routine 
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practices as a way of fostering organizational stability and viability.  Increasingly, 
however, there is a recognition that technology is creating dynamic, ever-changing 
organizational contexts that cannot be sufficiently theorized, or responded to, by 
mechanism.   
 With Bertalanffy’s application of an open system’s approach to organizations 
in the mid-1950s, many developments in organizational theory have been built on 
the principle that organizations, like organisms, must achieve appropriate relations 
with their environments if they are to survive.  To date, however, many of the 
advances have occurred in the theorizing of organizations as autopoietic systems, 
while practical applications of open systems theory continue to focus on mechanistic 
controls.  We find this, for example, in the 9/11 Public Hearing Transcripts.  The two 
dominant recommendations by witnesses for deterring future terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. homeland focused on controlling performance by reorganizing the Intelligence 
Community and implementing a rigid performance management system.   
 Advocates of autopoiesis encourage a different view of the world, one that 
recognizes that organizational resilience requires not only a view of the dynamic 
environments within which 21st century organizations reside, but also a new way of 
working within this context.  Suggestions that align practices with a view of 
organizations as autopoietically-structured systems include: 
1. Saturating the organization with self-referential principles to guide action 
that supports the viability of the systems identity and integrity. 
2. Loosening the controls on engagement, participation, and action and 
holding individuals accountable for viability of the system. 
3. Fostering ambivalence in the workplace. 
These suggestions, moreover, are not new concepts to organizational 
practitioners who follow organizational theory.  Efforts to implement these 
suggestions in organizations include the development of mission, vision, and value 
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statements; the implementation of cross training and job rotations; and the use of 
task forces.  But the temptation to control people and activities is difficult to resist.  
For example, in one organization where a cross-functional team was established to 
implement an institution-wide financial system, members were assigned full-time to 
the project but were given dual reporting relationships to both the project manager 
and the director of their functional areas.  These reporting relationships made it 
difficult throughout the life of the project for members to support decisions that were 
in the best interest of the institution, rather than their functional areas.  This 
spotlights the current challenge of 21st century organizations.  To tap into the 
potential that autopoiesis offers organizational practitioners, new views of the world, 
organizations, and leadership roles and responsibilities are needed.   
 Given the fear of relinquishing control, a fundamental concept of mechanism, 
it is unlikely that managers are willing to convert immediately to a new way of 
managing that involves relinquishing familiar controls. However, advances in building 
organizational resilience can be achieved by focusing on lessening the controls that 
dominate current practices and infiltrating current practices with those that are 
informed by autopoiesis.  This can be done by holding leaders accountable for 
identifying and realizing opportunities for developing system-wide consciousness, 
loosening controls, and fostering ambivalence.  Questions that can be used by 
leaders to infiltrate organizations with autopoietic practices include:   
1. How, and where, can I make ever-present a few self-referential principles 
for guiding individual actions?  
2. Where can I pilot a program that broadens the knowledge base and 
participation of organizational members?   
3. Where can I facilitate circular flows of information that allow for updating 
of experiences and diversity of perspectives? 
 165
4. On what projects, with what teams, can we instill ambivalence as a part of 
our processes?  Are we always asking:  What don’t we know?  What 
mental models are constraining our perspective?  What other mental 
models can we apply to this experience?  What is new?  What is unusual?  
What seems unimportant?  What doesn’t feel right?   
Leaders, actively engaged in the creation of system-wide consciousness, “heedful 
interrelating” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, pp. 357-381) and “acting thinkingly” (Weick 
et al., 2005, p. 412) can leverage efforts to build system-wide accountability and 
organizational resiliency.   
A challenge for leaders, however, is to step outside their current sensemaking 
processes and structures. One way to address this challenge is to interject 
alternative perspectives and language into the organization’s sensemaking 
processes.  For example, mechanistic organizational structures such as functional 
silos and rigid performance systems are constructed in feminist theories as 
masculine structures that serve to homogenize the workforce, centralize control and 
power, and constrain the participation and contributions of many of its employees.  
Injecting the perspective and voice of feminist theory into sensemaking processes 
can foster an ambivalent view of our current interpretations and responses to the 
environment, as well as our processes for generating this stock of knowledge.  
 Diverse perspectives, when they are part of an organization’s sensemaking 
processes, create opportunities to build the variety of knowledge, skills, and abilities 
that is requisite for systems that reside in complex, dynamic environments.  It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that the autopoietic sensemaking model 
presented in this dissertation is not a transmission model of communication.  
Therefore, the intent is not a one-way street of communication where various 
theories inform organizational practice.  True to the theory of autopoiesis, the intent 
is to inject the voice and perspective of scholarship (e.g., feminism, autopoiesis) into 
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organizational sensemaking practices where, through circular flows of communication 
and heedful inter-relating, each informs and is informed by the other.  For example, 
research on autopoietic systems from the field of biology informs, and is informed 
by, the sensemaking practices of organizations guided by the spirit of autopoiesis.   
In this way, learning opportunities are created that enrich individuals, the system, 
and the scholarship informing them. Creating a complex, dynamic, intelligent 
system, for the purpose of building system-wide accountability and resilience, is the 
unique responsibility of leaders.  For this, leaders should be held accountable.   
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Appendix A:  Dates of 9/11 Public Hearings and URLS for PDF Records  
The first public hearing:3 
 March 31, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing1/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-03-31.pdf) 
 April 1, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing1/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-04-01.pdf) 
The second public hearing: 
 May 22, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-22.pdf) 
 May 23, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.pdf) 
The third public hearing on “Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World”: 
 July 9, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing3/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-07-09.pdf) 
The fourth public hearing on “Intelligence and the War on Terrorism”: 
 October 14, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing4/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-10-14.pdf) 
The fifth public hearing on “Emergency Preparedness”:  
 November 19, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing5/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-11-19.pdf) 
The sixth public hearing on “Security and Liberty”: 
 December 8, 2003 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing6/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2003-12-08.pdf) 
The seventh public hearing on “Borders, Transportation, and Managing Risk”: 
 January 26, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing7/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-01-26.pdf) 
  
                                                 
3 Dates and titles for the 9/11 Public Hearings were taken from the official website of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States  
(http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/index.htm). No titles were given to the 
first and second hearings.   
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January 27, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing7/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-01-27.pdf) 
The eighth public hearing on “Counterterrorism Policy”: 
 March 23, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing8/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-23.pdf) 
 March 24, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing8/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-24.pdf) 
The ninth public hearing, with testimony form Dr. Condoleezza Rice: 
 April 8, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing9/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-08.pdf) 
The tenth public hearing on “Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community: 
 April 13, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing10/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-13.pdf) 
 April 14, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing10/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-14.pdf) 
The eleventh public hearing on “Emergency Response”:  
 May 18, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing11/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-05-18.pdf) 
 May 19, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing11/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-05-19.pdf) 
The twelfth public hearing on “The 9/11 Plot” and “National Crisis Management” 
 June 16, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-16.pdf) 
` June 17, 2004 (http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.pdf) 
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Appendix B:  Members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States 
 
Thomas H. Kean, Chair 
Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair 
Richard Ben-Veniste 
Fred F. Fielding 
Jamie S. Gorelick 
Slade Gorton 
Bob Kerrey 
John F. Lehman 
Timothy J. Roemer 
James R. Thompson 
Joseph M. Cleland (Hearings 1-4, resigned December 2003) 
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Appendix C:  List of Witnesses Cited in this Document 
 
Richard Armitage   Deputy Secretary of State4 
 
Larry Arnold   Commander, First Air Force and Commander  
 
of the Continental U.S. North American Aero-space  
 
Defense Command (NORAD) Region  
 
John Ashcroft   Attorney General 
 
Zoe Baird   Markle Foundation 
 
Stewart A. Baker  former General Counsel, National Security Agency  
 
William P. Barr  former Attorney General of the United States   
 
Michael R. Bloomberg Mayor, City of New York  
 
Steven Brill   Author, After: How America Confronted the September  
 
12 Era  
 
Daniel Byman  Georgetown University  
 
Mike Canavan  former Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation  
 
Security, FAA 
 
Richard Clarke  former National Counterterrorism Coordinator, NSC   
 
Jon Corzine    Senator, New Jersey   
 
John M.Deutch  former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy  
 
Secretary of Defense 
 
Gerald Dillingham   Director, Civil Aviation Issues, General Accounting Office  
 
Bodgan Dzakovic   Civil Aviation Security Inspector, Transportation Security  
 
Agency  
 
Mamoun Fandy   United States Institute of Peace  
 
                                                 
4 The titles listed for witnesses cited in this document were taken from the 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States (National Commission, 2004). Each title suggests the role 
that the Commissioners expected the witnesses to assume during the Hearings, and 
the expertise each was to provide.     
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Mary Fetchet    Voices of September 11  
 
Glenn Fine   Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice  
 
Cathal L. Flynn  former Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security,  
 
FAA 
 
John Gannon   Staff Director, House Select Committee on Homeland 
 
    Security  
 
Jane Garvey    former fAdministrator, Federal Aviation Administration 
 
Mark Gasiorowski   Louisiana State University 
 
Porter Goss   Representative, Florida   
 
Bob Graham   Senator, Florida   
 
Rohan Gunaratna   Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore;  
 
author of Inside al Qaeda, Global Network of Terror 
 
John J. Hamre  former Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 
Jane Harman   Representative, California  
 
Brian Jenkins   RAND Corporation   
 
Murhaf Jouejati  George Washington Institute  
 
Richard Kerr    former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence   
 
Mindy Kleinberg,   September 11 Advocates  
 
Randy Larsen   Institute for Homeland Security  
 
Frank Lautenberg  Senator, New Jersey 
 
Joseph Lieberman  Senator, California 
 
John MacGafin  former Associate Deputy Director of Operations, 
 
    Central Intelligence Agency 
 
Claudio Manno  Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Transportation  
 
Security Administration  
 
James May   Air Transport Association of America 
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John McCain   Senator, Arizona 
 
Mary O. McCarthy  former National Intelligence Officer for Warning  
 
Kenneth Mead  Inspector General, Department of Transportation  
  
Jose E. Melendez-Perez Inspector, Customs and Border Protection,  
 
    Department of Homeland Security  
 
Judith A. Miller   former General Counsel, Department of Defense 
Appendix C:  (Continued) 
 
Norman Mineta   Secretary of Transportation    
 
Robert Mueller  Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 
Nancy Pelosi   Representative, California   
 
Stephen Push   Families of September 11   
 
 
Magnus Ranstorp  University of St. Andrews    
 
Janet Reno    former Attorney General  
 
Condoleezza Rice   National Security Advisor     
 
Marc Rotenberg   Electronic Privacy Information Center 
 
Mary A. Ryan   former Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs 
 
Mary Schiavo   former Inspector General, Department of Transportation  
 
James R. Schlesinger former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of  
 
Defense Intelligence and Secretary of Defense 
  
Stephen J. Schulhofer New York University  
 
Charles Schumer  Senator, New York   
 
Christopher Shays  Representative, Connecticut  
 
Richard Shelby  Senator, Alabama  
 
Craig Sincock   United States Army (retired)  
 
Abraham D. Sofaer  Hoover Institution  
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James B. Steinberg  The Brookings Institute and former Deputy National  
 
Security Advisor, 1996-2000 
 
George Tenet   Director of Central Intelligence   
 
Larry D. Thompson   former Deputy Attorney General  
 
Peter F. Verga  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland  
 
Defense, Department of Defense 
 
Harry Waizer    survivor, Cantor Fitzgerald, LP 
 
Michael Wermuth  RAND Corporation  
Appendix (Continued) 
 
Randall Yim    Director, National Preparedness Team, General  
 
Accounting Office 
 
James Ziglar   former Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization  
 
Services, Department of Justice  
 
 
Commission Staff cited in this Document 
 
Philip Zelikow (Executive Director) 
 
Susan Ginsburg 
 
John Raidt 
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